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Summary 
 
Human perception and cognition processing are not universal. Culture and 
experience markedly modulate visual information sampling in humans. Cross-cultural 
studies comparing between Western Caucasians (WCs) and East Asians (EAs) have 
shown cultural differences in behaviour and neural activities in regarding to 
perception and cognition. Particularly, a number of studies suggest a local perceptual 
bias for Westerners (WCs) and a global bias for Easterners (EAs): WCs perceive most 
efficiently the salient information in the focal object; as a contrast EAs are biased 
toward the information in the background. Such visual processing bias has been 
observed in a wide range of tasks and stimuli. However, the underlying neural 
mechanisms of such perceptual tunings, especially the temporal dynamic of different 
information coding, have yet to be clarified. 
Here, in the first two experiments I focus on the perceptual function of the diverse eye 
movement strategies between WCs and EAs. Human observers engage in different 
eye movement strategies to gather facial information: WCs preferentially fixate on the 
eyes and mouth, whereas EAs allocate their gaze relatively more on the center of the 
face. By employing a fixational eye movement paradigm in Study 1 and 
electroencephalographic (EEG) recording in study 2, the results confirm the cultural 
differences in spatial-frequency information tuning and suggest the different 
perceptual functions of preferred eye movement pattern as a function of culture. The 
third study makes use of EEG adaptation and hierarchical visual stimulus to access 
the cultural tuning in global/local processing. Culture diversity driven by selective 
attention is revealed in the early sensory stage. 
The results here together showed the temporal dynamic of cultural perceptual 
diversity. Cultural distinctions in the early time course are driven by selective 
attention to global information in EAs, whereas late effects are modulated by detail 
processing of local information in WC observers.  
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1 Introduction  
 
During my high school year, a collection of 20th century architecture in my hometown 
was designated by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) as a World Cultural Heritage Site. Now known as the “Kaiping 
Diaolou and Villages”, it is a group of multi-storeyed watchtowers mainly built with 
financial support from the villagers who travelled abroad, mostly in South Asia and 
North America. Each of them is a combination of Chinese and Western architectural 
styles in rather unique manner. At the time, this was quite a significant event for a 
small southern Chinese city like my hometown. The local government offered a free 
tour to all students as a general education session. Growing up around these old 
buildings, I was actually amazed by the stories behind all the old stones and 
sculptures: how my ancestors began to construct these thick walls to fight against 
frequent heavy floods and bandits; how the older generation struggled to survive in a 
foreign land, yet still were tied to their roots; how these buildings underwent attack 
from guns and cannons and are still standing… It was the first time I encountered the 
concept of “culture”, and truly experienced its meaning. 
A couple of years later, I moved to a big city for my undergraduate course, and started 
to travel around. Meeting people from different places, I slowly realised that culture is 
more than old buildings and what people do during festivals. Culture is in the food we 
eat, in the clothes we wear, and more importantly, in those things we cannot 
physically see: language, religion, values, social conventions, etc. These differences 
even exist in regular daily interaction. I am still surprised at how people react to a 
similar situation, so distinctly dependent on their cultural background. 
The differences extend even further. For almost a century, social scientists such as 
anthropologists and social psychologists have examined how culturally specific 
activities and cultural practice shape individuals’ responses to social information. 
During the last 20 years, researchers in cognitive science and neuroscience have 
discovered that culture even impacts on basic cognitive process, such as attention and 
visual perception. These results are surprisingly contradictory to the universal 
assumptions of low-level information processing (Nisbett et al. 2001). 
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Built upon the previous findings of cultural diversity in visual perception, the work I 
have undertaken during my Ph.D. aims to investigate when and how culture affects 
information processing. Given the complexity of the concept “Culture” and its 
ambiguity among different research domains, the opening pages of my thesis will 
specify the meaning of culture being applied in all the studies. In the first section, I 
will discuss the definition of culture and its distinction with regard to race and 
nationality. A review of the behavioural and neuroimaging data on cultural 
differences in social values and high-level social cognition will follow. In the third 
section, I will summaries cultural modulation in attention and perception, according 
to various visual categories. Specifically, theoretical frameworks including 
individualist-collectivistic dichotomy, independent-interdependent self-construal, and 
analytic-holistic cognitive style will be discussed in the introduction. A brief section 
on the methods employed throughout this work (i.e. electroencephalogram and 
fixational eye movement) will precede the original empirical studies included in this 
thesis.  
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1.1 Culture: A dynamic Concept 
 
Preamble  
Here in the opening chapter, I will discuss some key incongruities in the definition of 
culture. After conceptualizing the core foundations of culture, I will provide my own 
definition. The distinction between culture and nationality, race would also be discussed.   
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1.1.1 Define Culture 
 
Culture as a concept is essential in daily human life and scientific practice. It has been 
widely used in popular expression, such as “corporate culture”, “Hip-hop culture,” or 
“preserve our culture and traditions”. Besides public discourse, we often hear it in a 
political context. For instance, it is widely used in policies involving immigration or 
minorities, as it usually triggers strong emotions (Fox and King 2002). Moreover, 
culture has been an important concept in many academic fields. It has been studied in 
many domains including anthropology, sociology, the humanities, linguistics, 
psychology and other social sciences. For example, culture is considered as the core 
concept of anthropology (Fox and King 2002; Kroeber and Kluckhohn 1952). 
English anthropologist Edward B. Tylor gave the very first definition of human culture 
in modern social science (Tylor 1871). As he wrote in the opening of Primitive Culture, 
in 1871: “Culture, or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex 
whole that includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other 
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.” However, after being 
studied in various fields for nearly 150 years, culture is still an amorphous concept 
with little consensus across or even within research domains (Kroeber and 
Kluckhohn 1952). For example, Kroeber & Kluckhohn (1952) listed over 160 
definitions of culture with little overlapping emphases. 
There is a number of primary divergences of the definition and the usage of the 
concept of culture in social science (Fox and King 2002; Wyer et al. 2009). One of the 
main difficulties is that a broad range of social activities and phenomena can be 
considered as “cultural”. For example, definitions similar to E. B. Taylor’s took an 
inclusive approach that includes both the material worlds (such as products, 
technology, and social activities) and the internal status (e.g. symbols, beliefs, and 
ideas). Other definitions tend to focus on ideational factors only, such as values and 
representation. For instance, Goodenough (1957) defined culture as ‘‘whatever it is 
one has to know or believe in order to operate in a manner acceptable to [society’s] 
members’’. Overall, the disagreements on the definition of culture could be 
summarized as the following: 1) whether culture is a static entity according to 
circumscribed geographic boundaries (i.e., Hofstede 1984; Hofstede and Hofstede 
2001; LeVine 2001) or a dynamic, changing character (i.e., Hong and Chiu 2001; Hong 
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et al. 2000; Oyserman and Sorensen 2009; Tsui et al. 2009); 2) whether culture should 
be conceptualised as a whole (i.e., Bond and Leung 2009; Schwartz 1992; Schwartz 
2009) or as a collection of concepts or knowledge (i.e., Chiu and Hong 2007; 
Oyserman and Sorensen 2009; Triandis 2001, 2009); 3) whether culture exists 
outside of the individual in a social environment (i.e., Bond and Leung 2009; Hong and 
Mallorie 2004; Schwartz 1992; Schwartz 2009) or is located in the individual’s mind 
and actions (i.e., Wan and Chiu 2009). 
Despite these discrepancies in regarding to the properties of culture, psychologists 
can generally agree upon two initial assumptions (Han et al. 2013). Firstly, there are 
similarities among a group of individuals, which are not part of their innate biological 
condition (Murdock 1932; Nisbett 1990). These mutual characteristics have 
developed over thousands of years within a given cultural group, and have become 
the core content of culture. The general features among cultural members can be 
internal (e.g. knowledge) or external (e.g. social behaviour). Some theories focus on 
the internal properties. For example, Keesing (1981) characterised culture as a shared 
system of competence consisting of people’s “theory of what [their] fellows know, 
believe and mean, of the code being followed, the game being played”. Similarly, Hong 
suggested that members from the same culture share networks of knowledge 
(meanings, routines of thinking, and the way of interacting with others), which are 
crucial for communication (Barth 2002; Chiu and Hong 2007; Hong 2009; Hong and 
Chiu 2001). Other perspectives took a more general approach and considered both 
internal and external features. For example, some social scientists defined culture as 
people’s shared representations of reality that include customs, values, beliefs, 
behavioural scripts, daily interaction, social convention and institutions (Pelto and 
Pelto 1975; Romney et al. 1996). Moreover, few cultural psychologists further defined 
culture operationally as statistical norms of the shared internal features. For example, 
few theories considered the average personal characteristics such as values, beliefs, 
and personal attributes as culture (Wan and Chiu 2009). 
Importantly, these shared meanings or information are distinguishable among 
cultures. Thus, they can be valuable delimiters to effectively distinguish one group 
from another, creating what has been referred to as cultural speciation (Goodall and 
Berman 1999). 
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The second initial assumption is that the shared cultural features transmit from one 
individual to another, non-genetically, through social learning (Kashima 2009; 
Kashima et al. 2008). Humans are born without predisposition to any particular 
culture, but rather have the potential and capability to acquire, and even to create 
culture (Harris 1999). In this sense, individual development could be viewed as a 
process of obtaining and embodying cultural belief systems or behaviour patterns 
from their surroundings (Rogoff 2003). From the very beginning of their lives, people 
engage in the complex composition of materials and social rules or practices, as well 
as folk beliefs, of their respective local communities. As suggested by Han et al. 
(2013), people adjust their value system and adapt their behaviour to meet the 
standards of the society. Such cultural knowledge development might even change the 
brain structurally and functionally, to become closely attuned to the surrounding 
socio-cultural environment (Wexler 2006). 
The assumption that cultural knowledge is socially transmitted has a crucial effect in 
psychology and cultural neuroscience research. Firstly, people from the same cultural 
groups can be quite heterogeneous in terms of the values and beliefs they acquire. 
Secondly, an individual may change his/her cultural values and beliefs as a result of 
experience (such as emigrating from his/her native country). This is particularly true 
in contemporary societies, where cultural exchanges occur often and rapidly. People 
in modern societies are usually exposed, sometimes deeply, to other cultures’ 
practices and beliefs in multiple socio-cultural contexts. Multiple cultural systems 
may become part of any single individual. At times this may require an individual to 
switch to and fro between different cultural systems during interactions, depending 
on particular contexts of social encounters (Hong et al. 2000). As for researches 
sampling participants from different cultures, it is important to limit the confusion 
caused by multi-cultural experience. For example, some studies used questionnaires 
to select participants with minimal experience of other cultures (Jack et al. 2012b). 
In summary, there are similarities among individuals within a geographically isolated 
area. These internal similarities are independent of human biological conditions, and 
represent a dynamic concept of the socio-cultural environment. They are developed 
over a long period of time in a society, and acquired by the individual through social 
learning. Moreover, these internal features interact with the external environment to 
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create a complex and dynamic social atmosphere where cultural information can be 
transmitted. 
It is worth noting that both assumptions are taken from a subjective perspective. 
While some researchers took this perspective and defined culture directly as a set of 
shared values or knowledge systems (e.g., Hong and Chiu 2001), other theories 
tended to see culture as the external environment where such internal similarities are 
developed (e.g., Han et al. 2013). The opinion on whether such subjective cultural 
information should be the main body of culture deeply influences the methodology 
and the approaches chosen during experiments. As summarised by Kashima (2009), 
cultural researchers who focus on internal properties usually consider culture as a 
mediator, or something that could/should be manipulated. Such approaches either 
actively change the “level” of cultural value through social priming (i.e., culture 
priming research), or using questionnaires to measure cultural values as mediating 
variables (e.g., Hong et al. 2000; Kühnen and Oyserman 2002; Trafimow et al. 1991). 
As an alternative, approaches that hold an external view compare individuals from 
different cultures – mainly between Western Caucasian and East Asian - in beliefs, 
attitudes, and values as well as associated social behaviour (e.g., Leung and Bond 
2004; Leung et al. 2002; Schwartz 1992; Schwartz 1994; Triandis 1995). In these so-
called cross-cultural studies, culture is usually being controlled as an independent 
variable. Such approaches are more closely related to “natural science”- like (Kashima 
2009). 
Despite the aforementioned differences in perspective and the absence of a genuine 
definition of culture, a general practice in culture studies has long been established. 
Indeed, by conceptualizing how an individual relates to the in-group and out-groups, a 
unique social characteristic could be identified in one and the same cultural 
population.  Such characteristic could be related to some distinctive sensorimotor 
tendencies (e.g., the span of visual attention, biases in cognition and categorization, 
styles of learning) under prevailing condition. Importantly, the cultural profile of the 
group is usually defined by the conceptualized social aspects, with the sensorimotor 
behaviour biases being treated as the effect of culture on cognition (e.g., Nisbett and 
Miyamoto 2005; Norenzayan et al. 2002; Varnum et al. 2010). While research subjects 
such as in sociology and anthropology aim to characterize given societies into 
different cultures, the primary object of cultural psychology or culture neuroscience is 
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to investigate how these high-level social-cultural characteristics influence the 
configurations of perception and cognition, and how they further shape internalized 
behaviour patterns and other mental functions. Importantly, the fundamental of 
cognitive processes might not be reliably identified on the basis of research and 
theory that are developed within a single social context (Wyer 2009). By comparing 
observers sampled from one culture to others, researchers can distinguish to what 
extent such configurations should be considered to be fundamental. 
In the current thesis, I took the same approach as cross-cultural research. Cultural 
differences in human mental processes and underlying cognitive mechanisms have 
been investigated extensively under this approach in the past two decades. From this 
line of research, theoretical frameworks such as individualistic versus collectivistic 
values, independent self-construals versus interdependent self-construals, and 
analytic versus holistic cognitive tendencies have emerged to guide empirical studies 
of cultural discrepancy in human perception, cognition and emotion (Kitayama and 
Cohen 2010; Nisbett et al. 2001; Varnum et al. 2010). Such theoretical frameworks 
will be discussed in the next two chapters. Cultural psychology takes the view that 
human cognitive and affective processing varies as a function of cultural 
environments. These diverse environments provide unique social contexts in which 
psychological processes are developed (Kitayama and Uskul 2011). The findings of 
cultural psychological research stimulate researchers to investigate neural substrates 
of the cultural diversity of human cognition and emotion. 
Therefore, here I define culture as a complex and dynamic external social-visual 
environment in which the human value system and the human brain is fostered and 
shaped. From a neuroscience point of view, such a definition emphasises the socio-
cultural nature of the human brain and places great weight on the influence of cultural 
values, beliefs, and practices shared by a social group on functional organization of 
the human brain. In addition, I included the visual environment as a major similarity 
among individuals. As I will explain in the next two chapters, the cognitive modulation 
effect of culture might not only come from social experiences, but also from visual 
experience that shapes our perception tuning to different information. 
Previous cross-cultural studies assessed cultural differences in human cognition by 
comparing the behavioural performances and the neural activities between Western 
Caucasians (Europeans and North Americans) and East Asians (Chinese, Japanese and 
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Koreans). Although there is of course no such thing as a homogeneous ‘Western’ or 
‘East Asian’ culture, Western and East Asian societies nevertheless differ in many 
aspects, and provide good samples for psychologists to investigate cultural 
differences in human cognition (Han and Northoff 2008). However, individuals from 
Western culture or East Asian culture also have different nationalities and races. In 
the next part, I will provide a belief distinction between them. Other issues related to 
such dual-cultural sampling will be discussed in the last chapter of the current thesis. 
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1.1.2 Culture, Nationality and Race 
 
Nationality is defined by social group membership, based on a shared nation state of 
origin. Different from the term culture, which emphasises shared ideas, values, beliefs, 
and practices, people of the same nationality do not necessarily share the same 
beliefs, values, or practices. Majority of cross-cultural psychology studies have 
recruited subjects from two different cultural groups (e.g., Westerners and East 
Asians) on the assumption that the two groups differ in specific cultural values or 
specific cognitive processes (Han and Northoff 2009). While these different cultural 
group members usually have various nationalities, in some case they can be from a 
same nation as well. For example, a number of cultural psychology studies have 
investigated cultural groups who are from the same nation, but are defined by ethnic, 
religious or political beliefs (Han et al. 2010; Han et al. 2008). In such cases, two 
groups of participants share the same nationality and language but differ only in a set 
of shared beliefs/values and practices, which are hypothesised to be relevant to a 
particular pattern of neural activity. 
Humankind can be divided into different races by distinct physical characteristics 
such as skin tone, facial feature or body shape. Individuals from a same racial group 
usually are similar in various fixed and biologically determined psychological traits 
and tendencies. Unlike culture, race is predetermined by inherent biological basis and 
unchanged over the course of a lifespan (Young 1994). Moreover, individuals 
classified as belonging to the same race do not necessarily share the same cultural 
values and experiences. For example, native Chinese and British-born Chinese may be 
considered as belong to the same racial group, but they do not share the same cultural 
values and beliefs. Researches focus on race, such as in empathy or face recognition, 
have distinctive different assumptions and results compare to studies on culture. For 
example, they tend to find similar cognitive pattern and neurocircuitry towards in-
group or out-group between different races (Kubota et al. 2012). 
In summary, culture can be separated from nationality and race. Although cultural 
psychology and cultural neuroscience studies sample participants from different 
cultures who usually also belong to different nationalities and races, the hypothesis 
and independent variables are dissimilar to those studies focusing on nationality or 
race. 
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1.2 Social Differences among Cultures: Individualism and 
Collectivism 
 
Preamble 
As explained in the opening chapter, culture should be considered as a unique 
combination of environmental factors where specific knowledge could be transferred. 
One example is the value in regarding the individual in relation to society. Following 
Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory, individualist vs. collectivistic values are amongst 
the main dimensions to discrete different cultures from a psychologist point of view. 
Such a contrast also becomes the main distinction in the East-West dichotomy. In this 
chapter, I will first conceptualise individualism and collectivism. The social behavioural 
differences resulting from these two core cultural values will be discussed. In the second 
and the third part of this chapter, I will discuss how people develop distinctive 
perspectives in regard to themselves and others under the impact of individualism or 
collectivism.  
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As explained previously, culture is a complex and amorphous concept.  It has been 
studied in many domains including sociology, anthropology, humanities, linguistics, 
psychology and other social sciences. Researchers from various areas take different 
approaches to investigate culture, and focus on different aspects of culture. 
Psychologists consider the dichotomy between individualism and collectivism as a 
major factor according to which cultures can be broadly categorised (Triandis 1996). 
Such a dichotomy has been referred to as the “deep structure” of cultural differences 
(Greenfield 2000). A large body of behavioural research has shown that such cultural 
values influence individual-level psychological mechanisms. More recently, cognitive 
and neuroscientists alike have begun to investigate the neural substrate of these 
cultural differences, focusing on whether this diversity is powerful enough to 
modulate neural activity. In this chapter, I will begin by defining individualism and 
collectivism, to then focus on how these cultural values shape the way we understand 
ourselves and others. Importantly, data on the modulatory influences of cultural 
values and beliefs upon neural activity will be discussed. 
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1.2.1 Individualism and Collectivism 
 
To identify one’s culture upon encounter might be difficult. However, if one spends a 
few minutes to consider how one interacts with others, one might be able to make an 
accurate judgment. Indeed, the core of cultural differences lies in social activities 
(Hall and Hall 1990). People’s exposure to all kinds of information in social 
interaction and culture shapes how their cognitive system perceives and makes use of 
it. Imagine a social scenario where a person brings some laughter to other people in 
the conversation. If he’s from a Western culture, such as Europe or North America, he 
might consider himself to be a funny person. Instead, if he’s from East Asia, he might 
likely thinks: “my friends think I am funny” or “in this circumstance I can be funny” 
(Trafimow et al. 1991; Triandis et al. 1990). Summarising similar observations, 
researchers have defined individualism and collectivism as follows: 
Individualism: The core idea of individualism is that individuals are independent of 
one another (Bellah et al. 1985; Hsu 1983; Kagitcibasi 1994; Kim and Choi 1994; 
Markus and Kitayama 1991; Sampson 1977; Triandis 1995). Individualism centers on 
personal goals, personal uniqueness, and personal control. For instance, Hofstede 
(1984) defined individualism as “a focus on rights above duties, a concern for oneself 
and immediate family, an emphasis on personal autonomy and self-fulfilment, and the 
basing of one’s identity on one’s personal accomplishments”. In individualistic 
societies people are autonomous: they give priority to their personal goals and 
behave primarily on the basis of their own attitudes rather than the norms of the 
general public (Triandis and Suh 2002).   
Collectivism: The core idea of collectivism is mutual obligation and the common 
values shared among a society’s members. In collectivism, one individual is merely a 
component of the social, a unit that subordinates to the larger context (Kagitcibasi 
1987, 1997; Oyserman 1993; Schwartz 1990; Triandis 1995). In collectivistic cultures 
people are closely connected with their in-groups (family, tribe, nation, etc.). They 
give priority to the common goals of the majority. They usually behave within social 
norms, and are notably concerned with relationships (Mills and Clark 1982). 
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Early work by anthropologists and social psychologists had revealed many 
behavioural differences between individualism and collectivism. These differences 
exist in almost every aspect of an individual’s social life including self-concept, well-
being, attribution style, and relationship with others (Oyserman et al. 2002). Here I 
will outline some examples of these differences: 
Motivation: In an individualistic society, people pursue personal uniqueness and 
desire to control their own lives, whereas in collectivistic cultures, people prefer to be 
like everyone else and follow orders (Kim and Markus 1999). As a result, personal 
choice generally enhances motivation more for individualism than collectivism. For 
example, Iyengar & Lepper (1999) showed that children from European-American 
backgrounds were more motivated when they were given a personal choice, and less 
motivated when the experimenter or peers made the choice for them. On the other 
hand, Asian-American children showed less motivation when they could choose for 
themselves. However, if their mothers or in-group member made the choices for 
them, Asian-American children showed the highest level of intrinsic motivation and 
performed the best. 
Evidence also suggests that motivation in individualist cultures increases following 
success, but in collectivistic cultures it increases following failure. For example, Heine 
et al. (1998) showed that experiencing success motivated European Canadian 
undergraduates more than those from Japan. After experiencing failure, individuals 
from a collectivistic culture might be motivate to change themselves to better satisfy 
the demands from their social environment. 
The presence of others also motivates individualism and collectivism in different 
ways. For example, Asians are motivated to justify their choice when significant 
others are primed (Kitayama et al. 2004). In another example, participants were 
exposed to a set of schematic faces that appear to be “watching” them from their 
perspective (Imada and Kitayama 2010). East Asians justified their choice when an 
impression of “social eyes” was primed during the choice. European Americans 
appear to show a weaker motivation effect under such conditions, reportedly because 
the eyes of others are experienced as unnecessary impositions on their freedom 
(Imada and Kitayama 2010). 
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Emotion, experiences and expressions: Depending on their cultural background, people 
experience emotion from different aspects. In individualistic cultures, emotions are 
self-focused. They reflect the status of personal feeling. In collectivistic cultures, 
emotions tend to be set in relationships and represent the status of these 
relationships (Mesquita 2001). Kitayama et al. (2000) showed that Americans 
reported more personal emotions (e.g., feeling superior, proud, top of the world), 
whereas Japanese reported more interpersonally engaged emotions (e.g., friendly 
feelings, feeling close, respect).  
Early observations from anthropology and psychology also suggested different 
“display rules” of emotion for people from different cultures (Ekman and Friesen 
1975; Matsumoto et al. 2008). While the individualists tend to express their emotions 
more freely, the collectivists usually restrain their emotional expression instead of 
being open and directly showing personal feelings (Niedenthal et al. 2006). 
Individualism is more expressive than collectivism, particularly for positive emotion, 
but also for negative emotion (Matsumoto et al. 2008). For example, the expression of 
anger is less prevalent in collectivistic than individualistic cultures (Markus and 
Kitayama 1991). However, most of these results are from observational studies or 
verbal self-reports. Cross-cultural research in emotions has not yet provided a clear 
link between the individualism/collectivism contrast and emotional expression 
(Oyserman et al. 2002). 
In addition facial emotion recognition usually was considered as universal in the 
early literatures (Ekman et al. 1969). Recent evident suggested that observers from 
different cultures also perceive emotional face differently (e.g., Jack et al. 2012a; Jack 
et al. 2012b). Details will follow in the next chapter.  
Communication: While people in individualistic cultures tend to speak openly, people 
in collectivistic cultures use indirect and sometimes ambiguous communication 
(Holtgraves 1997). Gudykunst et al. (1996) quantified communication styles and 
measured the level of individualism-collectivism among U.S., Australian, Japanese, 
and Korean students. They showed that indirect communication correlated 
negatively with individualistic cultures, and positively with collectivistic. In another 
study, among Korean, Japanese, and U.S. students, individualism was found to focus 
on clear, goal-oriented communication. Instead, collectivism was concerned about the 
listener’s feelings, and desired to avoid negative evaluation (Kim et al. 1996). 
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Social behaviour: Members of a collectivistic culture are strongly influenced by the 
behaviour and thoughts of other people. For instance, Cialdini et al. (1999) examined 
how people respond to a request to participate in a market survey. They found that 
people from collectivist cultures were easily influenced by social proof arguments 
(e.g., your friend has complied with this request). People from individualist cultures, 
however, were influenced more by personal commitment arguments (e.g., you have 
complied with a similar request in the past).  
Cultural values also change the way people handle social conflicts. Peng and Nisbett 
(Peng and Nisbett 1999) asked Chinese and American students to analyse 
contradictions drawn from everyday life. For example, one of the cases they 
presented to the students was a daily life conflict between mothers and their 
daughters on the daughters’ time management of study and entertainment. American 
students tended to respond in favour of one side or the other (e.g. “mothers should 
respect their daughters' independence”). Chinese responses were more likely to find 
a “Middle Way” (e.g. “both the mothers and the daughters have failed to understand 
each other”). They found virtue and fault on both sides, and attempted to reconcile 
the contradiction. 
In an individualistic society, people are encouraged to be independent, self-elevating, 
and assertive. Thus, one’s dominant behaviour is usually positively reinforced 
(Moskowitz et al. 1994). In contrast, a collectivistic society tends to positively 
reinforce subordination, sociability, and cooperation (Triandis and Gelfand 1998). 
Freeman et al. (2009) observed opposite neural activity patterns in two cultural 
groups relating to dominant behaviour. American and Japanese participants passively 
viewed images of individuals posing dominance and submission during an event-
related design functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scan. After the scanning 
session, the participants completed a survey to measure their personal endorsement 
of dominant versus submissive values (e.g., “I impose my will on others” and “I let 
others make the decisions”) (Goldberg et al. 2006). Results of the survey 
corroborated previous studies showing that Americans tend to endorse dominant 
values and behave in dominant ways, whereas Japanese tend to endorse submissive 
values and express more subordinate behaviour. More importantly, they found a 
direct relation between participants’ behavioural responses and their neural pattern. 
The neural activity in the bilateral caudate nucleus and medial prefrontal cortex 
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(mPFC) showed opposite patterns in the two cultural groups. Identified as part of the 
mesolimbic reward circuitry, these two brain regions have been directly linked to 
reinforcements and rewards (e.g., Aharon et al. 2001; Breiter et al. 2001). Americans 
showed greater activity in these brain regions when perceiving dominant stimuli than 
subordinate stimuli, whereas the reverse pattern of neural activity in the same brain 
regions was shown among Japanese. These findings suggest that functional activity in 
the mesolimbic reward system is modulated in different ways, in order to coordinate 
with cultural preferences for dominant or subordinate behaviour. 
Personality: Personality is the result of a combination effect from genetic and 
environmental factors (Engler 2008; Kellerman 2012). Among the most important of 
the latter are cultural influences. However, only a small number of studies have 
directly investigated the relationship between personality traits and 
individualism/collectivism. While studies showed consistent mean personality 
difference across different nations (Allik 2005; Terracciano et al. 2005), few studies 
have directly correlated personality with the cultural syndrome of individualism-
collectivism (e.g., Hui and Villareal 1989). Further study is still needed to clarify this 
subject. 
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1.2.2 “Know Thyself”: Self-construal and the Correlated 
Neural Activity 
 
Culture modulates how we behave in social situations and interact with other in-
groups. These modulations are internalized and further shape the way we think of 
ourselves (Triandis 1995; Zhu and Han 2008). Markus & Kitayama (1991) analysed 
how people from different cultures think about themselves in relation to others and 
suggested different self-construals between individualism and collectivism. 
Specifically, self-construal focuses on interdependence-independence, which is one of 
the most important aspects of the cultural syndrome of individualism-collectivism.  
According to Markus and Kitayama (1991), the independent construal of the self is 
autonomous and independent. It attends to the self and self-focused information. On 
the other hand, the interdependent construal of the self emphasizes social connection 
and relationship. It is generally sensitive to information relating to others, and 
attends to intimate others as much as to the self. 
 
Figure 1.2.1, Conceptual representation of the self. A: Independent construal; B: Interdependent 
construal. Adapted from Markus and Kitayama (1991) with permission. 
The differences between independent and interdependent self-construal are 
illustrated in Figure 1.2.1. The self is represented by the large circle, whereas smaller 
circles represent specific others. Within each circle are the various dimensions of the 
self or the others (mark as X). If two circles intersect, it means they share one or more 
similar aspects (the X in the intersection). As shown in Figure 1.2.1A, those with 
independent construal of the self do not share any inner attributes with others. They 
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refer to their internal attributes such as their own traits, abilities, values, and 
preferences in self-definition. For those with interdependent self-construal, self-
knowledge is generally based on their share elements with others who are close to 
them (Figure 1.2.1B). Thus, they define themselves mostly by relating to others. 
Self-concept develops in an early stage of individual development. Starting from birth, 
mothers with different cultural backgrounds talk to their children differently. For 
example, Western mothers are more likely to focus on experiences and attributes 
about past events than Asian mothers (Leichtman et al. 2003). As a result of parenting 
and other environmental influences, the distinction between independent and 
interdependent selves shows at an early age in children. Hayward (2004) compared 
5- and 6-year-old children from America and Japan and found that Japanese children 
scored higher on Collective Identity, Harm-Avoidance, and Social Closeness than 
American children in the Eder Self-View Questionnaire (Eder 1990). A similar study 
tested on preschool participants from Korea and the United States also confirmed 
that Korean culture fosters a relatively interdependent conception of the self (Ahn 
and Miller 2012). 
Many self-related psychological processes are altered by our self-construal (Markus 
and Kitayama 2003). For example, previous results showed differences in self-related 
memory between independent and interdependent self. People from individualistic 
cultures usually hold better memory of information about the self than that about 
others. This is known as the self-reference effect (Klein et al. 1989). However, for the 
interdependent self, the advantage of self-related memory is much less significant 
(Conway et al. 2005; Markus and Kitayama 1991; Markus and Kitayama 2003). 
Westerners showed self-reference effect over close others such as mother and best 
friends in a trait memory task (Heatherton et al. 2006; Klein et al. 1989), whereas 
Chinese participants remembered equally well trait adjectives associated with the self 
and close others (Zhu and Zhang 2002). In another example, Wang and Conway 
(2004) studied cross-cultural differences in autobiographical memory. They found 
that European-American adults frequently focused on memories of personal 
experiences. Thus, people with independent self-construal place a great emphasis on 
their feelings and personal roles in memory events. In contrast, Chinese participants 
tended to describe memories of social and historical events. They focused more on 
social interactions and the roles of other people than the European-American 
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participants. The result in autobiographical memories lends further support to the 
difference in memory related to independent-interdependent self-construal. 
Moreover, the differences in self-representation are also reflected at a neural level. A 
series of recent studies on self-related tasks have shown different patterns of neural 
activation between people from individualistic and collectivistic cultures (Amodio 
and Frith 2006; Ames and Fiske 2010; Chiao et al. 2009, 2010; Zhu et al. 2007). Zhu et 
al. (2007) scanned two cultural groups (i.e., Westerners and Chinese) while they 
performed trait judgment tasks regarding themselves or a close other (i.e., their 
mother). Researchers contrasted trait judgments of the self and trait judgments of a 
public person to obtain a region of interest (ROI) related to the self, namely the 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Previous 
studies showed that activation of mPFC would increase during the self-related task 
(e.g., Amodio and Frith 2006; Gusnard et al. 2001). Zhu et al. (2007) found that, for 
Chinese subjects trait judgments of themselves and their mothers both activated the 
mPFC compared to the trait judgment of a public person. In contrast, Western 
subjects’ mPFC activation only increased during self-trait judgment, but not for 
mother-judgment or other-judgment. These ﬁndings provided the ﬁrst neuroimaging 
evidence for cultural difference in self-related neural activity.  
In another example, Chiao et al. (2009) scanned Caucasian Americans and Japanese 
while they made judgments of general trait descriptions or contextual self-
descriptions. Moreover, they controlled each participant’s degree of endorsement of 
independent and interdependent self-construals using the Self-Construal Scale 
(Singelis 1994). They found that people with individualist tendencies showed greater 
mPFC response while thinking of themselves in a general manner, whereas people 
with collectivist tendencies showed greater mPFC response while thinking of 
themselves in a relational manner. These results provided further evidence for the 
inﬂuence of cultural values on individuals’ neural substrates underlying self-reﬂective 
thinking. 
Some studies used face stimuli to investigate the differences in self-processing 
between Western Caucasians and East Asians. It has been proposed that self-face 
recognition (e.g., to recognise oneself in a mirror) is an indicator of high-level self-
awareness (Keenan et al. 2000). Some authors hypothesised that people with 
independent self-contrual might assign more positive associations with their own 
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face than to others’ faces (Han 2013; Han and Northoff 2009). As a result, people with 
an individualist background might attend more to their own faces when presented 
amongst others’ faces, and process their own faces more deeply (Sui and Han 2007; 
Sui et al. 2009). In contrast, as the East Asian emphasises social connections between 
the self and others, enhanced processing of one’s own face may not be as strong 
compared to Westerners. For example, Sui & Han (2007) scanned Chinese subjects 
only while they performed an implicit face recognition task that required judgments 
of orientations of one’ own face or a familiar face. Moreover, subjects were primed 
before the face recognition task with either independent or interdependent 
construals (Gardner et al. 1999) by marking independent (e.g., I, mine) or 
interdependent (e.g., we, ours) pronouns in an essay. They found that neural activity 
in the right middle frontal cortex increased when recognising their face, rather than 
familiar faces. Moreover, the right frontal activity differentiating between the self and 
familiar faces was enlarged by independent relative to interdependent self-construal 
priming. Increased right frontal activity was also associated with faster responses to 
their own face rather than familiar faces.  
Furthermore, the same research group recorded event-related potentials from British 
and Chinese subjects while they judged head orientations of their own face or a 
familiar face (Sui et al. 2009). They observed faster responses to one’s own face 
relative to the familiar face in both cultural groups. However, the self-advantage in 
behavioural performances was greater for British than for Chinese subjects. In 
addition, they found that one’s own face elicited a larger negative activity at 280–340 
ms over the frontal–central area (N2) relative to the familiar face in the British. In 
contrast, the Chinese showed reduced anterior N2 amplitude to their own face 
compared with the familiar face. Some evidence showed that frontal-central N2 
component is sensitive to perceptual salience of stimuli (Folstein and Van Petten 
2008). This is possibly associated with individuation and deeper processing of the 
face (Ito and Urland 2003; Kubota and Ito 2007). Thus, the authors suggested that the 
reverse pattern of the N2 in the cultural groups showed that independent self-
construal endows their own face compared to familiar faces, and vice versa for 
interdependent self-construal. For people with interdependent self-construal, the 
properties of others contribute to a large portion of the self. 
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Brain mechanisms underlying self-investment in personal versus public choice have 
also been investigated. Park et al. (2012) tested a negative neural electric peak that 
occurs when an error is committed in a cognitive task (called error-related negativity 
or ERN). Evidence indicates that ERN increases as a function of motivational 
significance of the errors (Hajcak et al. 2005). In Park et al’s (2012) experiment, 
immediately before each trial, participants were briefly exposed to a face prime 
(which is designed to induce an impression of being seen by others - the face-priming 
trials) or a control prime (the control trials). As predicted, Asians showed a greater 
ERN in the face-priming trials than in the control trials, but European Americans 
showed a reversed pattern, with a weaker ERN in the face-priming trials than in the 
control trials. Most importantly, the ERN magnitude in the witnessing-eyes priming 
condition was significantly correlated with self-reported levels of interdependence 
(versus independence) as assessed by the Singelis (1994) self-construal scale. In fact, 
the cultural difference in ERN in this condition was completely mediated by 
interdependent (versus independent) self-construal. 
In summary, culture affects our internal self-related processing. People from 
individualistic cultures tend to develop an independent view of the self. In 
comparison, people sharing a collectivistic background tend to represent their self in 
an interdependent way. Different views of the self modulate how people process self-
related information. Moreover, results illustrate that self-related neural activities are 
shaped by the construal of the self. 
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1.2.3 Understand Others: Theory of Mind and Empathy 
 
As social animals, human beings are adapted to understand each other in order to 
communicate and share information. We are capable of attributing others’ mental 
states (e.g., intentions, desires and beliefs) in order to interpret and predict their 
behaviour. This is one of the fundamental social abilities, and is referred to as “theory 
of mind” (ToM) or “mentalising” (Premack and Woodruff 1978; Wellman et al. 2001; 
Wimmer and Perner 1983). However, culture influences the way we interpolate 
others’ behaviour and emotion (Han and Northoff 2008; Nisbett and Miyamoto 2005). 
For example studies showed that Americans were inclined to explain murders and 
sports events respectively by invoking presumed traits, abilities, or other 
characteristics of the individual, whereas Chinese and Hong Kong citizens are more 
likely to explain the same events with reference to contextual factors, including 
historical ones (Lee et al. 1996; Morris and Peng 1994). In this section, I will discuss 
the differences between individualism and collectivism in understanding others.   
The first important aspect of the ToM is how people make sense of others’ actions. 
This question has been investigated for nearly fifty years, and one of the fundamental 
discoveries is that people tend to explain others’ behaviour as arising from their 
internal factors (their characters or personality), while neglecting situational 
causality (Gilbert and Malone 1995; Jones and Harris 1967; Ross 1977). This has been 
referred to as the “correspondence bias” or “fundamental attribution error”. 
However, most of the early attribution studies were based on observations of the 
Western Caucasian population. As discussed previously, people in this population 
share a similar independent self-construal. While they refer themselves more to 
internal elements, they might also rely more on internal factors to define other 
people.  Instead, people from a collectivistic culture pay more attention to situational 
forces in explaining the causes of people’s actions (Nisbet 2003). As a result they 
might show less bias of this attribution error.  
Indeed, evidences suggested that this allegedly universal bias might be much more 
pronounced for Western Caucasians than for East Asians (Choi and Nisbett 1998; 
Morris and Peng 1994). Many studies indicate that Asians are inclined to explain 
other person's behaviour by regarding to the situational factors (Lee et al. 1996; 
Miller 1984; Morris and Peng 1994; Norenzayan et al. 2002). Such cultural attribution 
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differences persist even when situational factors are extremely salient (Jones and 
Harris 1967). For example, situation salience manipulations bias East Asians' 
attributions much larger toward external factors, whereas Americans may still 
attribute behaviour to internal factors such as personality traits (Choi and Nisbett 
1998; Masuda and Kitayama 2004). In addition, East Asians are more likely to believe 
that behaviour does not correspond to actual attitudes than Westerners (Kashima et 
al. 1992). These findings suggest that East Asians' views about the causes of 
behaviour and the importance of situational factors differ from those of Westerners. 
Interestingly, these differences in attribution bias were not only limited in explaining 
real world scenarios and social behaviour. Studies showed that individualists and 
collectivists gave different explanations even for events involving animals and 
inanimate objects. For example, Morris and Peng (1994) showed participants 
animations of an individual fish moving in relation to a group of fish in various ways. 
Compared with the Chinese, American participants were more likely to see the 
behaviour of the individual fish as being produced by internal factors of that fish. 
However, as for Chinese participants, they were more inclined to see the behaviour of 
the individual fish as being produced by external factors, namely the other fish. 
Another study asked Chinese and American participants with no formal physics 
education to explain some ambiguous physical events (phenomena involving 
hydrodynamics, magnetism etc.). They found that Americans referred more to 
dispositional factors (e.g., weight) and less to contextual factors (e.g., a medium) than 
did Chinese (Peng and Knowles 2003). 
Another aspect of the ToM is to understand that others’ mental representation of the 
situation can be different from your own. One of the classical tasks to quantify this 
ability is the false-belief task (Wimmer and Perner 1983). In this task the participant 
is usually observed or read a story in the third-person view, then answer several 
questions relating to the internal perspectives of the people in the story. The ability to 
accomplish the false-belief task is one of the landmarks of children’s cognitive 
development. Studies on Western Caucasians found that, four-year-old children are 
generally able to succeed at false-belief tasks, whereas 3-year-old children tend to fail 
(Baron-Cohen et al. 2000). This pattern has been hypothesised to be universal, 
regardless of culture (Wellman 1998). However, recent evidence has suggested wide 
variations in developmental timing across cultures (Chen and Lin 1994; Naito 2003; 
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Vinden 1996). For example, the onset of false-belief understanding in Hong Kong 
children appeared much later (in some cases up to 2 years) than in Caucasian 
children (Liu et al. 2008). Moreover, even when they answer correctly, children from 
collectivistic cultures give different justiﬁcations compared to ones with an 
individualistic background. Naito & Koyama (2006) found that Japanese children 
usually referred to social rules rather than the internal or personal reasons 
commonly given by children from Western cultures (e.g., Bartsch and Wellman 1989; 
Wimmer and Mayringer 1998). These results suggest that children across cultures 
understand theory of mind in different ways. While children from individualistic 
cultures mentalise others’ behaviour as personal and intentional, the ones from 
collectivistic cultures attribute them to the situation and surroundings. As a result, 
children from collectivistic cultures might struggle more to understand that other 
people can interpret the circumstances differently than themselves. 
Recently, studies using fMRI showed that cultural differences in Theory of Mind can 
further affect our neural activities. For example, Kobayashi et al. (2006, 2007) 
scanned participants from Japan and America while they were performing adapted 
versions of false-belief task. In the brain regions associated with theory of mind (e.g., 
Brunet et al. 2000, 2003; Ferstl and von Cramon 2002; Fletcher et al. 1995; Goel et al. 
1995), they found a comparable neural activity between subjects from individualistic 
and collectivistic cultures in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and anterior 
cingulate cortex (ACC). However, another crucial brain region related to the ToM task, 
namely temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), showed a different activity in Japanese 
participants than those from individualistic cultures. They found that the TPJ 
activation was much lower in Japanese children and adults (Kobayashi et al. 2006, 
2007). It has been shown that the TPJ is involved in distinguishing self-agency from 
other agencies (Blakemore and Frith 2003; Decety and Grèzes 2006; Decety and 
Lamm 2007; Jackson et al. 2006). For individualistic cultures that have a more self-
other distinction of theory of mind, the TPJ might be more involved in the related 
processing (Kobayashi and Temple 2009). Therefore, the diminished activity in TPJ in 
Japanese children and adults might reﬂect a weakened sense of self-other distinction 
in Japanese culture (Han and Northoff 2008; Perner and Aichhorn 2008). 
Han & Northoff (2008 & 2013) also proposed an alternative explanation of why 
judgments of mental states produced greater activation of TPJ in American than in 
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Japanese participants. The TPJ might have a role in integrating sensory modalities 
and limbic inputs (Moran et al. 1987). Moreover, Kobayashi et al. (2006) found: that 
1) Americans showed greater activation in the right insula, which has been suggested 
to mediate the connection between the limbic system and frontal regions of the brain 
(Allman et al. 2005); 2) greater brain activity for the Japanese participants than the 
Americans in their right orbital frontal gyrus, which has been shown to be involved in 
emotional mentalising tasks (Moll et al. 2002). Therefore, Han & Northoff (2008 & 
2013) have argued that attributing mental states to other people might require the 
integration of sensory modalities and limbic inputs more for people who grew up in 
an individualistic culture than for people who grew up in a collectivistic culture. In 
contrast, people from collectivistic cultures rely more on emotional mentalising.  
However, this interpretation contradicted the finding in the following study by 
Kobayashi et al. (2007). In the later study, Japanese children showed higher 
activation in the left anterior superior temporal sulcus and temporal pole than 
American children in a cartoon based ToM task. The temporal pole has been 
suggested to integrate sensory information and limbic inputs (Moran, Mufson, & 
Mesulam, 1987). The authors argued that Japanese children had to integrate sensory 
and limbic inputs more than American children to complete the task, which opposes 
the interpretation by Han & Northoff (2008 & 2013). 
Another study using fMRI also reported both cultural consistency and diversity in the 
neural networks associated with performance in a Theory of Mind task. Adams et al. 
(2010) showed observers from America and Japan photographs of human face eye 
regions, and asked them to interpolate their corresponding mental states. This is 
known as the ‘‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’’ test, a well-validated social-perceptual 
test of mental state reasoning and theory of mind (Baron-Cohen et al. 2001). In both 
groups of observers, greater bilateral posterior superior temporal sulci (pSTS) 
activation was shown in same-culture mental state decoding than in other-culture. 
They also found activation difference in right TPJ between the two cultural groups. 
Different from Kobayashi et al. (2007), they found overall stronger activity during the 
experiment task in the right TPJ for subjects from a collectivistic culture (i.e. Japan) 
than those from an individualistic culture (i.e. America).  Although the tasks applied 
in these two studies are different, it is too early to provide a definite explanation of 
these complex cultural differences in TPJ. 
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Interestingly, TPJ may also be modulated by cultural values in the empathy task 
(Cheon et al. 2011; de Greck et al. 2012). Using fMRI, Cheon et al. (2011) measured 
the neural responses of Korean and American participants while they gave an 
empathy level rating to scenes of racial in-group or out-group members in emotional 
pain. Compared to Caucasian-Americans, Korean participants showed stronger in-
group biases in empathy behaviourally. Additionally, Koreans showed stronger 
neural responses within bilateral TPJ. Cheon et al. (2011) showed that larger in-group 
empathy bias was associated with larger neural response in these regions. However, 
for the empathy of anger, the TPJ activation shows an opposite pattern. One study 
found that Germans, compared to Chinese participants, showed stronger 
hemodynamic responses in the right TPJ to intentional empathy for anger than for 
baseline conditions (de Greck et al. 2012). These results suggest that the TPJ might 
have a general relationship with individualism-collectivism culture contrast, but how 
exactly it’s modulated by culture values and the type of emotion still needs more 
investigation.  
It is worth noting that in the same empathy study by de Greck et al. (2012), culture 
also modulates other brain regions. Participants from collectivistic cultures (i.e. 
China) showed stronger hemodynamic responses compared to those from 
individualistic culture (i.e. Germany) in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC). Previous studies have reported the involvement of the DLPFC in emotion 
regulation and inhibition (MacDonald et al. 2000; Ochsner and Gross 2005; Ochsner 
et al. 2004; Shackman et al. 2009; Vanderhasselt et al. 2006). The larger left DLPFC 
activation of Chinese participants might reflect a higher suppression of anger-related 
feeling in collectivistic cultures. The authors also claimed to observe regions that 
were directly related to the level of interdependency/independency. They showed a 
larger BOLD signal in the right inferior temporal gyrus, right superior temporal gyrus, 
and left middle insula for the contrast of empathy with anger minus baseline in 
Germans than in Chinese subjects. Hemodynamic responses in these three brain 
regions negatively correlated with interdependences scores over all subjects acquired 
after the fMRI scan. However, it might not be appropriate to combine the two cultural 
groups together in the correlation analysis as they did. The percentage of signal 
changes in these three regions actually positively correlated with interdependences 
scores for Chinese participants (see Figure 3 in de Greck et al., 2012; however the 
authors didn’t report the statistic of the correlation independently for each group of 
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observer). The relationship between these brain areas and the level of 
interdependency/independency thus remains unresolved. 
Overall, there are cultural differences in BOLD activation during interpolation of 
mental or emotional states of others. Most of the current studies have shown cultural 
diversity in the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ). However, the results among studies 
are inconsistent. Further examination is required to help identify the underlying 
social psychological differences between individualist and collectivist observers. 
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1.3 Culture Shapes Human Perception and Cognition 
 
Preamble  
The effects of culture are not limited to social behaviour and other forms of high-level 
cognition. Under the theoretical framework of analytic vs. holistic cognitive styles, 
cultural differences in low level perception and cognition were supported by various 
behavioural and neuro-cognitive studies. However, such cognitive style frameworks can 
be restricted, given the current results on face perception. In this chapter, cultural 
differences in perception and cognition will be reviewed according to the stimuli and 
tasks applied in different studies. Interpretations are made under cognitive style theory 
and the information-tuning hypothesis. 
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Individuals from different cultures hold diverse values and beliefs. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, a body of research has led to a generalisation of two distinct cores 
of cultural values: individualism and collectivism. Furthermore, the cultural values we 
hold affect how we think of ourselves and interpret others’ behaviour, and modulate 
the related neural activity. Similar investigation of how social environmental factors 
impact upon brain functioning has provided researchers with a new perspective, that 
high-level cognition and its neural architectures are not universal. In contrast, low-
level perception and cognition and their neural substrates have been considered to be 
culturally independent. However, recent behavioural and neuroimaging data has 
fundamentally questioned these assumptions, highlighting the diversity of perceptual 
and cognitive processes across different cultures. 
Indeed, behavioural and brain imaging results showed differences between 
individuals from Western and East Asian cultures on various cognitive domains. 
Mainly focused on visual perception, differences were found in: attention (Chua et al. 
2005; Hedden et al. 2008; Ji et al. 2000), perception (Blais et al. 2008; Lynch et al. 
1990; Lynch et al. 1991; Neuhaus 2003), categorization (Choi et al. 1997; Norenzayan 
et al. 2002), memory (Masuda and Nisbett 2001), logical reasoning (Norenzayan et al. 
2002), change prediction (Ji et al. 2001), and tolerance of contradiction (Peng and 
Nisbett 1999).  
Early theoretical frameworks introduced by Nisbett et al. (2001) suggested two 
different cognitive styles that directly link to the two distinct cultural values. People 
from individualistic cultures, such as those in America and Europe, develop an 
analytic processing bias. They tend to emphasise focal objects and thinking in a 
context-independent style. In contrast, in collectivistic cultures such as Japan, China, 
and Korea, people tend to broadly divide their attention to contextual or background 
features. They adapt a holistic reasoning style that focuses on the connections among 
objects or the relationship between an object and its context (Markus and Kitayama 
1991; Nisbett et al. 2001; Triandis 1995). Importantly, different cognitive styles 
modulate the information we attend to, and further bias the way we perceive and 
make use of this information. 
However, in the original work by Nisbett, as well as the follow up studies that 
investigated the contrast between analytic and holistic processing styles, the type of 
information being processed by different cultural observers was never actually 
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quantified. Crucially, recent evidence on face perception has shown that, even though 
Western Caucasians (WCs) and East Asians (EAs) applied different eye movement 
strategies to face stimuli (face features), the information being perceived was actually 
the same (Caldara et al. 2010). It’s debatable whether the perceptual and cognitive 
differences between individualism and collectivism should be described in terms of 
two distinctive cognitive styles, or as biases in perceptual/information gathering 
strategy. 
In the following chapter, I will elaborate on the cultural differences in perception and 
cognition according to the stimuli and tasks which have been employed in vision 
studies. Some of these studies were originally conducted under the hypothesis of the 
analytic-holistic cognitive style. However I will discuss them under a broader 
framework, focusing on how our perception system is culturally tuned to different 
information. 
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1.3.1 Object and Scene 
 
Nisbett et al. (2003; 2005; 2001) suggested that one of the main differences between 
analytic and holistic processing style lies in the way people attend to objects and their 
surroundings (either other objects or the environment in general). Several 
behavioural studies have suggested that WCs focus on the focal object and its 
property within a scene, whereas EAs attend to the background/context or 
relationship between objects (Kitayama et al. 2003). Such cultural variation in visual 
perception is believed to occur because of the internalization of social information 
preferences (i.e., the emphasis of internal factor in individualistic culture and the 
emphasis of relationship in collectivistic culture; Gutchess et al. 2010; Kitayama et al. 
2003). 
Early studies in developmental psychology observed differences in parenting that 
might contribute to the formation of cultural perceptual differences. For example, 
when American mothers play with their children, they tend to direct the children’s 
attention to objects and their properties (‘‘see the truck; it has nice wheels’’), whereas 
Japanese mothers emphasise feelings and relationships (‘‘when you throw your truck, 
the wall says, ‘ouch’’’). Moreover, American mothers label toys and point out their 
attributes more often than Japanese mothers do (Bornstein et al. 1990a; Bornstein et 
al. 1990b; Fernald and Morikawa 1993). By contrast, Japanese mothers tend to 
engage their infants in social routines more than American mothers. Thus, the 
perceptual differences observed in adults between different cultures might originate 
from the early experiences of the everyday environment. 
A number of attempts have been made to assess attentional differences between 
Western Caucasian and East Asian in object and/or scene perception. For example, in 
an early study Masuda and Nisbett (2001) first showed short animated video clips of 
underwater scenes to Japanese and American participants, then recorded their verbal 
descriptions of the videos. American subjects tended to begin by describing the most 
salient object, whereas Japanese participants were more likely to first outline the 
context. Japanese subjects also reported more background details than Americans. 
The same objects from the clips were then presented to the participants in a separate 
session, but with one of the following backgrounds: the original, a new background, 
or no background at all. Results showed that background manipulation affected the 
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performance of Japanese but not American participants. Similar results were shown 
when the experimenters presented previously seen real-world objects to the subjects. 
Japanese were less likely than Americans to correctly recognise the object if it was 
presented in a different context. Moreover, in later work, Masuda & Nisbett (2006) 
reported that EAs were more likely than WCs to detect changes in contextual 
information within a scene in a change blindness paradigm. 
However, the bias towards object or background between WC and EA observers is not 
well supported by eye movement evidence. Some studies showed a cultural 
difference in fixation number and fixation duration between WCs and EAs while they 
were viewing scene stimuli with objects inside (Chua et al. 2005; Goh et al. 2009; 
Masuda et al. 2008a). Chua et al. (2005) showed that Americans spent a greater 
proportion of viewing time on objects relative to backgrounds than Chinese 
participants. Although the fixations that landed on objects generally lasted longer 
than those which landed on the background, the contrast between the two was larger 
for American participants than for Chinese participants. (However, as shown in Chua, 
Boland, & Nisbett, 2005 figure 3c, the overall fixation duration of American 
participants was longer than the Chinese. They should have compared the relative 
contrast instead of the absolute contrast). In addition, while the number of object 
fixations was similar in both groups, the Chinese made more background fixations 
than Americans. A similar result by Goh et al. (2009) also found that Americans 
mainly fixated on the foreground object in a picture, whereas East Asians shift their 
gaze between the foreground object and the background constantly. However, other 
studies report little or no difference between the two cultures (Evans et al. 2009; 
Miellet et al. 2010; Rayner et al. 2009; Rayner et al. 2007). For example, a direct 
replication of Chua et al. (2005) did not ﬁnd any difference between the two cultural 
groups (Evans et al., 2009). In another study, experimenters showed participants 
scenes consisting of several identifiable objects. They found no differences between 
Westerners’ and East Asians’ eye movements (Rayner et al., 2007). Similarly, Rayner 
et al. (2009) showed Americans and Chinese the same photographic scenes, 
containing either a usual or highly unusual object. Even though there were 
differences between the scan path deployed to explore normal and unusual versions 
of the scenes, no cultural difference was found. They reported that eye movements 
were quickly drawn to highly unusual aspects of a scene in a similar way in both 
groups of observers. Recently, Millet et al. (2010) applied a gaze-contingent technique 
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to dynamically mask central vision (i.e. Blindspot) during a visual search task of 
animals in natural scenes. Both groups of observers showed comparable animal 
identification performance, which decreased as a function of the Blindspot sizes (0°, 
2°, 5°, or 8°). Dynamic analysis of the exploration pathways revealed identical 
oculomotor strategies for both groups of observers during animal search in scenes. 
The result showed that culture does not impact on extrafoveal information use during 
a visual search. It is worth noting that the coupling between fixated and processed 
information is not perfect (concepts of overt vs. covert attention, see Posner 1980). 
WC and EA observers might use the same eye movement strategies, but extract 
different information from the environment, or vice versa (see Blais et al. 2008; Kelly 
et al. 2010; Kita et al. 2010; Rodger et al. 2010 in the case of face stimuli). Thus, the 
cultural modulations of eye movement in object and scene perception still remain 
unresolved.  
Despite the inconclusive results in eye movement, fMRI studies showed that the 
attentional bias towards objects for individualism affect neural activity within the 
visual cortex. For example, Gutchess et al (2006) showed American and East Asian 
participants pictures of an object alone, scenes without an object or an object within a 
meaningful scene. Overall they found that Americans showed greater activation in 
object-processing regions than East Asians. The activation differences were shown in 
the ventral visual cortex, as well as in areas associated with semantic processing of 
objects (i.e. bilateral middle temporal, right superior temporal, and left superior 
parietal regions). However, they did not deploy any precise measurement to identify 
the brain area related to object or scene processing (i.e. a standard region of interest 
localizer of LOC or PPA). Instead, they created two masks by contrasting the object-
only and scene-only trials, and compared the activation of subject viewing combined 
pictures (stimuli containing both object and background) within these two masks. 
Although the authors suggested that their approach increases sensitivity in detecting 
cultural differences, and has advantages over defining regions of interest a priori by 
using the whole brain as the initial search space, the appropriateness of such a 
method is arguable (Han and Northoff 2008). 
In another study, Goh et al. (2007) employed a fMRI adaptation paradigm to evaluate 
how culture shapes the object-processing related brain area as a function of age. They 
presented images composed of objects and scenes with changes of object, scene, or 
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both. Previous work demonstrated that attention modulates the adaptation effects in 
the ventral visual processing stream. Larger adaptation might indicate better 
functional integrity than weak or absent adaptation (Chee et al. 2006; Chee and Tan 
2007; Eger et al. 2004; Murray and Wojciulik 2003; Yi and Chun 2005). Goh et al. 
(2007) thus hypothesised that due to prolonged exposure to an object-biased culture, 
elderly WCs would engage more during object-processing than elderly EAs, resulting 
in a larger adaptation effect in the correlated brain regions. In contrast, elderly EAs 
would show more adaptation effect in their background-processing areas than 
elderly WCs. Contradictory to this hypothesis, background processing was relatively 
similar across both age and culture. Specifically, the parahippocampal place area 
(PPA) showed nearly equivalent activation and adaptation magnitude across all 
conditions. However, the lateral occipital complex (LOC), indexed as an object-
processing region (Grill-Spector et al. 2001; Grill-Spector et al. 1999; Grill-Spector et 
al. 1998), showed an Age x Culture interaction. The BOLD responses in bilateral LOC 
were generally less in older adults than younger adults. Moreover, the elderly WCs 
showed significantly larger object-processing adaptation than did elderly EAs, 
suggesting that neural sensitivity to object processing might decline with age 
disproportionately in EAs. However, they only observed Age x Culture interaction 
over the right LOC. Nonetheless, this finding demonstrates that the perceptual bias 
towards objects might accumulate through experience. More efficient object 
processing (represented by more adaptation effect within object–related regions) in 
individualism than collectivism becomes even more distinctive with age (Miyamoto et 
al. 2006; Nisbett and Masuda 2003; Nisbett et al. 2001). 
In a subsequent study adapting a similar adaptation paradigm, Jenkins et al. (2010) 
investigated culture-modulated attention bias by presenting participants with 
incongruent scenes. The incongruent scenes were created by placing an object against 
a background where it would not commonly be found (e.g., a cow in a kitchen). Since 
observers from a collectivistic culture would attend to the relationship between an 
object and its background, an incongruent scene would attract their attention more 
than a congruent scene. For Chinese participants only, Jenkins et al. found that neural 
activity in the bilateral occipital cortex showed significantly larger adaptation to 
incongruent scenes than to congruent scenes. This indicates greater engagement with 
object processing in Chinese participants when the objects appear in incongruent 
contexts than when they appear in congruent contexts. The author suggested that, 
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Chinese participants, sensitive to the context in which an object is embedded, pay 
more attention to that object when the context is semantically inconsistent. American 
participants, in contrast, are less likely to pay attention to an object that violates 
normal semantic relationships.  
The attentional bias to incongruent information for collectivism observers has also 
been observed in one ERP study (Goto et al. 2010). Participants were presented first 
with a background picture (e.g., a car park). Then, a semantically congruent or 
incongruent object was shown superimposed upon the background (e.g., a car or a 
crab). They found that a negative ERP component peaking at about 400 ms after 
stimulus onset (N400) was affected by culture. For East Asian American observers, 
the N400 amplitude was larger when the target object was presented on a 
semantically incongruent background than a congruent background. Such amplitude 
difference was not shown by European or American participants. Moreover, they also 
found that higher N400 magnitude difference between conditions was associated 
with lower independent self-construal scores across all the subjects. It has been 
suggested that N400 amplitude is sensitive to semantic relationship processing 
(Kutas and Hillyard 1984). Asian Americans might be more prone to detecting the 
incongruity than Europeans or Americans due to their relative sensitivity to context. 
This result further supports the behavioural observation that collectivism is biased 
more towards the relationships between an object and its background. 
The cultural attentional bias towards objects or relationships between objects further 
shape how we make use of this information. When they are asked to categorise 
different objects together, WC observers tend to classify them on the basis of rules 
and properties, whereas EAs tend to classify on the basis of similarity and 
relationships. For example, Chiu (1972) asked American and Chinese children to 
group two of three different items together (e.g., a man, a woman, and a baby). He 
found that American children were much more likely to group objects on a 
“categorical” basis than Chinese children. They put the man and the woman together 
“because they are both adults”. In contrast, Chinese children were more “relational-
contextual”. They grouped together a woman and a baby “because the mother takes 
care of the baby”. Similar results were shown in adult subjects across various tests 
(Gutchess et al. 2006; Ji et al. 2004; Unsworth et al. 2005). For example, Norenzayan 
et al. (2002) showed participants two groups of animated objects and asked them to 
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classify the target object in one of the groups (see Figure 1.3.1 as an example). EAs 
were inclined to think that the object was more similar to the group with which it 
shared a family resemblance (i.e. to the group on the right in Figure 1.3.1), whereas 
Europeans and Americans were more likely to regard the object as similar to the 
group to which it could be assigned by application of the rule (i.e. to the group on the 
left in Figure 1.3.1 as they all have the same topmost string). 
 
Figure 1.3.1, Examples of stimuli used in Norenzayan et al. (2002). The target object bears a 
strong family resemblance to the group of objects on the right, but there is a rule that allows 
placing the object in the group on the left (the style of the topmost string).  
Studies using fMRI found differences in the brain activities related to the two 
categorical strategies at a semantic level. Gutchess et al. (2010) asked WC and EA 
participants to match two words out of three words either following the “category” 
rule or the “relationship” rule. For example, participants were presented with word 
triplets “panda-banana-monkey”. In the “category” condition, participants selected 
two words that belonged to the same category (e.g. panda and monkey). In the 
“relationship” condition, participants selected the two words that shared a functional 
relationship (e.g. monkey and banana). An extensive network including frontal, 
temporal and parietal regions were activated in both groups of observers in both 
tasks. Moreover, EA observers showed stronger activations in the right angular gyrus 
and the right middle frontal gyrus in both tasks than WCs. As comparison, the right 
cingulate gyrus is more activated in WCs compare to EAs in category tasks. The 
authors suggested that, EA observers engaged more top-down controlled processes 
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to inhibit irrelevant information and select one strategy from the other. This resulted 
in stronger frontal-parietal network activation (Collette et al. 2005; Corbetta and 
Shulman 2002; Wager and Smith 2003). As for WC participants, they engaged more in 
solving the semantic conflict among word pairs rather than selecting an appropriate 
strategy. This activated the brain regions related to semantic information processing, 
such as temporal lobe regions and the cingulate gyrus (Copland et al. 2007; Lambon 
Ralph et al. 2009; Sass et al. 2009). Although Gutchess et al. (2010) did not find any 
special neural tuning direct link to a culturally preferred task (i.e. the category task 
for WCs and the relationship task for EAs), the results showed that culture affects 
participants’ neural activation during categorisation. 
Overall, the results from both behavioural and brain-imaging showed differences 
between individualism and collectivism in object/scene related processing. While 
WCs showed attentional and perceptual bias towards focal objects, EAs usually 
perceive more information from the background, the relationship among objects, and 
the connection between objects and background (Nisbett et al. 2001; Nisbett and 
Masuda 2003). These biases further affect our brain activities, sometimes possibly 
even leading to two completely different neural mechanisms processing related 
information. It also suggests the possibility of two diverse information-binding 
strategies for WCs and EAs. For observers from WC culture, they are better at 
decoding local information. In contrast, EA observers are better at global information 
processing (Nisbett et al. 2001; Nisbett and Masuda 2003).  
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1.3.2 Face and Emotional Face 
 
The ability to recognise faces and facial emotions is a crucial skill for effective social 
interaction. The early literature suggested a systematic and universal eye movement 
strategy employed by adults to extract facial information. As revealed in the seminal 
work by Yarbus (1961), human beings make fixations to the eye and mouth regions 
while viewing faces; overt visual attention directs our eyes toward these desired 
visual locations. Since then, eye movement studies have consistently shown a similar 
triangular scan-path in face processing, with dominance given to the eyes (e.g., Althoff 
and Cohen 1999; Groner et al. 1984; Henderson et al. 2005). However, these previous 
findings were based on a sample of adults from WC cultures only. Thus, whether 
human beings deploy a universal eye movement strategy to encode and recognize 
faces remains uncertain. 
To resolve this question, our lab (Blais et al. 2008) recorded the eye movement of 
both WC and EA observers while they were performing various face related tasks. 
Moreover, to properly estimate the differences in fixation patterns, we developed a 
data-driven eye-tracking data analysis method that does not require pre-defined 
regions of interest (i.e. iMap, see chapter 1.5.1 for details). Consistent with previous 
findings, we showed an eye-mouth fixation bias for WC observers. However, 
compared to WCs, EA participants directed their fixations more to the central area of 
the face (see Figure 1.3.2 first row). Both WC and EA subjects showed comparable 
behaviour performance. Divergent scan patterns deployed by different cultural 
observers were consistent across tasks (i.e. learning, recognition, and categorisation) 
and not affected by the race of the face being observed (i.e. Caucasian or Asian faces).  
Follow up studies from our lab and other independent research groups around the 
world further confirmed the differential oculomotor patterns during face processing 
between individualistic and collectivistic cultural observers (Caldara et al. 2010; Kelly 
et al. 2010; Kita et al. 2010; Miellet et al. 2013; Rodger et al. 2010). Such fixational 
biases seem to arise as early as 7 years old in development (Kelly et al. 2011b) and 
persist for second-generation immigrants from an Eastern to a Western country 
(Kelly et al. 2011a). Interestingly, the same differences were observed for inverted 
faces (Rodger et al. 2010) and extended to visually homogeneous objects like animal 
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faces or greebles (Kelly et al. 2010). See Figure 1.3.2 for a summary of the 
representative results. 
During eye fixation, sharp central vision from the fovea centralis samples the 
maximum acuity of information for visual processing. Due to the fact that the eyes 
and mouth contain the most diagnostic information of the human face (Davies et al. 
1977; Gosselin and Schyns 2001; Rowley et al. 1998; Viola and Jones 2004), it is 
puzzling how EA observers recognize faces by fixating on a redundant facial feature 
(i.e., the center of the face). To address this issue, Caldara et al. (2010) applied a gaze-
contingent paradigm that limits the extra-foveal information. In this experiment, 
Gaussian apertures (“Spotlights”) actively centred on participants’ fixations while 
they were exploring a face. In the condition of 2° visual angle (foveal vision only) and 
5° (extra-foveal vision largely limited), the Spotlight only covered a small area of 
facial features. For example, the eyes and the mouth were not visible when 
participants were fixating on the nose in these two conditions. However in 8° 
condition, both eyes and mouth were available when participants fixated on the nose. 
As a result, the center fixation strategy for EA observers disappeared in both the 2° 
and 5° conditions. Instead, they looked at the eyes and mouth in a similar manner to 
WC observers. In the 8° condition in which extra-foveal information was available, EA 
observers reverted to their preferred center fixation strategy. These results suggest 
that despite cultural variance in eye movements, WC and EA observers universally 
rely on similar facial information to recognise faces. Importantly, WCs preferentially 
sample foveally the diagnostic features in natural vision, whereas EA observers rely 
preferentially on extrafoveally extracted diagnostic features (eyes/mouth) sampled 
from central fixation locations (on the center of the face). However, both eye 
movement strategies can efficiently obtain information from facial features (i.e. eyes 
and mouth). 
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Figure 1.3.2, Upper panel: Fixation biases for WC and EA participants during natural vision or 
conditions equivalent to natural vision in previous studies. Lower panel: Spotlight (Caldara et 
al., 2010) and Blindspot’s (Miellet et al., 2012) results revealing the abolition of the culture-
preferred fixation strategy when the available visual information is restricted.  Adapted from 
Miellet et al. (2012) with permission. 
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The results also showed that the culturally shaped eye movement pattern we deploy 
during face recognition is also highly flexible. Similar conclusions were reached with 
another gaze-contingent technique. Miellet et al. (2012) used a moving mask (i.e. 
Blindspot), which forced the participant to use extra-foveal visual information. The 
size of the mask was also parametrically manipulated (0° = natural vision, 2°, 5°, and 
8° of visual angle). The results showed that the cultural fixational biases of faces were 
abolished by the size of the mask. In the larger Blindspot conditions, WC abandoned 
their usual triangular fixation strategy and shifted toward the typical EA central 
fixation pattern. Instead, EA observers were insensitive to the Blindspot 
manipulations. 
To precisely quantify the foveal and extra-foveal information sampled from different 
cultural eye movement strategies, Miellet et al. (2013) developed another gaze-
contingent technique similar to Spotlight. Instead of a fixed size Gaussian window, the 
Spotlight aperture expanded with time (1° every 25ms). Moreover, information 
outside of the Spotlight was replaced with an average face template to allow saccade 
programming without providing useful information for the experiment task. 
Therefore, participants would remain fixated on the same location until they obtained 
enough foveal and extra-foveal information for the task at hand. Consistent with the 
previous result, WCs fixated more on the eyes whereas EAs were significantly biased 
towards the center of the face. Importantly, Miellet et al. (2013) employed a retinal 
filter based on spatial frequencies decomposition, and reconstructed the visual 
information available in the stimulus according to the fixation pattern of each group 
of observers. The analysis showed that WC observers relied on local high-spatial-
frequency information sampled from the eyes and mouth, whereas EAs used global 
low-spatial-frequency information from the same facial features (Figure 1.3.3). 
Overall, these gaze-contingent studies (i.e. Spotlight, Blindspot, Expanding Spotlight) 
further supported the notion that people from collectivistic cultures developed 
different eye movement strategies compared to people from individualistic cultures. 
Human beings flexibly engage in local or global eye movement strategies and 
constantly adjust them in adapt to constrained visual situations (Spotlight & Blindspot 
result). Moreover, cultural-biased eye movement strategies extract information from 
the same facial features (Spotlight & Blindspot result). However, the spatially filtered 
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information obtained from different strategies is culturally tuned (Expanding 
Spotlight result). 
The information sampling and eye movement strategy differences among cultures 
also expand to categorization of facial expressions of emotions (e.g., Jack et al. 2009; 
Kelly et al. 2011a). The universality of facial expression has been questioned by 
various behavioural studies (e.g., Biehl et al. 1997; Ekman et al. 1987; Ekman et al. 
1969; Matsumoto 1992; Matsumoto and Ekman 1989; Moriguchi et al. 2005). For 
example, Russell et al. (1993) reported that Japanese individuals often mistake fearful 
faces for surprised faces. Similarly, Jack et al. (2009) showed that EA observers 
preformed significantly worse in recognizing “fear” and “disgust”. Moreover, using 
eye tracking and a model information sampler, Jack et al. (2009) showed that EA 
observers systematically biased their fixations towards the eye region and sampled 
information that is highly ambiguous for distinguishing between certain expressions 
(i.e., ‘‘fear’’ and ‘‘surprise’’; ‘‘disgust’’ and ‘‘anger’’). EA observers mainly involved the 
eye region but not the mouth as diagnostic for facial expression categorization. The 
internal representation of facial expressions might be different for EA and WC 
observers. 
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Figure 1.3.3, Upper panel: information reconstruction based on spatial-frequency 
decomposition. White area shows the available information on different facial fixation locations 
from the retinal filter. The size of the Gaussian aperture is determined by the expansion velocity 
of the Spotlight and the average fixation duration in the corresponding significant area. Lower 
pane: Information span for the global (EA) and local (WC) strategies. Adapted from Miellet et al. 
(2013) with permission. 
Using reverse correlation, Jack et al. (2012a; 2012b) further estimate the cultural-
specific internal representations of the basic facial expressions of emotion. For 
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example, Jack et al. (2012a) presented neutral faces with white noise to WC and EA 
observers. Participants categorized the faces into one of the six basic facial 
expressions of emotion (i.e., happy, surprise, fear, disgust, anger and sad). According 
to their behavioural response, they averaged the noise templates to reconstruct the 
internal representation of each emotion expression. Indeed, the internal 
representations of facial expressions are very different between WC and EA 
observers. While the eyebrows and mouth were primarily featured in the WC 
representations, the EA representations of emotion expressions are mainly 
constructed only with the information from the eye region. Moreover, the result 
showed that the gaze direction is also an important feature of the EA internal facial 
expression templates. In a later study following the same logic, Jack et al. (2012b) 
presented participants computer generated three-dimensional facial animation of 
random facial movements and asked them to interpreted them into a meaningful 
facial expression. The facial movements were comprised by stimulation of random 
face muscle movements. Using dissimilarity matrices and cluster analysis, they 
showed that WC and EA rely on different facial movements to categorize emotion 
expressions. While WCs represent each of the six basic emotions with a distinct set of 
facial movements, the clusters of EAs’ representation often overlap particularly for 
“surprise”, “fear”, “disgust”, and “anger”. Moreover, EA observers judged emotion 
intensity primarily according to the early muscle movements around the eyes, 
whereas WC judged emotional intensity with other parts of the face. 
For observers from collectivist cultures, their facial expression perception is highly 
influenced by the social and environmental factors. For example, they tended to bias 
their categorization responses toward less socially threatening emotions (e.g., 
perceive “fear” as ‘‘surprise’’; see Jack et al. 2009; Moriguchi et al. 2005). Using 
cartoon face, Masuda et al. (2008b) showed that Japanese observers’ perception of 
facial emotion was influenced by the surrounding faces, but not Westerners’. In 
another example, Goto et al. (2013) presented emotional faces superimposed on top 
of affective scenes in an ERP experiment. Asian Americans showed greater N400 
response to incongruent trials (e.g., positive emotion face superimposed upon a 
negative scene) than to congruent trials, whereas no difference in amplitude across 
the two conditions is observed in European Americans. 
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Overall, culture biases the information we sample from face stimuli for identity 
recognition and emotion recognition. However, it is worth noting that face perception 
system is not solely sculpting by culture (Pascalis et al 2002; 2005). None the less, 
people from different cultures tend to rely on diverse spatial frequency information 
for face identification, and different spatial/temporal information for emotion 
expression task. These differences affect our eye movement strategy, behavioural 
performance and even our brain activities. 
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1.3.3 Non-cultural Stimuli and Other Cognitive Tasks 
 
The cultural bias in perception and cognition even expands to low-level, culture-free 
abstract visual stimuli. One of the first evidences is demonstrated by Ji et al. (2000). 
They presented WCs and EAs with the rod-and-frame test (RFT), designed by Witkin 
and colleagues to assess the differences between field-independent and field-
dependent (Witkin 1967; Witkin and Berry 1975; Witkin and Goodenough 1977). The 
concept of field dependence was developed by Witkin (1967) as an index of cognitive 
style. On one extreme (i.e., field-independent), observers tend to separate the target 
from the environment (i.e., field). Observers whom are in the other extreme, defined 
as field-dependent, incline to see the world as a whole. In the RFT task, a rod or line 
appears in a frame, which can be rotated independently from the rod. Participants 
were asked to judge when the rod appeared to be vertical but ignore the position of 
the frame. EA participants made more errors in this task than WC participants. The 
researchers interpreted it as a result of the difficulty to separate the rod from the 
whole field for EA observers (i.e., EAs are more field dependent).  
Based on the RFT, Kitayama et al (2003) developed the Framed-Line Test (FLT). In 
this test, the stimulus was a vertical line within a square frame. After viewing the 
initial stimulus, participants were then shown a same or different size square frame 
and asked to draw a line within the frame. In the absolute task they were asked to 
draw a line the same length as the previous line; in the relative task the line being 
drawn was proportionate to the height of the surrounding frame. The results showed 
that observers from a collectivistic culture (i.e., Japan) performed better in the 
relative task, whereas those from an individualistic culture (i.e., America) were more 
accurate in the absolute task. However, Zhou et al. (2008) attempted to replicate the 
FLT in China and USA but without success. They showed that people estimated a 
line's relative length more accurately than its absolute length, regardless of culture. 
Nonetheless, Hedden et al. (2008) deployed a modified FLT to test in two groups of 
observers and showed cultural differences in neural activities. Participants were 
presented with a series of stimuli, each consisting of a vertical line inside a box. The 
context-dependent task required judgments of whether the box and line combination 
of each stimulus matched the proportional scaling of the preceding combination. The 
context-independent judgment task required judgments of whether the current line 
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matched the previous line, regardless of the size of the accompanying box. Hedden et 
al. (2008) found no difference in accuracy between the two tasks for either group of 
participants. However, the fMRI results showed an interaction of culture in the 
prefrontal and parietal cortices. Specifically, BOLD responses were higher in these 
areas during context-dependent than context-independent tasks for WCs, whereas 
EAs exhibited stronger activity in the same areas during the context-independent 
than context-dependent tasks. The opposite patterns of neural activity might reflects 
the enhanced sustained attentional control during culturally non-preferred tasks in 
comparison with preferred tasks (Hedden et al. 2008). 
Stronger neural activation of the attention network during culturally non-preferred 
tasks was also evidenced in another fMRI study. Goh et al. (2013) asked participants 
to judge the related distances between a dot and a line during scanning sessions. This 
is a visuospatial judgment task involving relative contextual judgments, which are 
typically more challenging for Westerners. Behavioural results showed that WCs 
responses were slower than EAs. They also showed greater neural engagement 
compared to EAs in frontal, parietal, and occipital areas, as a result of the greater 
difficulty of the task. Moreover, WC observers also showed greater suppression of the 
default network, a brain network that is suppressed under conditions of high 
cognitive challenge. This study supplied further neural evidence that attention 
control during visual tasks is modulated by culture. Besides the activation in fronto-
parietal regions, the suppression in default network regions was also affected by 
culture during tasks.  
The results from RFT and FLT suggested EAs are more influenced by information 
from their surroundings than WCs. Nisbett et al. (2001) proposed that observers from 
collectivistic cultures are field-dependent, whereas individualistic cultural observers 
are field-independent (see also Ji et al. 2000; Norenzayan and Nisbett 2000). Field-
dependence is defined as a relative difficulty in separating objects from the context 
where they are located (Witkin et al. 1962). It closely relates to the context-
dependent attentional bias. Eye movement study investigating the distractor effect on 
saccade trajectories (Doyle and Walker 2001) also showed similar cultural bias 
(Petrova et al. 2013). When a distractor was presented, Chinese participants showed 
stronger curvature away in saccade trajectories than German participants (Petrova et 
al. 2013). This suggested that observers from a collectivistic culture exhibited 
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stronger suppression of their attention towards distractors than those from an 
individualistic culture (Godijn and Theeuwes 2004; McSorley et al. 2004; Theeuwes 
and Van der Stigchel 2009; Tipper et al. 2001; Van der Stigchel and Theeuwes 2007).  
One study using Navon stimuli attempted to directly quantify such contextual/global 
attention bias for collectivistic cultural observers. A Navon figure (e.g., large E made 
up of small Vs) is used as a standard stimulus in the attention literature to investigate 
global versus local attention bias. McKone et al. (2010) showed participants from 
different cultures Navon figures, and found that EA observers demonstrated a strong 
advantage over WCs. 
Broad attention towards the surroundings might result from a better extra-fovea 
vision. For example, Boduroglu et al. (2009) asked observers from WC and EA culture 
to detect colour changes in a set of moving blocks. They found that EA participants 
were better than WCs when the layout of the blocks was expanded to the periphery of 
a scene, and worse when it is shrunk. Instead, WCs detected central colour changes 
most effectively. This result suggests more efficient parafoveal vision in EAs 
(Boduroglu et al. 2009).  
Cultural attention bias has also been observed in electroencephalography signals. For 
instance, Lewis et al. (2008) used an ERP oddball paradigm to investigate the EEG 
activity of Europeans, Americans and Asian Americans to novel stimuli. Compared to 
European Americans, Asian Americans showed greater amplitude on the P3 
component, which has been consistently associated to novelty detection (Debener et 
al. 2005; Ranganath and Rainer 2003). Taken in conjunction with the aforementioned 
behavioural findings (i.e. greater attention to contextual details for EAs), these results 
suggest that relative to European Americans, Asian Americans are more surprised 
when presented with a novel stimulus, presumably as a consequence of processing 
perceptually discrepant events to a greater extent.  
In summary, culture shapes our visual experience. Even when the visual system is 
receiving identical input from the physical world, how the brain processes these input 
signal is influenced by cultural experiences. More importantly, these biases are likely 
adapted from the selective attention to different real world elements, and further 
merge into specific cultural perceptual tuning of different information. Indeed, much 
like real world stimuli could be decomposed into substances such as different 
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categories of objects (including faces) and context information: certain abstract 
stimuli could be considered as constructed by smaller modules (e.g., features) or 
components (e.g., spatial information) in a similar way. Thus, culture shapes the 
human visual perception by regulating the information weighting to different 
components and the way these components interact with each other. 
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1.4 The Purpose of This Thesis 
 
As shown in the previous chapter, a number of studies have showed systematic 
differences between East Asian and Western Caucasian observers in low-level 
perception and cognition. Culture affects how people are biased towards different 
information, which further modifies the correspondent brain areas. However, when 
and how culture influences the perceptual experience is yet to be clarified. 
Interpretation based on analytic-holistic cognitive tendency framework suggests that 
such bias is driven by attention to various kinds of information. Such hypotheses have 
suggested that culture diversity appears at an early perceptual stage. For example, 
selected visual information could be filtered by a top down effect depending on the 
culture of the observer. However, such perceptual selectivity and its neural correlate 
have never been directly observed with high temporal resolution methods. For 
example in the two studies using EEG, the cultural modifications seem to happen only 
in the later cognitive stages. It is worth noting that the limitation of the tasks should 
also be considered. The majority of the current cross-culture studies applied stimuli 
which are highly dissimilar in low-level visual properties (Petrova et al. 2013). 
Experiments only manipulated on the semantic level are unlikely to reveal any early 
effect (e.g., Goto et al. 2010). 
Therefore, in this thesis, I aim to investigate the temporal modification effect of 
culture. I conducted three experiments with two highly sophisticated techniques that 
provided accurate temporal resolution: fixational eye movement and event-related 
potential. Stimuli were spatially normalized faces and Navon figures, which control 
for the information content. 
The first study uses fixational eye movement to assess when different cultural 
observers actively explore new facial information through microsaccades. Different 
facial locations were aligned with the fovea while presented during eye movement 
recording. Recent evidence shows that microsaccades relocate the gaze towards the 
spatial location of interest (e.g., Ko et al. 2010; Rucci et al. 2007). If the fixation 
strategy differences between East Asians and Western Caucasians are indeed driven 
by the visual tuning to different spatial frequency information, Western Caucasian 
observers should exhibit better facial recognition ability after microsaccades 
compare to East Asian observers.  
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The second study examined the electrophysiological response associated with the 
cultural fixational bias. Following the result in the first experiment, this study 
adopted a similar paradigm. Face stimuli were presented briefly on the screen during 
EEG recording to simulate a single fixation. Given that observers perceive different 
information in each facial position, this experiment directly assessed when the ERP 
response is sensitive to eye movement strategies. Belief presentation of face stimuli 
on preferred face viewing location should improve the behavioural response of face 
recognition, and further reflect in early ERP time-window especially N170. 
The third and final study makes use of adaptation with Navon stimuli in EEG 
measurement. Adaptation (i.e., repetition suppression) is a well-established paradigm 
to evaluate the nature of information coding at the perceptual and neurophysiological 
levels. With Navon figures that control for local and global information, this study 
investigated when differential levels of repetition suppression (and thus sensitivity) 
across types of information in according to different cultures. Following the attention 
account of the early perceptual difference between WC and EA observers, different 
manipulations of local and global information should modulate the early attention-
related ERP component (e.g., P1). 
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1.5 Methods 
1.5.1 Eye Tracking 
 
Eye tracking is a methodology to study oculomotor behaviour. As the most important 
organ of the human visual system, our eyes are never static. Human eyes are 
constantly moving to the most interesting location of the visual world. Benefiting 
from the optic properties of the eyeball, the visual world can be projected onto the 
retina in the surface inside the eye (Atchison and Smith 2000). The energy and 
information in the light is then converted into electrical and chemical signals by 
photoreceptor cells (i.e., rods and cones). Due to the differences in neurophysiological 
properties between the two and their respective distribution in the retina, the spatial 
resolution is not the same across retina location (Ryan et al. 2012). The fovea, which 
contains densely packed cones, is responsible for sharp central vision with maximum 
visual acuity (See Figure 1.5.1). However, central foveal vision covers only a very 
small portion of the entire visual field (normally subtends 2° of visual angle). To 
overcome such constraints, the human eyes are in constant motion to reposition the 
fovea to different part of the visual world (Duchowski 2007; Rayner 1998). By 
combining different characteristic eye movement measures (such as gaze location, 
fixation duration and saccade direction) with behavior or other psychophysiology 
measurements, vision scientists can infer what type of visual information is being 
perceived by the tested human observers. 
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Figure 1.5.1, The relative acuity of the left human eye (horizontal section) in degrees from the 
fovea. Adapted from Hunziker (2006). 
Different eye tracking techniques have been developed over the last 70 years since 
the first modern eye movement experiment was conducted (Buswell 1935). Three 
main eye tracking approaches are widely applied: Electro-OculoGraphy (EOG), scleral 
contact lens/search coil, and video-based eye-tracker (Duchowski 2007). A video-
based eye tracker that combines pupil and corneal reflection is the most popular 
method, for its non-invasiveness and inexpensiveness. In a common video-based eye 
tracker setup, an infrared / near-infrared light source is placed at some fixed position 
to create stable corneal reflections. A video camera or specially designed optical 
sensor then records the position of the corneal reflection and the center of the pupil. 
The vector between the corneal reflection and the center of the pupil is computed to 
extract the differences in eye rotations. After a simple calibration, the changes in eye 
orientations can be transforming into gaze location on the screen. Although such two 
point references on the eye can separate eye movements from small head movements 
quite efficiently, head stabilisation is usually required by putting the participants on a 
head/chin rest or a bite bar. 
Eye movement studies generate a large quantity of data with a combination of spatial 
and temporal information. The raw signal is characterised into different meaningful 
events: blinks, fixations, saccades/microsaccades, pupil dilation, smooth pursuits, etc. 
For most computer-based psychophysiological studies, fixations and saccades are the 
main variables of interest. Fixations are relatively static eye movements that stabilize 
the fovea over a small area of the visual environment. Approximately 90% of viewing 
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time is devoted to fixations (Duchowski 2007; Irwin 2004). Saccades are rapid eye 
movements that reposition the fixation to a new location. The categorisation of eye 
movement events is usually established by velocity of the gaze location changes. The 
velocity of the signal is compared to an empirical threshold. Fixations are then 
defined as eye movement below the threshold, whereas saccades are defined 
otherwise. 
Different properties of eye movement events are then analyzed depending on the 
research hypothesis. Vision researchers usually perform statistic analysis on the 
fixation location and duration. As for saccades/microsaccades, the latency, amplitude, 
curvature, orientation, and occurrence over time are the common dependent 
variables in eye movement studies.  
Conventional fixation analysis uses a region or area-of-interest (ROI or AOI) 
approach. In such an approach, statistical testing is only carried out on the eye 
movement data within the predefined areas in the stimulus space. For example, the 
number of fixations or the mean fixation duration within the region is tested across 
conditions. Unless the visual input can be divided into clear, unambiguous discrete 
units, like in the case of reading, segmenting visual inputs into ROIs can be 
constrained by subjective evaluations (Caldara and Miellet 2011). Such bias and 
inconsistency in defining ROI compromise the potential to replicate findings across 
studies. Moreover, in some cases researchers define post hoc ROIs according to the 
actual data. Such usage of the same dataset for both selection and statistic analysis is 
inappropriate and runs the risk of “double dipping” (sees Kriegeskorte et al. 2009). 
To overcome these limitations, our lab has recently introduced a novel, robust, data-
driven technique that does not require the a priori segmentation of digital images 
used as stimuli into ROIs: iMap (Caldara and Miellet 2011). iMap is a data-driven 
spatial analysis application originally based on statistic applications such as statistical 
parametric mapping (image statistic with spatial smoothing using Gaussian Kernel). 
Further details can be found in Caldara & Miellet (2011) and 
perso.unifr.ch/roberto.caldara/index.php?page=3 
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1.5.2 Electroencephalogram 
 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) is one of the standard techniques employed by 
neuroscientists to investigate the neural responses related to various perceptual and 
cognitive phenomena. First tested on human subject by Hans Berger in 1924, EEG is 
now widely applied in both scientific and clinical fields. Although the spatial 
resolution of EEG is quite poor, its high temporal resolution (1 ms or better) and 
relatively low cost make it a popular brain-imaging technique.  
Generally, EEG non-invasively measures electrical brain activity from electrodes at 
different locations on the scalp. Neurons convert and process information in the form 
of electrical and chemical signals. However, the electrical activity produced by a 
single neuron is too weak to reach the scalp (Kirschstein and Köhling 2009). Instead, 
when thousands or millions of neurons that have similar spatial orientation activate 
synchronously, the summation of electrical potential results in voltage difference on 
the human scalp (Nunez 2006). Moreover, electrical activity recorded by EEG 
electrodes is the summation of postsynaptic potentials, given that action potential is 
too brief (around 1 ms) to be sufficiently summed up. Cortical pyramidal neurons are 
considered as the main generator of EEG signal, due to their unique orientation 
(Kirschstein and Köhling 2009). Pyramidal neurons have long apical dendrites 
perpendicular to the cortical surface, which make them excellent dipoles in EEG 
signals. Figure 1.5.2 demonstrates how negative and positive deflections in EEG are 
generated by pyramidal neurons (adopted from Kirschstein and Köhling 2009). 
Overall, EEG records the total of excitatory and inhibitory postsynaptic potentials 
from a population of synchronous and partly aligned cortical neurons that extend 
over large areas of the cortical surface. 
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Figure 1.5.2, Origin of EEG signal. Superficial excitatory inputs (A) or deep inhibitory inputs (B) 
to the pyramidal neurons produce negative (upward) deflections, whereas deep excitatory 
inputs (A) or superficial inhibitory inputs (B) to the same neurons produce positive (downward) 
deflections. Adapted from Kirschstein, & Köhling (2009) with permission. 
Electrocortical activity is recorded by electrodes placed on the scalp. Low resistance 
Ag/AgCl electrodes are positioned on an electrode cap or electrode net according to 
the international 10–20 system (Jasper 1958), which standardised the electrode 
position in relation to fixed markers of the skull (i.e. the nasion and the inion). While 
the number of electrodes being used depends on the experimental question, in 
modern EEG studies electrode number normally ranges from 32 to 256 (Schneider 
and Strüder 2012). Such an electrode cap or net is positioned on the head of the 
participant. Special gel is placed between the scalp and the electrodes to improve 
conductance. 
During EEG recording, participants are usually required to limit head and neck 
movements, as these will produce undesired EEG artefacts. Eye movements from eye 
blinks and saccades are also a major source of EEG artefacts. In most vision 
experiments, participants are instructed to maintain their fixation on the center of 
screen. In the two EEG experiments of the current thesis, high-resolution binocular 
eye movement was recorded with EEG and processed online to ensure the criteria of 
stable fixation during the experiment. More details will follow in the next section. 
The scalp electrical signal is then recorded at a desirable rate (256 to 2000 Hz) and 
transformed through a differential amplifier. The EEG signal represents the voltages 
difference between electrodes and a given reference. There are four types of 
referencing methods are mainly used. 1) Single reference: one designated reference 
electrode is placed and EEG signal is measured as the difference between each 
channel and the reference electrode; 2) bipolar reference: similar to single reference 
but two electrodes are used as reference; 3) average reference: the reference is 
defined as the average signal of all electrodes. 4) CSD reference: the reference is 
defined as power spectra computed from current source density (CSD). CSD is an 
implication of linear volume-conduction model (Nicholson 1973; Nicholson and 
Freeman 1975). It measures the strength of extracellular current generators 
underlying the recorded EEG without depending on predefined references. In the 
cases of single and bipolar reference, designated electrode/electrodes are usually 
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placed in locations of low neuro-electrical activity (e.g., the nose or the earlobe). 
Average reference is favoured increasingly by EEG experts (Picton et al. 2000; 
Rosenfeld 2000). It can be considered as a virtual ground site in the brain, which 
represents the zero potential point (Paukkunen and Sepponen 2008). 
The raw EEG signal then undergoes several pre-processing steps, such as filtering and 
artefact rejection, to remove noise generated by unwanted electrical activity. For 
example, pertinent artefacts can be identified and rejected using independent 
component analysis (ICA) or principle component analysis (PCA) (Romo-Vazquez et 
al. 2007).  
There are many ways to analyze the pre-processed EEG data. For example, in time-
frequency analysis EEG signal is transformed into predefined frequency domains to 
correlate with different neurocognitive function. In the current thesis I exploit one of 
the main EEG techniques: Event Related Potentials (ERPs). 
ERPs are time-locked electrophysiological segments to an internal or external 
stimulus. They are observed after stimulus onset, and therefore are directly related to 
the presented stimulus (Nunez and Srinivasan 2006). The onset of a stimulus is 
usually defined as time zero. An epoch of arbitrary length is then chosen based on the 
research question and extracted from the continuous signal (e.g., from -100 ms to 500 
ms in related to stimulus onset). In each trial the mean activity of the pre-defined 
baseline is then subtracted (e.g. from 100 ms before stimulus onset to 0), to fulfill the 
assumption that no task-related neural activity should be observed before stimulus 
onset (i.e., baseline correction). Noisy trials are rejected and further artefact 
correction could also be applied. Accepted trials are averaged according to 
experiment conditions. Depending on the hypothesis, a large number of events is 
normally required to increase the signal-to-noise ratio (for a recent review, see 
Pontifex and Hillman 2007).  
The resulting averaged ERP waveforms are combinations of a set of positive and 
negative voltage deflections, usually referred to as ERP components. Depending on 
the polarity of the deflection, they are labeled as P or N (i.e. P for positive and N for 
negative) followed by a number referring to the latency of occurrence (usually in 
milliseconds). See Figure 1.5.3 for a standard procedure to extract the averaged ERP. 
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Classical ERP analysis is component based. The variables of interest are the amplitude 
and latency of each ERP peak. The peak of a component is defined as the most 
positive or most negative deflection point within a given time-window. The ERP 
latency is then measured as the occurrence of the peak. While the peak amplitude can 
be considered as the component amplitude, researchers sometimes also calculate the 
mean amplitude of a component by averaging all the time points of an arbitrary time 
window centerd on the peak. However, conventional analyses that focus on the pre-
defined components are restrictive and potentially miss meaningful differences 
between components (Rousselet and Pernet 2011). For example, Schyns et al. (2007) 
demonstrated that component peaks might signal the end of a process instead of its 
information processing mechanism. Increasingly, the literature started to apply data-
driven analysis at all time points and electrodes to investigate the effect over the 
whole ERP time course (Delorme et al. 2007; Pernet et al. 2011; Rousselet et al. 2008; 
Schyns et al. 2007, 2009; Schyns et al. 2011). 
 
 
Figure 1.5.3, Example of extracting ERP waveform from the ongoing EEG signal. (a) Stimuli (1… 
N) are presented with ongoing EEG recording. The specific response to each stimulus is too small 
to be seen at single trial level. (b) EEG segments within pre-define epoch following each stimulus 
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are extracted and averaged together to create the ERP waveform. Adapted from Luck, 
Woodman, & Vogel (2000) with permission. 
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2 Microsaccades Boost Face Identification as A Function 
of Culture 
 
Preamble  
Human observers engage in different eye movement strategies to gather facial 
information depending on their cultural backgrounds. Free-viewing studies show that 
Westerners preferentially fixate on the eyes and mouth during face processing across a 
range of tasks, whereas Easterners allocate their gaze relatively more on the center of 
the face (Blais et al. 2008). Such divergence in fixation patterns has been demonstrated 
to be driven by the sampling bias for different spatial-frequency bands (Miellet et al. 
2013).  
Here, we further test the differences in cultural information tuning by registering 
microsaccades as an indicator of high-spatial frequency information sampling in an 
identification task. As the fastest and the smallest fixational eye movements, 
microsaccades enhance visibility of fine-spatial details during stable gaze (Martinez-
Conde et al. 2013). Western Caucasian (WC) and Eastern Asian (EA) observers first 
learned eight face identities. We then examined the occurrence of microsaccades during 
identification of these identities while participants maintained fixation on the center of 
the screen. Nine equidistant Viewing Positions (VPs) were defined to cover the internal 
facial features. Face stimuli were aligned with a random VP centered with the fixation 
cross. Aligning participants gaze on the eye region elicited the highest rate of 
microsaccades and fastest identification response in both groups of observers. Crucially, 
WC observers showed optimal performance and highest microsaccade occurrence rate 
(400 – 500 ms) at their preferred viewing locations (as determined in the free viewing 
learning task). For EAs, fixation location preference predicts their microsaccade onset 
rate in the same time window, but not their behavioural performance. These findings 
show that the conjunction between preferred fixation location and high-frequency 
information is crucial to achieve optimal face identification performance.  
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2.1  Introduction 
 
One of the most astonishing abilities human beings possess is face recognition. For 
example, we can determine a person’s identity accurately within few fixations (Hsiao 
and Cottrell 2008) and across a wide range of viewing conditions (e.g., spatial scales, 
head orientations, lighting; Peterson and Eckstein 2012). Humans employ very 
sophisticated and consistent eye movement strategies to extract information from 
faces to accomplish various face-related tasks. Interestingly, these strategies are 
highly culture-specific (Blais et al. 2008; Caldara et al. 2010). For WC observers, their 
gaze follows a systematic triangular sequence of fixations to the eyes and mouth. This 
was revealed by the seminal work of Yarbus (1961) and confirmed in subsequent 
eye-movement studies (e.g., Althoff and Cohen 1999; Groner et al. 1984; Henderson et 
al. 2005). In contrast, recent researches have shown that EAs direct their gaze to the 
central area of the face (Blais et al. 2008; Caldara et al. 2010; Kelly et al. 2010; Kita et 
al. 2010; Miellet et al. 2013; Rodger et al. 2010). These culturally divergent 
oculomotor strategies are comparably efficient (Miellet et al. 2013), and consistent 
across different tasks (learning, recognition, categorization, etc). 
Eyes and mouths contain the most diagnostic information for face processing (Davies 
et al. 1977; Gosselin and Schyns 2001; Rowley et al. 1998; Viola and Jones 2004). For 
example, visual information from the eye region is crucial for face identification and 
gender categorization tasks (Schyns et al. 2002). It is intriguing that the preferred 
fixation locations for EA observers are not aligned with the most informative facial 
features. To address this issue, Caldara et al. (2010) developed a novel gaze-
contingent paradigm. In their experiment, a Gaussian “spotlight” was centered on the 
participant’s fixation to restrict extra-foveal information. Their results showed that 
EAs’ typical center fixation strategy disappears when extra-foveal information is 
unavailable, with participants instead exhibiting a scanpath identical to that observed 
for WC observers. This suggests that despite cultural diversity in eye movements, EA 
and WC observers universally rely on similar facial information to recognize faces. 
Furthermore, Miellet et al. (2013) employed a similar gaze-contingent procedure with 
a Gaussian “spotlight” that expands over time (i.e., dynamic spotlight). They then 
applied a retinal filter based on spatial frequency decomposition to reconstruct the 
visual information seen by participants. Their results showed that WCs preferably 
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sample high-spatial frequency information from the eyes and the mouth with a local 
strategy. EAs on the other hand extract low-spatial frequency information from the 
same facial features with a global eye movement strategy. Together, these results 
reveal that fixation pattern variations between WCs and EAs are driven by differential 
spatial frequency tuning. 
It is worth noting that the cultural differences in eye movement strategies and visual 
tuning are assumed to be relative matters of emphasis, rather than absolute 
differences of capability (Caldara et al. 2010; Miellet et al. 2011; Miellet et al. 2013). 
Indeed, observers can flexibly engage into local or global fixation strategies (Caldara 
et al. 2010; Miellet et al. 2012). Moreover, as shown in Miellet et al. (2013), EAs also 
fixate the eyes and mouth to obtain high resolution feature details. Thus, the 
importance of high-spatial frequency facial information, especially the contribution of 
such information across different facial locations, still remains unresolved. 
To directly investigate this question, we developed a novel technique involving 
recordings of microsaccades to track the time course of high-spatial frequency 
information usage. Microsaccades are the involuntary microscopic relocations of gaze 
that occur during attempted steady fixation (for a review sees Martinez-Conde et al. 
2009; Martinez-Conde et al. 2013). Although the precise perceptual function of 
microsaccades is yet to be clarified, recent evidences suggests that it may serve a 
similar role as saccades during exploration (Hafed et al. 2009; McCamy et al. 2012; 
Otero-Millan et al. 2013; Otero‐Millan et al. 2011; Otero-Millan et al. 2008; Rolfs et 
al. 2008b). Crucially, microsaccades enhance the visibility of high-spatial frequency 
information by fine-tuning the retina position within fixation locations (Donner and 
Hemilä 2007; Ko et al. 2010; McCamy et al. 2012; Rucci et al. 2007). For example, 
Donner and Hemila (2007) showed that microsaccades might improve the retinal 
sensitivity to edges and spatial resolution. 
Here, we investigated the temporal patterns of participants’ fixational eye movements 
during a face identification task. Forcing WC and EA observers’ fixations on various 
locations of the face (i.e. manipulating foveally processed information), we explored 
the dynamic interaction between cultural fixation bias, behavioural response, and the 
related microscopic oculomotor activity. Specifically, we compared microsaccade 
onset rates across cultures, while information was presented either at their 
non/preferred fixation locations. Given the tight relationship between local fixation 
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strategy and high-frequency information usage in WCs, we hypothesized that they 
would benefit more from microsaccades than EAs. Regression analyses were 
conducted between fixation preferences, behavioural response, and microsaccade 
occurrence overtime. Our results indicate that, for both groups of observers, 
preferred location of fixations positively predicts microsaccade occurrence rate 
around 400-500 ms. Crucially, however, microsaccades that occurred within this 
time-window boosted face identification for WC, but not EA observers. 
2.2  Materials and Methods 
 
Participants 
Nine WC (4 females) and ten EA (5 females) observers with normal or corrected-to-
normal vision participated in the study. One WC and two EA participants were 
excluded from the analysis due to noisy eye movement recordings resulting from 
pupil occlusion. All EA participants were students from Sun Yat-Sen University, 
Mainland China; WCs were recruited in University of Fribourg, Switzerland. EA 
participants were tested by Dr. Lingnan He under a joint project between the 
psychology department of University of Fribourg and Sun Yat-Sen University. None of 
the subjects had previously participated in fixational eye movement studies, nor were 
they aware of the experiment’s purpose. The study received approval of the 
respective local ethical committee (EA: Sun Yat-sen University Ethics Committee, WC: 
Ethics Committee of Vaud), and all participants provided written informed consent. 
Stimuli and procedure. 
WC and EA face stimuli were taken from the KDEF (Lundqvist et al. 1998) and AFID 
(Bang et al. 2001) databases, respectively. Faces were grey-scaled and aligned on the 
eye and mouth positions. Each image was 390 × 390 pixels in size, subtending around 
10x10° of visual angle at a 70 cm viewing distance. Overall luminance was normalized 
using Matlab 7.5 (2007b); images were presented on a CRT monitor with a 800 × 600 
pixel white background and a refresh rate of 120 Hz. 
The subjects sat in a dimly lit, sound-attenuated booth. A head/chin support ensured 
maintenance of a constant viewing distance and prevented head movements. 
Participants were tested on two consecutive days. On the first day, they learned eight 
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facial identities (2 races x 2 genders). Each identity was depicted displaying two 
emotional expressions (i.e. disgust, and happy) and assigned to one button on the 
keyboard. Participants learned to associate each identity to a specific finger by 
pressing the appropriate key. The stimuli were presented randomly at the center of 
the screen for 5 seconds each, with the corresponding response key displayed below. 
Throughout this process, participants could press the corresponding key freely to 
achieve an adequate level of familiarity and confidence. Subsequently, subjects 
performed a recognition task. The same face images were displayed (in blocks of 
eight trials, randomly depicting all identities encoded) at random locations on the 
screen until participants responded by button press indicative of facial identity. The 
memory task ended upon successful completion of at least 5 error-free blocks, 3 of 
which had to be completed consecutively. Throughout this initial learning phase, 
participants explored the stimuli freely while their eye movements were recorded. A 
drift correction was performed before each face presentation to ensure accuracy of 
oculomotor recording. 
On the second testing day, participants were tested in the same room with the 
identical eye-tracking set-up. The stimuli presented included the previously learned 
identities as targets (displayed with neutral expression to ensure facial identification 
rather than image recognition) among 81 novel faces as distracters to increase task 
difficulty. Before the task began, the eight target identities (neutral expression) were 
presented for 2 minutes printed on a sheet of paper. Participants were instructed to 
identify target faces as accurately and as fast as possible, while ignoring (i.e. without 
providing button press response) distractor identities. Stimuli were presented at nine 
different locations on the screen. Based on the size of the face feature, we defined 
nine equidistant positions within the face (i.e. Viewing Positions – VPs) spaced by 
2.24° visual angle (Figure 2.1a). The stimuli were then displayed with one of the nine 
VPs centered on the fixation cross. This procedure was to control for foveal and extra-
foveal information sampling. 
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Figure 2.1, (a) Illustration of 9 Viewing Positions (VPs, white numbers) and the corresponding 
Viewing Position regions (red circles). Each region covers 1.6° of visual angle. b) The differential 
fixation map between the Western Caucasian (WC) and East Asian (EA) observers for the 
learning task (Day 1). The significant fixation bias difference is shown in the area delimited by 
white borders (Zcrit > |4.49|, p < .05, red for WC bias, blue for EA bias). 
Each trial began with a fixation cross (0.2° of visual angle) displayed in the center of 
the screen for 500 ms, followed by the presentation of a face centered to one VP. The 
cross would not disappear during face stimulation to help the participant maintain 
their gaze. Stimuli remained on the screen until a response was provided for a 
maximum of 3000 ms for target faces, and 1000 ms for distractor faces. Trials were 
separated by a 500 ms ISI, with the subsequent trial automatically starting upon 
center fixation. 
Participants were told to keep focus on the fixation cross at all time during the 
experiment. Stable gazing on the fixation cross was verified by eye-tracking. 
Participants’ eye movements were monitored and processed on-line for trial 
validation. Trials containing blinks or saccades during face presentation were 
excluded. A trial was validated if the participants’ eye drift was less than 2° of visual 
angle away from the center of the screen during stimulus presentation. The 
experiment ended when a participant completed 801 valid trials including 720 trials 
for target identities (8 faces × 9 positions × 10 times each position) and 81 trials for 
distracters (10% of the trials, 9 different faces at each position). See Figure 2.2 for a 
demonstration of the experiment procedure in day 2. 
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Figure 2.2, Experiment procedure in day 2. 
Eye-tracking 
Eye movements were recorded by means of Desktop-Mount EyeLink 2K eye tracker 
(SR Research Ltd., Mississauga, Ont., Canada) with a temporal resolution of 1000 Hz. 
We recorded binocular eye movements, but only the dominant eye position was used 
for on-line trial validation. The eye movement data were recorded via Matlab 
(R2006a), using the Psychophysics Toolbox (PTB-3, Brainard 1997; Kleiner et al. 
2007) and EyeLink Toolbox extensions (Cornelissen et al. 2002). Calibration and 
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validation of eye fixation were conducted before the experiment and repeated 
whenever necessary throughout the study. 
Eye movement data preprocessing 
Eye movement data sampled during face memory task on Day 1 included blinks, 
saccades and fixations. Blinks, as well as fixations outside stimulus area were 
excluded from the analysis. We then computed fixation duration maps individually 
for each observer in Matlab. Taking into account that more than 1 pixel is processed 
during one fixation, each fixation was smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (α=10 pixels) 
to represent the foveal area (2° visual angle). Individual fixation maps were 
computed by summing all fixation locations (x, y coordinates) across time for all 
trials. Moreover, to estimate each participant’s fixation bias we first created masks of 
1.6° of visual angle for each of the nine VPs. We then extracted the values of the 
fixation maps independently within each mask. To acquire the individual preference 
towards different VPs, we ranked the VPs for each participant by the value within the 
masks (i.e. Viewing Positions Ranks – VPRs). 
Eye movement data collected on Day 2 were segmented into epochs from 0-1000 ms 
post stimulus onset. Analyses were restricted to valid trials for target faces (i.e. hits). 
Microsaccades were defined as outliers in 2D velocity space thresholded for peak 
velocity and minimum duration (Engbert and Mergenthaler 2006). We first computed 
eye movement velocity with a modified version of the central difference algorithm 
(Bahill et al. 1982; modified by Engbert and Mergenthaler 2006) to suppress high-
frequency noise. We calculated the average of eye movement velocity within a 
moving time window (i.e. 10 ms). To detect microsaccades, we adapted the parameter 
implemented by Engbert and Mergenthaler (2006). Relativity thresholds were set 
independently for each participant as the outliners (five standard deviations away 
from the median) of the velocity values observed across the entire 1000 ms interval. 
Microsaccades were then defined where velocity exceeded a relative threshold for a 
minimum duration of six samples (6 ms). We only considered binocular 
microsaccades with a temporal overlap of at least two data samples (2 ms). 
Microsaccades were defined as saccades with magnitude <2° in both eyes. 
2.3  Analysis and Result 
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Fixation map results 
Group fixation maps were computed based on the individual duration maps from the 
face learning task from Day 1. Individual maps were summed separately per group to 
compute group-specific fixation maps. The mean and standard deviation of the 
fixation distributions of all observers were calculated and used to normalize the data. 
We then carried out a two-tailed Bonferroni corrected Pixel test (Chauvin et al. 2005) 
to assess locations significantly fixated by participants (iMap; see Caldara and Miellet 
2011 for more details). 
Consistent with previous results (Blais et al. 2008; Kelly et al. 2010; Rodger et al. 
2010), WC participants preferentially fixated the eyes and mouth regions during face 
learning, while EAs predominantly fixated on the center of the face, mainly on the 
nose region. As shown in Figure 2.1b, the difference maps resulting from a two-tailed 
pixel test (Zcrit = |4.49| with threshold at p = .05) illustrate group-dependent 
differential fixation strategies. The effect sizes of the average fixation patterns per 
group were calculated using Cohen’s d, which yielded d = 1.13 for eyes area for WC 
observers, and d = 1.37 for nose region for EA observers. 
Behavioural results 
The behavioural results are summarized in Figure 2.3. Mix model ANOVA and logit 
mix model regression are carried out on reaction time (RT) and accuracy rate (ACC) 
respectively. Essentially, the mix-model could be represented as: 
Behavioural measure ~ 1 + Groups_of_observers + VPs + Races_of_stimuli + 
Groups_of_observers*VPs + Groups_of_observers*Races_of_stimuli + 
VPs*Races_of_stimuli                                                                                                                       (1) 
Result showed no significant main effects of race of the stimuli for ACC (SE = .024, p = 
.078) or RT (F (1,281) = .667, p = .414). Importantly, no significant interaction 
between groups of observers and race of the stimuli is revealed (ACC: SE = .013, p = 
.051; RT: F (1,281) = .314, p = .576). Although the impairment of recognizing other-
race faces (i.e., other-race effect) has been widely report in the literature (e.g., Vizioli 
et al 2009 and 2010), in the current experiment only 4 target identities per race were 
presented. The relatively low task demand might account for participants’ high 
performance on both races of stimuli. Moreover, given that our main focus is not on 
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the other-race effect, the mix-model applied in the following analysis is simplified as 
model (2) with the race of the stimuli as a random effect: 
Behavioural measure ~ 1 + Groups_of_observers + VPs + Groups_of_observers*VPs + 
(1 + Races_of_stimuli + Groups_of_observers*Races_of_stimuli | subject)                     (2) 
No significant main effect of groups of observers is observed for ACC (SE = .016, p = 
.324) and RT (F (1,14) = .501, p = .480). We did not observe main effect of viewing 
positions for ACC (SE = .003, p = .744). Both WCs and EAs were comparably accurate 
(94.2%, 95% CIs [93.4%, 95.1%] for WC and 92.5%, 95% CIs [91.6%, 93.5%] for EA) 
regardless of the presentation location. We observed significant main effect of 
viewing positions for RT (F (8,112) = 15.892, p = 8.15e-5). No significant interaction 
was observed in ACC (SE = .002, p = .778) but RT (F (8,112) = 8.404, p = .004). Paired-
sample t-test revealed that participants responded faster to the VPs on the upper part 
of the face (i.e., eyes and nose) than the lower part of the face (i.e., mouth) in WC but 
not EA. 
 
Figure 2.3, Behavioural results for the identification task on Day 2. (a) Accuracy rate and (b) 
reaction time for both Western Caucasian (WC, red line) and East Asian (EA, blue line) 
observers. All error bars indicate 95% CIs. 
Microsaccade results 
Figure 2.4a shows the time course of microsaccade onset after stimulus (target faces’) 
onset for both groups of observers. The microsaccade occurrence rate of both groups 
of observers complies with the stereotypical time course with an early inhibition 
followed by a later increase (Engbert and Kliegl 2003; Rolfs et al. 2008a). The 2 
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(groups) × 9 (VPs) mixed model ANOVA on overall microsaccade occurrence rate 
revealed significant differences across viewing positions (F (8,112) = 3.668, p = 
.00078). Paired-sample t-tests showed that participant exhibited more microsaccades 
to the VPs on the upper part of the face (i.e., eyes) than the lower part of the face (i.e., 
nose and mouth). No significant group effect or interaction was found (Figure 2.4b). 
The microsaccade amplitude distributions of both groups of observers are shown in 
Figure 2.4c. The mean microsaccade magnitude of EAs was significantly larger than 
that of WCs (two-tailed independent t-test: t (2,15) = 24.5, p = 7.55e-7). 
 
Figure 2.4, (a) Smoothed time course of the microsaccade onset rate of WC observers (red line) 
and EA observers (blue line). A 20 ms time-window moving average was applied as smoothing. 
Standard error at each time point is shown as shadow under the line plot. (b) Overall mean 
microsaccade onset rate for both groups of observers. (c) Distributions of microsaccade 
amplitude for WC (red) and EA (blue) observers. 
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Regression between viewing position preference, behavioural response, and 
microsaccade event 
To fully explore the relationship between fixation bias, reaction time, and 
microsaccade onset rate over time, we first fitted a linear mixed-effects model then 
performed regression analyses independently per group of observer to further 
estimate different effect. 
VPR and RT:  
The reaction time and the fixation bias were first fitted into model (3). The reaction 
time was entered as respond vector and the main effects of groups of observers and 
fixation bias (VPRs) and the interaction effect between the two had been modelled. 
Noticeably, the races of stimuli and the other-race effect were controlled as random 
effect. 
RT ~ 1 + Groups_of_observers + VPRs + Groups_of_observers*VPRs + (1 + 
Races_of_stimuli + Groups_of_observers*Races_of_stimuli | subject)                              (3) 
Result showed significant main effect of groups of observers (b = -.010, 95% CIs [-.015, 
-.003], SE = .003, t (284) = -3.041, p = .0026) and significant interaction between 
groups of observers and VPRs (b = .0057, 95% CIs [.0018, .0096], SE = .002, t (284) = 
2.875, p = .0043).  
To clarify the interaction effect and better estimate the coefficients of the fixation bias 
in each group of observers, a linear regression was performed using a robust 
regression approach independently for WC and EA observers. As shown in model (4), 
the reaction time was the respond vector and fixation preferences of each VP (VPRs) 
were entered as predictor. Moreover, to put the participants’ behavioural response 
into the same scale, their reaction time was Z-scored.  
Z (RT) ~ 1 + VPRs                                                                                                                             (4) 
As shown in Figure 2.5, fixation bias (VPZs) significantly regressed with reaction time 
in WC observers (b = -.137, 95% CIs [-.193, -.033], SE = .04, t (70) = -2.818, p = .0063), 
but not EAs (b = .079, 95% CIs [-.00063, .159], SE = .04, t (70) =1.979, p = .052). 
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Figure 2.5, Regression results. We used VPR as predictor variable to regress with RT 
independently in WC observers (red line) and EA observers (blue line). 
VPR and microsaccade onset: To understand the relationship between fixation 
preferences and microsaccade onset, we conducted linear regressions similar to 
model (4) using VPR as predictor variable to regress with microsaccade occurrence 
rate across the time course. Due to the discrete temporal property of microsaccade 
onset, conventional analyses usually consider its occurrence rate within some 
predefined time-window (Martinez-Conde et al. 2009). Here, we developed a novel 
method to parametrically sample microsaccade onset over time to study its temporal 
dynamics. Specifically, we divided the overall microsaccade onset time course (0-
1000 ms post stimulus onset) into different numbers of time-windows (i.e., steps). 
Here, the number of time-windows we applied ranged from one (i.e., the whole time 
course, the first step) to 250 (i.e., four time points within each window, the last step). 
For each step, the microsaccade occurrence rate was calculated independently within 
each window and inputted into the regression as an output vector. We then 
conducted linear regressions using VPR as a predictor across all time windows 
independently for all the steps within each group. Such a method does not require 
subjective definition of a time window or temporal smoothing of the microsaccade 
onset rate. 
To correct for false positives arising due to multiple comparisons, we used a 
multivariate clustering technique with bootstrapping (Maris and Oostenveld 2007; 
Vizioli et al. 2010; Wilcox 2005). Within each group, we first centered the 
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microsaccade occurrence rate so that each condition had a mean of zero. We then 
used bootstrap to derive an estimate of the sampling distribution under the null 
hypothesis that no difference across the means was true. In each bootstrap, we 
sampled subjects with replacement and carried out the regression (as described 
above) independently at all steps and time-windows. We then grouped the significant 
F values (p < 0.05) into temporal clusters (Maris and Oostenveld 2007), considering 
only clusters with a duration >20 ms (maximum microsaccade duration). For each 
bootstrap, we computed the sum of F values in every cluster and selected the 
maximum cluster sum. We repeated this procedure 499 times, resulting in 500 F 
cluster sums for each main effect and the interaction. After sorting the 500 cluster 
sums according to their size, we selected the 95th percentile as the cluster threshold 
to assess statistical significance. The significant F values from the original regression 
were clustered, and the sum of F values inside each cluster was compared with the 
bootstrap cluster threshold for that test. A cluster was considered significant if the 
cluster sum was equal to, or larger than the threshold (Vizioli et al. 2010). 
The results are shown in Figure 2.6. Fixation preference positively related to the 
microsaccade onset from 400-500 ms in both groups of observers. We found a 
significant regression in this time window, with increased VPR correlate with more 
microsaccade onset (WC observers: b = .058, 95% CIs [.030, .086], SE = .014, t (70) = 
4.136, p = 9.67e-5; EA observers: b = .069, 95% CIs [.042, .095], SE = .013, t (70) = 
5.189, p = 1.97e-6). Moreover, VPR also negatively related to microsaccade onset rate 
in the earlier time-course for EA observers. For example, we found less 
microsaccades at 200 – 300 ms on more preferred viewing position (b = -.302, 95% 
CIs [-.528, -.076], SE = .113, t (70) = -2.663, p = .0096). 
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Figure 2.6, Regression between VPR and microsaccade onset rate. The x-axis shows the time in 
ms and the y-axis shows the different number of time-window being used in the current step. 
The value shows the t-statistic of the regression coefficients. (a) Original t value for WC 
observers. (b) Original t value for EA observers. The black line highline the significant t values 
for WC (a) and EA (b) observers. Multiple comparison corrections were conducted based on the 
significant F-statistic value of the model. 
Microsaccade onset and RT: We determined whether and when microsaccade 
occurrence rate was related to reaction time by means of regression analysis. 
Microsaccade onset time course was binned in a similar way as previously described. 
We then carried out a regression independently per step using the microsaccade 
occurrence rate as the predictor, and reaction time as output. No significant temporal 
cluster was revealed after multiple comparison correction for EAs, indicating no 
relation between microsaccade occurrence rate and their behavioural response. For 
WC observers the increase of microsaccade onset rate in the 400–500 ms time 
window correlated with a faster behavioural response (b = -.834, 95% CIs [-1.479, -
.190], SE = .323, t (70) = -2.581, p = .012), while the increase of microsaccade 
occurrence in the first 100 ms was related to a slower reaction time (b = .53, 95% CIs 
[.015, 1.048], SE = .259, t (70) = 2.054, p = .437). The result is showed in Figure 2.7. 
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Figure 2.7, Regression between microsaccade onset rate and RT for WC observers. The x-axis 
shows the time in millisecond plotted against the different number of time-windows being used 
in the current step. The value shows the t-statistic of the regression coefficients. (a) Original t 
value for WC observers. (b) Original t value for EA observers. Significant is indicated by the 
black area. Multiple comparison corrections were conducted base on the significant F-statistic 
value of the model. 
2.4  Discussion 
 
The current study represents the first empirical evidence providing a direct link 
between local eye movement strategy and high-spatial frequency visual information 
during face identification. Here, we compared the recognition performance of 
observers from different cultures in a fixational eye movement design. Participants 
maintained their gaze on the center of the screen, while face identities were 
presented with different facial locations aligned to the fixation cross. Behavioural 
results showed that participants perform better when they fixated the upper compare 
to the lower part of the face, regardless of their preferred oculomotor strategy. 
Moreover, both groups of observers exhibited overall more microsaccades when they 
fixated the upper compared to the lower part of the faces. To understand the 
relationship between fixation strategy and high-spatial frequency information 
processing, we perform linear regression between fixation bias for different facial 
positions (obtained in the separate free-viewing face learning session) and the 
microsaccade occurrence rate. We found that microsaccade events occurring at 400-
500 ms positively regress with fixation preference in both WCs and EAs. However, 
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microsaccade events within this time window correlated with a faster behavioural 
response in WC observers only. These results together suggest that microsaccades 
boost face identification for observers who rely on a local information sampling 
strategy (i.e. WCs). WC observers rely on high-spatial frequency information from 
their preferred viewing location for face recognition. 
Optimal and preferred point of fixation for faces as a function of culture 
The result in the present study shows that fixating at the eye region is optimal for face 
identification, regardless of the cultures of the observers and the eye movement 
strategy they engage in. The eye region contains the highest visual information than 
any other face area. For example, gazing at just below the eyes optimize participant’s 
behavioural performance across various tasks (Peterson and Eckstein 2012). 
Similarly, we found that WC subjects respond faster when they fixate the eye area 
than the lower part of the face. Thus, EA observers are likely not rely on fovea vision 
to perceive diagnostic information in the eye region  
Moreover, we observed that fixating on the preferred viewing location has 
behavioural advantage for WCs only. WC observers respond faster on their preferred 
viewing position, whereas EAs respond equally well across all viewing positions. 
Previous result sampling only WC participants also reported similar results (Peterson 
and Eckstein 2012, 2013). The behavioural function of preferred viewing location is 
likely to be driven by differences in spatial-frequency information tuning between 
WCs and EAs. Specifically, EA observers prefer to sample low-spatial-frequency 
information via a global eye movement strategy (Miellet et al. 2013). They are able to 
perceive efficiently facial information from peripheral vision even when they are 
forced to fixate at points away from their preferred viewing location. Instead, fixating 
away from the preferred viewing location substantially degrades perceptual 
performance of WCs. 
These results further confirm that the behavioural advantage on preferred viewing 
position in WC observers stems from their perceptual tuning to high-spatial 
frequency information. While both groups of observers exhibited more 
microsaccades on their preferred viewing position, WC observers only exploit the 
advantages conferred by the fine-detail enhancement following microsaccade to 
better recognize faces.  
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Functional microsaccade in face recognition 
The possible origins of microsaccade have long been debated (e.g., Collewijn and 
Kowler 2008; Rolfs 2009). Different microsaccade generation mechanisms could be 
summarized into two hypotheses. The first hypothesis mainly accounts for 
involuntary microsaccade. It suggests that such microscopic oculomotor behaviour is 
produced by the physiological mechanism to prevent and/or counteract image fading 
(Ditchburn et al. 1959; Ditchburn and Ginsborg 1952; Martinez-Conde et al. 2006), as 
well as the exogenous (bottom-up) attentional shifts while attempting fixations 
(Rucci et al. 2007). The second hypothesis suggests that microsaccades are driven by 
the shift of covert attention during fixation maintenance (Cornsweet 1956; Engbert 
and Kliegl 2004; Hafed and Clark 2002). For example, pervious results showed that 
participants used microsaccade to precisely relocate their gaze for the task at hand 
(Cunitz and Steinman 1969; Ko et al. 2010). Interestingly, regardless of the potential 
different origins, the perceptual outcome of microsaccade is the same. As 
demonstrated in recent studies, microsaccade could enhance visibility during fixation 
(Martinez-Conde et al. 2006), counteract visual fading both foveally and peripherally 
(McCamy et al. 2012), and re-sharpen fine-spatial details for feature extraction 
(Donner and Hemilä 2007; Kuang et al. 2012). Here we make use of the perceptual 
consequence of microsaccade as a physiological marker to measure the cognitive 
processing of high-spatial frequency visual information. We observed that 
microsaccade occurrence rate is the highest on the eye region, which contains the 
most task relevant information for both groups of observers. Moreover, our results 
showed that WCs, with a high-spatial frequency information tuning, benefit more 
from the perceptual gain following microsaccades. 
While the bulk of the empirical research on microsaccades focuses on the mechanism 
of microsaccade generation, the temporal dynamic of microsaccade remains 
surprisingly unexplored. Here, we observed that microsaccade onset within 400 to 
500 milliseconds is critical for behavioural response and it is likely to be related to 
the amount of available information. No study has previously reported perceptual 
enhancement effect of microsaccade during 400 – 500 ms. A limited number of 
studies indicate that microsaccades are generated every 200 – 300 ms to provide a 
high-acuity “snapshots” of a visual scene (Otero-Millan et al. 2008; Uchida et al. 
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2006). However, further research is required to clarify the exact function of 
microsaccade in this time window. 
In summary, the microsaccade results empirically confirmed the perceptual tuning of 
different cultural fixation bias. Results from visual information reconstruction 
indicate a high-spatial frequency information tuning for WCs during face recognition 
(Miellet et al. 2013). Here, by directly comparing the behavioural performance 
following microsaccade in WC and EA observers, we showed that a local eye 
movement strategy is indeed driven by a high-spatial frequency information tuning. 
WC observers, who employ a local eye movement strategy, achieve optimal 
behavioural performance on their preferred viewing location following the 
perceptual improvement produced by microsaccade. 
Conclusion 
Human observers elaborate face representations through diverse eye movement 
patterns. Driven by the preference to different parts of the spatial-frequency 
spectrum, observers engage in either a local or global strategies to sample 
information from various face parts. Here, we showed that WC observers make use of 
high-spatial-frequency information from their preferred viewing location for more 
rapid face identification, while no behavioural advantage is observed on their 
preferred viewing location in the EAs. Moreover, WCs benefit from the enhanced 
detail visibility following microsaccade on the preferred point of fixation. These 
observations confirm that culturally shaped fixation strategies are driven by 
perceptual preference to different spatial frequency information. 
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3 Tracking the Neural Tuning of Cultural Diversity in Eye 
Movements for Faces 
 
Preamble  
Eye movement strategies deployed by humans to identify conspecifics are not universal. 
When looking at faces, Westerners fixate the eyes and the mouth regions, whereas 
Easterners focus more on the center. However, the neural bases of this culturally 
Preferred Viewing Location (PVL) bias have never been directly investigated. 
We simultaneously recorded eye movements and electroencephalographic (EEG) signals 
of Westerners and Easterners while they performed face identification of learnt 
identities. To avoid EEG artefacts generated by saccades, we defined 9 equidistant 
Viewing Positions (VPs) covering all the internal facial features and presented faces 
centered on random VPs for 100 ms. The fixation maps extracted from a prior free-
viewing condition corroborated cultural diversity in PVLs during face recognition. To 
directly isolate modulations of EEG signals as a function of PVLs, we first computed the 
ranking of fixation intensity for each non-overleaping VP regions (Viewing Position 
Ranks - VPRs). We then carried-out a component-free data-driven spatio-temporal 
regression between the VPRs and EEG amplitudes. This novel approach revealed a 
marked direct relationship between both measures at around 350 ms in all observers, 
which was not related to a burst of microsaccades occurring in this time-window. A 
data-driven pattern classification procedure associated the scalp topography of this 
effect with the topography of the well-defined face-sensitive N170 component. 
Our data show that the distinct cultural fixation preferences for faces are related to a 
late universal post-perceptual tuning in the occipito-temporal cortex. Culture shapes 
visual information sampling, but does not regulate neural information decoding. 
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3.1  Introduction 
 
Human beings make use of sophisticated eye movement strategies to extract visual 
information and effectively adapt to the environment. It is thus very intriguing that 
when processing the most critical biological stimulus – i.e. the human face – 
observers from different cultures markedly differ in their information gathering 
strategies. Westerners use a triangular sequence of fixations including eyes and 
mouth (Althoff and Cohen 1999; Groner et al. 1984; Henderson et al. 2005; Yarbus 
1961). By contrast, Easterners deploy central fixations (Blais et al. 2008; Kelly et al. 
2010; Kita et al. 2010; Rodger et al. 2010), while reaching comparable face 
recognition performance. Yet, the underlying neural mechanisms of this cultural 
perceptual tuning in preferred viewing positions (PVLs) have never been directly 
investigated. 
The accurate temporal resolution of electroencephalography (EEG) posits this 
neuroimaging technique as the optimal candidate to track early temporal dynamics of 
information processing. With regards to face processing, a wealth of evidence 
highlights the importance of a specific time window spanning approximately from 
140 to 180 ms after stimulus onset. The N170 is an ERP component peaking 
negatively at bilateral occipitotemporal electrodes, larger to faces compared to any 
other visual category (Bentin et al. 1996). Importantly, N170 amplitude modulations 
have been observed for facial features in isolation, with the largest amplitude 
increase elicited by the eyes, compared to nose and mouth (Bentin et al. 1996). 
However electrophysiological modulations to facial features in isolation do not 
necessarily relate to processes involved during natural viewing conditions. These 
effects could be simply related to visual completion processes engaged in the 
reconstruction of full-face information. More recently McPartland et al. (2010) 
reported larger N170 to eyes and mouth compared to the nose, thus arguing for 
differential impact of PVLs upon neural face processing. Crucially though, this study 
employed a passive task and did not track eye movements during EEG recording, 
therefore not controlling for fixation locations and individual differences in PVLs. 
Given this shortcoming, it is impossible to unambiguously conclude whether such 
N170 modulations are related to PVLs, leaving this question unresolved. 
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To this aim, we simultaneously recorded eye movements and EEG signals of Western 
and Eastern observers while they performed a face identification task. Tracking the 
eye movements during EEG recording ensured a perfect control of the fixation 
location, as well as the elimination of trials contaminated by microsaccades, a source 
of potential confound (Dimigen et al. 2009). Because multi-oriented saccades 
generate complex EEG artefacts, faces were briefly flashed on nine predefined 
equidistant Viewing Positions (VPs, see Figure 1a) covering all the internal features. 
Individual PVL were extracted from a prior free-viewing face identity learning session 
using eye-tracking. We then directly related the electrophysiological signals with the 
PVLs by applying a component-free data-driven spatiotemporal regression analysis 
between those measures. Our data show no sensitivity on the N170 component, but 
the presence of a universal post-perceptual occipitotemporal neurophysiological 
sensitivity to PVLs at 350 ms, which mainly involve the same generators as the N170. 
3.2  Materials and Methods 
 
Participants.  
Twenty-four right-handed subjects (12 East Asians – EA and 12 Western Caucasians – 
WC), 13 of which (7 EA and 6 WC) female, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
(mean age 26.4) participated in the study. All the EA participants were Chinese and 
had never been to a western country before. The maximum duration of residence in 
the UK upon testing was less than 6 months. The experiment received the approval of 
the local ethical committee and all participants provided written informed consent. 
Stimuli and procedure.  
A total of 24 grey scale images of four EA and four WC identities containing equal 
numbers of male and female faces were obtained from the KDEF (Lundqvist et al. 
1998) and AFID (Bang et al. 2001) databases. Each identity was portrayed twice as an 
emotional (i.e. disgust and happy) and once a neutral face. The images were 390 × 
390 pixels in size, subtending 15.6° degrees of visual angle vertically and horizontally 
with the face cover about 10° degrees of visual angle in the visual field. Viewing 
distance was maintained at 70 cm by a chinrest, reflecting a natural distance during 
human interaction (Hall 1966). Faces were cropped to remove external features and 
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aligned on the eye and mouth positions. After normalizing their luminance in Matlab 
7.5 (2007b), images were presented on a Dell P1130 19” CRT monitor with an 800 × 
600 pixel white background, and a refresh rate of 170 Hz.  
The whole experiment was carried out over two consecutive days. During the first 
day only emotional faces were displayed. The subjects sat in a dimly lit, sound-
attenuated electrically shielded booth. Participants were instructed to learn the 8 
identities. Each identity was assigned to one button of a computer’s keyboard. 
Participants learned to associate each identity to a specific finger – ranging from the 
index to the little finger of both hands – placed on the appropriate key. The stimuli 
were presented, in a random order, at the center of the screen for 5 seconds each, 
with the corresponding response key being displayed below each face. Within the 5 
seconds presentation time, participants were allowed to press the key paired to the 
identity displayed on the screen as many times as they needed to achieve an adequate 
level of familiarity and confidence with the response. Subsequently subjects 
performed a memory task where they were required to recognize the faces they had 
just learned by pressing the buttons associated to the identities. The memory task 
ended upon successful completion of at least 5 error free blocks, 3 of which had to be 
consecutively completed without mistakes. Each block consisted of 8 identities 
displayed once until behavioural response, in random order and at random locations 
on the screen. The participants could freely explore the stimuli while their eye 
movements were recorded. An eye tracker drift correction procedure was performed 
before each face presentation to accurately determine the eyes position. 
In Day 2, participants were tested in the same room with the same eye tracking 
setting. Additionally, EEG scalp signal was simultaneously recorded (see Eye Tracking 
and EEG recording section for details). Importantly, the stimuli presented in day 2 
represented the same previously learned identities, but this time all faces displayed a 
neutral expression. Before the task began, the 8 neutral faces were rendered available 
for 2 minutes on a sheet of paper. On paper, the faces measured 4 by 4cm. 
Participants were instructed to correctly recognize the faces by button press as 
described before as accurately and as fast as they could. The faces were presented at 
9 different locations of the screen. Based on internal features, we defined 9 
equidistant positions within faces (i.e. Viewing Positions –VPs, see Figure 3.1a) 
spaced by 2.24° visual angle. The stimuli were then displayed for 100 ms with 1 of the 
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9 VPs centered on the fixation cross. By implementing this procedure we controlled 
for foveal and extra-foveal information sampling. 
Each trial lasted approximately for 2500 milliseconds. The procedure began with a 
0.3° fixation cross in the middle of the screen, displayed for 800 ms. This was 
followed by the presentation of a face centerd on one VP for 100 ms, succeeded by a 
second fixation cross which remained on the screen until behavioural response. 
There was a 1200 millisecond delay after the participants’ response, and the next trial 
started automatically upon fixation at the center of the screen.  
To avoid complex EEG artefacts generated by saccades, participants were told to keep 
focus on the fixation cross at all time during the experiment. Stable gazing on the 
fixation cross was verified using eye-tracking. Participants’ eye movements were 
monitored and processed on-line for trial validation. Trials containing blink or 
saccade during face presentation were excluded. A trial was validated if the 
participants’ eye drift was less than 1° of visual angle away from the center of the 
screen during stimulus presentation. The experiment ended when a participant 
completed 720 valid trials (8 faces × 9 positions × 10 times each position).  
Eye tracking and EEG recording.  
Eye movements were recorded by means of a Desktop-Mount EyeLink 2K eyetracker 
(SR Research Ltd., Mississauga, Ont., Canada) with a temporal resolution of 1000 Hz, a 
spatial resolution of 0.01°of visual angle and an average gaze position error of about 
0.25°. Eye movements were recorded binocularly, but only the dominant eye position 
was used for valid trials on-line processing. The eye movement data were recorded 
via Matlab (R2006a), using the Psychophysics (PTB-3) and EyeLink Toolbox 
extensions (Brainard 1997; Cornelissen et al. 2002). Calibration and validation of eye 
fixation were conducted before the experiment and repeated whenever necessary 
during the procedure. 
The EEG data were acquired on a 128-channel Biosemi Active Two EEG system 
(Biosemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands), sampled at 1024 Hz. According to the 10-5 
system (Oostenveld and Praamstra 2001), electrodes were placed in a nylon cap. Four 
additional electrodes (UltraFlat Active electrodes, Biosemi) were attached below and 
at the outer canthi of both eyes to record vertical and horizontal electro-oculograms. 
All electrode amplitudes were kept between ±25 μV. The ground consisted of an 
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active electrode (common mode sense, CMS) and a passive electrode (driven right leg, 
DRL) forming a feedback loop for amplifier reference. Subjects were asked to 
minimize blinking, head movement, and other body movement. 
Behavioural studies.  
We applied mix model regression on reaction time (RT) and logit mix model 
regression on accuracy rate (ACC).  
Eye movement data analysis.  
During face memory task in Day 1 all identities fixation maps were computed 
individually for EA and WC observers using Matlab 7.5 (2007b). Blinks and fixations 
outside stimulus area were excluded from analysis. Taking into account gaze-tracking 
errors, each fixation was smoothed with a Gaussian kernel (α=10 pixels, 
corresponding to 0.4 degree of visual angle in the stimulus space). Individual fixation 
maps were computed by summing all fixation locations (x, y coordinates) across time 
for all trials. Moreover, to estimate each participant’s fixation bias we first created 
masks of 1.6° of visual angle for each of the nine VPs. We then extracted the values of 
the fixation maps independently within each mask. To acquire the individual 
preference towards different VPs, we ranked the VPs for each participant by the value 
within the masks (i.e. Viewing Positions Ranks – VPRs).  
We first computed the group fixation maps as the smoothed average fixation 
durations per pixel normalized in the stimulus space. Differences in fixation patterns 
across groups were then computed as a normalized contrast between EA and WC 
group maps.  We then carried out a two-tailed Bonferroni corrected Pixel test 
(Chauvin et al. 2005) to assess the significant differences between the group fixation 
maps. For a detailed discussion on the novel approach used to analyze eye-movement 
data (iMap) see Caldara & Miellet (2011). 
Eye movement data collected in Day 2 were segmented in epochs from -100 ms to 
500 ms centered on stimulus onsets to maintain consistency with the EEG epoch. 
Trials with eye blinks and saccades with amplitudes >1° of visual angle were 
discarded from the microsaccade analysis (7 out of 720, <1%). Following the 
algorithms detailed in Engbert and Mergenthaler (2006), microsaccades were defined 
as outliers in 2D velocity space thresholded for peak velocity and minimum duration. 
We first computed the eye velocity with a modified version of the central difference 
90 
 
algorithm (Bahill et al. 1982; modified by Engbert and Mergenthaler 2006) to 
suppress high-frequency noise. The eye movement velocity was a combination of 
vertical and horizontal movement components. Relativity thresholds were set 
independently for each participant as the outliners (five standard deviations away 
from the median) of the velocity values observed across the entire 600 ms interval. 
Microsaccades were then defined where velocity exceeded a relative threshold for a 
minimum duration of six samples (6 ms). Finally, we only considered binocular 
microsaccades with a temporal overlap of at least two data samples (2 ms). 
EEG signal analysis.  
Only trials with correct behavioural response were analyzed (96% for WC and 98% 
for EA, detailed in Result session). EEG signal was preprocessed using BESA 5.2 and 
further analyzed in EEGLAB (Delorme and Makeig 2004) and Matlab 7.5 (2007b). In 
BESA, EEG data were referenced off-line to an average reference, and low-passed 
filtered at 40 Hz with a slope of 6dB. We rejected noisy electrodes on a subject-by-
subject basis and later interpolated them using the EEGLAB topoplot function. 
Activity due to eye blinks was removed from the data before segmentation using 
BESA built-in principal components analysis (PCA). To exclude possible artefacts 
from voltage drifts or amplifier saturation, we also discarded segments with absolute 
voltages larger than 120μV. Trials were averaged across epochs of -100 ms to 500 ms 
(614 time-points), independently per condition. For baseline correction, the average 
100 ms of pre-stimulus activity was removed from every time-point independently at 
each electrode and condition.  
To properly determine whether the neural activity measured with EEG was directly 
related to individually preferred viewing locations (PVL), we fitted different linear 
mixed-effect model and also conducted linear regressions to quantify the relationship 
between VPRs and EEG amplitudes. These analysis were applied to  at all the 
electrodes and time-points independently in each group (Rousselet and Pernet 2011). 
To be consistent with the regressor, electrophysiological responses were also 
normalized based on the same logic. We Z-scored the ERP signal at each electrode and 
each time-point across all the participants independently. This analysis is a 
component-free data-driven method that makes no a-priori assumption about where 
and when to look for effects in the ERP signal. However, this method increases the 
likelihood of type I errors (false significant) due to the large number of comparisons. 
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To correct for multiple comparisons, we used robust statistic, including bootstrap 
(Wilcox 2005) and a multivariate clustering technique (Maris and Oostenveld 2007). 
Within each group, we first centered the ERP amplitude so that each condition had a 
mean of zero. We then used bootstrap to derive an estimate of the sampling 
distribution of our statistic in a condition in which the null hypothesis of no 
difference across the means was true. In each bootstrap, we sampled subjects with 
replacement and carried out the regression (as described above) independently at all 
electrodes and time-points. The signiﬁcant F values (P < 0.05) were then grouped in 
spatiotemporal clusters (Maris and Oostenveld 2007). For each bootstrap, we 
computed the sum of F values in every cluster and selected the maximum cluster sum. 
We repeated this procedure 499 times, leading to 500 F cluster sums for each main 
effect and interaction. After sorting the 500 cluster sums, we selected the 95th 
percentile as our cluster threshold to assess statistical signiﬁcance. The signiﬁcant F 
values from the original regression were clustered, and the sum of F values inside 
each cluster was compared with the bootstrap cluster threshold for that test. If an 
observed cluster sum was equal or larger than the threshold sum obtained under H0, 
all of the time-points and the electrodes contained in that cluster were considered 
signiﬁcant (Vizioli et al. 2010). 
3.3  Results 
 
Behaviour 
Logit mix model regression is carried out on accuracy rate (ACC) with the following 
mix-model (1): 
ACC ~ 1 + Groups_of_observers + VPs + Races_of_stimuli + Groups_of_observers*VPs 
+ Groups_of_observers*Races_of_stimuli + VPs*Races_of_stimuli                                    (1) 
Based on the low difficulty of the task, we expected both group perform equally well 
with high accuracy rate. Indeed, result showed no significant main effects of viewing 
position (SE = .00176, p = .503) or groups of observers (SE = .00644, p = .054). We did 
not observed any other-race effect in accuracy rate as the result did not show 
significant interaction between groups of observers and race of the stimuli (SE = 
.00418, p = .938). As shown in Figure 3.1b, both WC and EA observers showed high 
face identification accuracy (WC: 96.3%, 95% CIs [96.0%, 96.6%]; EA: 98.1%, 95% 
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CIs [97.9%, 98.3%]) regardless of the viewing position. To increase the sensitivity of 
our analysis, only trials with accurate identification were considered in the following 
analysis. 
A mix model ANOVA (1’) is applied on the reaction time (RT). 
RT ~ 1 + Groups_of_observers + VPs + Races_of_stimuli + Groups_of_observers*VPs + 
Groups_of_observers*Races_of_stimuli + VPs*Races_of_stimuli                                      (1’) 
The result is shown in Figure 3.1c. No significant main effect or interaction is 
revealed. Especially, no significant interaction between groups of observers and race 
of the stimuli is revealed (RT: F (1,425) = .025, p = .874). To further quantify the 
relationship between fixation bias and reaction time, I fit the following linear mixed-
effect model to the interested variables: 
Z (RT) ~ 1 + Groups_of_observers + VPRs + Groups_of_observers*VPRs + (1 + 
Races_of_stimuli + Groups_of_observers*Races_of_stimuli | subject)                             (2) 
Result showed significant main effect of VPRs (b = -.11, 95% CIs [-.218, -.006], SE = 
.00539, t (284) = -2.081, p = .038, see Figure 3.1d). To better estimate the coefficients 
of the fixation bias in each group of observers, a linear regression was then 
performed using a robust regression approach independently for WC and EA 
observers. As shown in model (3), the reaction time was the respond vector and 
fixation preferences of each VP (VPRs) were entered as predictor. Moreover, to put 
the participants’ behavioural response into the same scale, their reaction time was Z-
scored.  
Z (RT) ~ 1 + VPRs                                                                                                                             (3) 
Regression result is shown in Figure 3.1e and 3.1f. Fixation bias (VPZs) significantly 
regressed with reaction time in both WC observers (b = -.137, 95% CIs [-.207, -.066], 
SE = .0357, t (106) = -3.823, p = .00022) and EA observers (b = -.075, 95% CIs [-.149, -
.00044], SE = .0373, t (106) =-1.995, p = .049). 
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Figure 3.1. (a) Illustration of 9 Viewing Positions (VPs, white numbers) and the correspondent 
Viewing Position regions (red circles). Each VP region covers 1.6 degree of visual angle. (b) 
Accuracy rate for both Western Caucasian (WC, red bar) and East Asian (EA, blue bar) 
observers of the recognition task in Day 2. (c) Reaction time for both WC and EA observers. 
(d)Main effect of viewing position ranks (VPRs) in relate to normalized reaction time (RT) in 
liner mixed-effect model (2).  (e) and (f) robust regression between VPRs and RT for both groups 
of observers. Error bars indicate 95% CIs. 
Eye movements 
Group fixation maps were computed based on the eye movement data collected in 
Day1. Consistently with previous results (Blais et al. 2008; Kelly et al. 2010; Rodger et 
al. 2010), WC participants preferentially fixated the eyes and mouth regions during 
face recognition. By contrast, EA participants predominantly fixated on the center of 
the face, mainly on the nose region. As shown in Figure 3.2c, the difference maps on 
which a two-tailed pixel test (Zcrit = |4.25| with threshold at p = .05) was applied 
clearly illustrated diverse fixation strategies across groups of observers. Figure 3.2a 
and 3.2b show the relative fixation biases per group. The areas fixated above chance 
are delimited by white borders (Figure 3.2c). The effect sizes on average fixation 
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intensity between the two groups were calculated using Cohen’s d (d = 2.31 for eyes 
and mouth region, and d = 2.43 for center region). 
 
Figure 3.2. (a) Fixation maps for the Western Caucasian (WC) and b) East Asian (EA) observers 
in the learning task (Day 1). The white lines delimit areas significantly fixated above chance 
level. The differential fixation map (c) was computed by subtracting the WC (a) from the EA Z-
scored group fixation map (b). A significant fixation bias in (c) is shown in the area delimited by 
white borders (Zcrit = |4.25| with threshold at p = .05, red for WC bias, blue for EA bias). 
Data-driven EEG analyses  
Spatiotemporal linear mixed-effect model. Linear mixed-effect model was performed 
independently for all electrodes and all time points with normalized ERP amplitude 
as response vector and VPRs as input vector. 
Z [ERP (ie, tp)] ~ 1 + Groups_of_observers + VPRs + Groups_of_observers*VPRs + (1 + 
Races_of_stimuli + Groups_of_observers*Races_of_stimuli | subject)                              (4) 
After multiple comparison correction, only significant main effect of VPRs is revealed 
in the time window of 330 to 380 ms (Figure 3.3a). Within this cluster, VPRs 
positively correlated with the normalized ERP amplitude over both occipito-temporal 
clusters (i.e., P7, P7h, P9h, PO5, PO7, PO7h, PO9h, PO9 on the left; P8, P8h, P10h, PO6, 
PO8, PO8h, PO10h, PO10 on the right, see Figure 3.3b), The largest effect was 
observed over PO8 at 357 ms: b = .219, 95% CIs [.176, .262], SE = .0217, t (284) = 
10.069, p = 9.39e-20; the minimum effect was reported over P7 at 379 ms: b = .115, 
95% CIs [.065, .164], SE = .0252, t (284) = 4.559, p = 8.65e-6. 
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Figure 3.3. Spatiotemporal linear mixed-effect model results. (a) Significant t-value map of the 
VPRs main effect after multiple comparison correction. Electrodes are stacked up along the y-
axis and time is shown along the x-axis. Statistical significant effects were found in 330 to 380 
ms time window. (b)Topography of the VPRs main effect in this time window. 
Spatiotemporal regressions. Within each group of observers, linear regression was 
performed independently for all electrodes and all time points with normalized ERP 
amplitude as response vector and VPRs as input vector. 
Z [ERP (ie, tp)] ~ 1 + VPRs                                                                                                                  (5) 
After multiple comparison correction, significant clusters were reported in both 
groups of observers in the time window ranging from 330 to 380 ms (Figure 3.4a & 
3.4b, red panel). For clarity purposes, here we report only the statistical values of the 
electrode showing the maximal and the minimal effect within each cluster. VPRs 
significantly correlated with the normalized ERP amplitude over both occipito-
temporal and center-parietal clusters (Figure 3.4g & 3.4i). On both sides of occipito-
temporal cluster, VPR positively correlated with ERP amplitudes in both groups of 
observers (Figure 3.4h & 3.4j). For WC participants, the largest effect within the left 
cluster was observed over PO9 at 357 ms: b = .412, 95% CIs [.367, .463], R2 = .263, 
F(1,80) = 34.538, p = 5.35e-4; the minimum effect was reported over P7 at 332 ms: b 
= .257, 95% CIs [.206, .300], R2 = .067, F(1,80) = 6.936, p = .032. For EA participants, 
the largest effect within the left cluster was observed over P9h at 366 ms: b = .457, 
95% CIs [.403, .510], R2 = .367, F(1,80) = 61.375, p = 9.63e-5 and the minimum over 
PO8 at 377 ms: b = .291, 95% CIs [.217, .349], R2 = .062, F(1,80) = 6.958, p = .045. 
Contrarily, on center-parietal cluster (Cz, C1, C2, CPz, etc.), VPR negatively correlated 
with ERP amplitudes. For WC observers: bmax = -.417, 95% CIs [-.462, -.368], R2 = .172, 
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F(1,80) = 21.954, p =  1.609e-6 and bmin = -.251, 95% CIs [-.305, -.199], R2 = .062, 
F(1,80) = 6.947, p = .049. For EA observers: bmax = -.432, 95% CIs [-.489, -.372], R2 = 
.217, F(1,80) = 29.393, p =  5.47e-6 and bmin = -.251, 95% CIs [-.305, -.199], R2 = .062, 
F(1,80) = 6. 958, p = .048.  
 
Figure 3.4. Spatiotemporal regression results for the Western Caucasian (WC, (a)) and the East 
Asian (EA) observers (b) after multiple comparison correction. Only significant clusters are 
shown. Electrodes are stacked up along the y-axis and time is shown along the x-axis. Statistical 
significant effects were found in two time-windows. Within the first, occurring at around 100 ms 
to 150 ms (yellow box), only EA observers show significant regression between Viewing 
Positions Region (VPR) intensity and normalized ERP amplitude (highlight as yellow). The 
second (red box) occurred at around 330 ms to 380 ms with consistent cluster burst in both 
groups. Topographies of both groups of observers at the latency of the maximum effect within 
each time window are shown accordingly in c), e), g) and i). Line plots of the original ERP are 
shown in d), f), h) and j) with only the most preferred VP (highest VPR intensity, red line) and 
the least fixated VP (lowest VPR intensity, green line) of selected electrodes (white circles shown 
in topographies, accordingly). 
Moreover, a significant cluster in the time window ranging from 100 ms to 150 ms 
was observed at center-occipital electrode sites (i.e., POz, Oz, OIz, Iz, O1h, O2h) for EA 
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observers only (Figure 3.4b yellow panel and Figure 3.4e). Regression results showed 
that VPR intensity were negatively correlated with normalized ERP amplitudes: bmax = 
-.527, 95% CIs [-.571, -.470], R2 = .280, F(1,80) = 41.216, p =  1.44e-7 over Oz at 134 
ms and bmin = -0.283, 95% CIs [-.331, -.227], R2 = 0.079, F(1,80) = 9.148, p = .038 over 
POz at 103 ms; see Figure 3.4f.  
Microsaccades 
Figure 3.5c & 3.5d show the rate of microsaccades after the presentation of target 
stimuli along the ERP time course in both groups of observers. Previous studies 
showed that the microsaccade rate follows a stereotypical time course after sensory 
events, apparent as an early inhibition followed by a later rebound (Engbert and 
Kliegl 2003; Rolfs et al. 2008a). A similar result was observed here: after stimulus 
onset microsaccade occurrence decreased over time, to then increase after 200 ms, 
reaching a stable level at 300 ms. 
To rule out the effect of microsaccade onset rate on our analysis, and especially the 
increase of microsaccade rate in the time window from 300 ms to 400 ms, we carried 
out a second level analysis on the spatiotemporal regression, taking microsaccade 
rate into account. After EEG signal preprocessing, but before averaging ERP epoch, 
the trials containing microsaccades on-set between 300 ms to 400 ms were excluded. 
This reduced the mean number of trials per condition to 56 (SD = 10.4). We then 
carried out the regressions between VPR intensity and the ERP amplitude again. As 
shown in Figure 3.5e & 3.5f, however, the pattern of result did not change. 
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Figure 3.5. Spatiotemporal regression results before (a & b) and after (e & f) removing trials 
contenting microsaccades. Microsaccade onsets in all trials of each participant are displayed in 
the raster plots (c & d, top). Each row represents one trial. Microsaccades detected by binocular 
eye tracking are marked with dots. Histograms in the bottom of c) and d) represent the saccade 
rate (per second) calculated in 20 ms blocks. The green lines are reporting the smoothed time 
course of the microsaccade onset rate. The blue dashed lines across the histograms represent 
the mean rate across the whole epoch (-100 ms to 500 ms). The yellow panel and the red panel 
are indicating the time windows of the significant regression clusters. 
Topography 
To provide further insights on the neural correlates underlying activation pattern 
revealed by the regression, we computed Pearson’s correlation between the 
topography of the beta weight obtained from the regression between VPRs and ERP 
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amplitudes (which showed significant effects at roughly 350 ms – Figure 3.6a & 3.6d) 
with the original ERP topography of N170 (Figure 3.6b & 3.6e) and P300 (Figure 3.6c 
& 3.6f) components independently per group of observers. Beta topography 
correlated higher with the N170 topography (Pearson's correlation coefficient of WC 
observers |rWC| = .916, p = 8.21e-52 and EA observers |rEA| = .798, p = 1.92e-29) 
compared to P300 (|rWC| = .736, p = 3.95e-23 for WC observers and |rEA| = .569, p = 
2.47e-12 for EA observers). Pearson’s correlation between beta topography map and 
original topography is performed independently for all participants. Paired-sample 
ttest is performed on individual Pearson’s r for each pair of comparison after fisher 
transformed. The correlation between beta topography and N170 topography is 
significantly higher than the correlation between beta and P300 topography (t (23) = 
3.391, p = .0025). 
 
Figure 3.6. The topographies of the beta weight from the regression cluster at 357 ms for 
Western Caucasian (WC) observers (a) and at 366 ms for East Asian (EA) observers (d). b), e), c) 
& f) are the original ERP topographies of N170 (147 ms for WC observers and 146 ms for EA 
observers) and P300 (356 ms for WC observers and 341 ms for EA observers), respectively for 
WC (top row) and EA observers (bottom row). 
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3.4  Discussion 
 
Culture alters the way people look at faces. Our data confirmed that Westerners 
preferentially fixate the eyes and mouth during face recognition, whereas, strikingly, 
Easterners focus more on the central facial region (Blais et al. 2008; Kelly et al. 2010; 
Kita et al. 2010; Rodger et al. 2010). Here, we aimed to isolate the neural dynamics of 
this perceptual, by using an original experimental design overcoming the EEG 
artefacts generated in the signal by eye movements. Regardless of the culture of the 
observer, brief fixation on Preferred Viewing Location (PVLs) increase participant’s 
behavioral performance. Contrary to our initial expectations, the face-sensitive N170 
was not modulated by the facial features presented on PVLs, or by the culture of the 
observers. In contrast, our data showed that the cultural contrast in PVLs for faces is 
universally coded by a distinct electrophysiological scalp response on the occipito-
temporal cortex, occurring at about 350 ms in the time window of the P3 component. 
Interestingly, the topography enclosing the late sensitivity to PVLs was strikingly 
similar to the electrophysiological N170 topography and unrelated to a burst of 
microsaccades occurring in its time window. 
Methodological contributions 
There have been different attempts to combine eye movement and 
electrophysiological measures. Researchers either measured EEG and eye movements 
over separate sessions to then associate the averaged responses (Raney and Rayner 
1993; Sereno et al. 1998); or recorded both measures simultaneously and correlated 
their signals (Dimigen et al. 2011; Nikolaev et al. 2011). In the latter scenario, 
fixation-related brain potentials (FRPs) are computed by averaging the electrical 
brain activity after saccade offset to isolate the contribution of the neural generator of 
saccadic movement to the ERP signals (e.g., Dimigen et al. 2011; Nikolaev et al. 2011). 
However, the implementation of this approach holds potential drawbacks, especially 
when investigating high-level neural responses to visual stimuli. Electrophysiological 
signals produced by neural saccade generators and those elicited by the stimulus at 
hand would concomitantly modulate the ERP signal, compromising the 
discrimination of the relative contribution of each of those two processes. 
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To overcome this limitation, we measured observers’ fixation patterns in a separate 
free viewing face learning session. We extracted the fixation intensities in non-
overlapping Viewing Position Regions (VPRs), as a measure of the individual 
preferences towards each Viewing positions. To directly link the eye movement and 
electrophysiological signals, we then simulated a single fixation by briefly presenting 
faces on 1 of 9 viewing positions and simultaneously recorded eye movements. We 
then performed a data-driven spatiotemporal regression between the VPR fixation 
intensities and the normalized ERP amplitude signals across all the time points and 
all the electrodes. In addition, following the recent concerns in microsaccade 
contamination of event-related EEG data (Dimigen et al. 2009; Yuval-Greenberg et al. 
2008), we further carried out a confirmatory analysis by excluding the trials 
containing microsaccades. 
Early and late electrophysiological responses of Preferred Visual Locations 
P1 - We found a cluster of electrodes peaking at around 130 ms over the central-
occipital site that was sensitive to PVLs in East Asian observers only. This observation 
might be accounted by a stronger sensitivity for processing faces with extra-foveal 
vision within this cultural group. In fact, we have recently shown that Westerners 
mainly rely on foveal vision, using mostly a relatively small (local) information span. 
In contrast, Easterners predominantly use a large information span, relying more on 
extra-foveal information while processing faces (Miellet et al. 2013). Since faces were 
mostly presented in diverse eccentric VPs, they most probably triggered a greater use 
of visual resources in Easterners, as the observers from this culture tend to extract 
global information from faces. 
N170 - In the electrophysiological literature, the N170 has been established as being 
the major component showing sensitivity to faces (e.g., Bentin et al. 1996; Carmel and 
Bentin 2002; Rossion and Jacques 2008). Despite the N170 being clearly affected by 
various experimental and stimulus manipulations (Joyce et al. 2006), there is limited 
direct evidence in the literature that suggests that its amplitude is modulated by the 
facial features attended by the observers (but see the work of Schyns, 2003 & 2004). 
For example McPartland et al. (2010) showed that N170 amplitude was larger when 
participants gazed at the upper (i.e., between the eyes) and the lower part (i.e., 
mouth) of the face, compared to the central part (i.e., the nose). In the current study, 
we did not find significant modulation of the N170. The absence of an early 
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electrophysiological effect on the N170 was surprising, yet not completely 
unexpected. To simulate genuine eye movement fixations to single features, we 
intentionally used faces covering a large visual angle (roughly 10° degrees). This is 
notably larger to what is routinely used in the electrophysiological literature (in 
general less than 7° of visual angle). Therefore, with this visual control it was not 
trivial for the observers to process all facial information from a single fixation, which 
might have engendered the necessity of going through a deeper stage of processing to 
retrieve the fine-grained representations of the facial identities. This observation is in 
line with previous studies, showing that the N170 amplitude was modulated by face 
images with task-related diagnostic information only on gender task but not on 
expression task (Joyce et al. 2006). In addition, unlike McPartland et al. (2010), here 
we used an active task. This factor could also account for the absence of an effect at 
this stage of face processing. More importantly, McPartland et al. (2010) did not 
consider the cultural bias in fixation preferences or directly took into account 
individual fixation preferences. This is an important drawback, as our active free-
viewing condition clearly shows that every observer, even within the same cultural 
group, deploys a specific individual fixation pattern to achieve face recognition. 
P300 - The novelty relies here. We found a distinct and strong linear relationship 
between both measures at around 350 milliseconds, on a cluster of bilateral and 
central electrodes of the occipital-temporal scalp. The more one region was 
preferentially fixated by an observer, the greater the electrophysiological amplitude 
responses on those clusters. This result remained unaltered after the removal of 
microsaccades, which indicated that this electrophysiological pattern is genuinely 
related to neural and not muscular activations related to micro eye movements. 
The positive on-going amplitude occurring in this time window and its topography 
are in line with the P300 or P3b, a classical ERP component following the N170. The 
P300 is considered as a component reflecting decision-making process (Philiastides 
et al. 2006). Its amplitude is directly related to task demands, cognitive and 
perception workload (Kok 2001).  Although P300 is usually not considered as face-
specific, limited evidence suggests that it can be modulated by face processing 
(Liddell et al. 2004; Schupp et al. 2004; Streit et al. 2000), especially when an active 
task is involved (Campanella et al. 2000; Smith et al. 2004). For example Smith et al. 
(2004) showed that selective attention to diagnostic features and correct 
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categorization modulated the P300 signal. In another example, the P300 amplitude 
was modulated by task complexity only when the participant was required to 
respond (Campanella et al. 2000).  
Of particular interest, our data-driven classification procedure clearly associated the 
scalp topographies of our statistical regression effects to the surface activations 
characterizing the N170 electrophysiological topography for faces (and not the P300). 
This observation suggests that the neural activations modulated by the individual 
fixation preferences are most probably tapping into a neural network similar to the 
one recruited during the occurrence of the N170. Since the N170 has been associate 
to the brain regions dedicated to face processing (Sadeh et al. 2010), the P300 
sensitivity to PVLs might be related to a re-entrant signal in the face system. This re-
entrance for PVLs might reflect an access to fine-grained representations dedicated to 
decision recognition processes. 
Regardless of this interpretation, the topography of the neural fixation bias for faces 
we identified here suggests that this phenomenon is most probably occurring in the 
occipito-temporal cortex instead of the frontal brain areas dedicated to the control of 
eye movements. However, due to the spatial resolution of EEG, further investigations 
are necessary to isolate the neural generators behind this effect and clarify the extent 
to which it would be related to the processing of faces, non-face visual objects and 
words. 
3.5  Conclusions 
 
Eye movement studies have shown that the preferred viewing locations for faces are 
different across East Asian and Western Caucasian observers. To isolate the neural 
responses underlying this cultural visual preference, we used a novel experimental 
design coupled with original robust data-driven analyses directly combining eye 
movements with electrophysiological signals over the time course. Our data show 
that the cultural perceptual bias is linked to a distinct universal electrophysiological 
response. Fixations towards the individual preferred facial regions elicit maximal 
bilateral occipito-temporal responses at around 350 ms, with a scalp topography very 
similar to the one typifying the face-sensitive N170 component. These findings 
provide unique evidence for a neural coding of eye movements for faces with an 
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identical neural signature in every individual, most probably occurring in the 
occipito-temporal brain areas dedicated to face processing. 
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4 Culture modulates the Temporal Dynamics of 
Global/Local Processing 
 
Preamble  
Cultural differences in the way individuals from Western Caucasian (WC) and East 
Asian (EA) societies perceive and attend to visual information have been consistently 
reported in recent years. WC observers favor and perceive most efficiently the salient, 
local visual information by directing attention to focal objects. In contrast, EA observers 
show a bias towards global information, by preferentially attending elements in the 
background. However, the underlying neural mechanisms and the temporal dynamics of 
this striking cultural contrast have yet to be clarified. 
The combination of Navon figures, which contain both global and local features, and the 
measurement of neural adaptation constitute an ideal way to probe this issue. We 
recorded the electrophysiological signals of WC and EA observers while they actively 
matched culturally neutral geometric Navon shapes. In each trial, participants 
sequentially viewed and categorized an adapter shape followed by a target shape, as 
being either: identical; global congruent; local congruent; and different. We quantified 
the repetition suppression (stRS), a reduction in neural activity in stimulus sensitive 
regions following stimulus repetition, using a single-trial approach. A robust data-
driven spatio-temporal analysis revealed at 80ms a significant interaction between the 
culture of the observers and shape adaptation. EA observers showed sensitivity to global 
congruency on the attentional P1 component, whereas WC observers showed 
discrimination for global shapes at later stages. 
Our data revealed an early sensitivity to global and local shape categorization, which is 
modulated by culture. This neural tuning could underlie more complex behavioral 
differences observed across human populations. 
 
 
(This chapter has been published in Culture and Brain under the same title)  
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4.1  Introduction 
 
Human visual experience is strongly modulated by culture. For over 20 years, cross-
cultural research in cognitive science and, more recently in neuroscience, have shown 
that culture shapes the way we perceive the world (for a review, see Han et al. 2013). 
Studies comparing Western Caucasian (WC) and East Asian (EA) observers have 
provided convergent evidence on the cultural perceptual biases characterizing the 
cognitive styles of those populations (e.g., Nisbett and Miyamoto 2005; Nisbett et al. 
2001). Westerners preferably focus on local information in objects (e.g., Masuda and 
Nisbett 2001), scene (e.g., Masuda and Nisbett 2006), and face perception (e.g., Blais 
et al. 2008; Caldara et al. 2010). In contrast, individuals from EA cultures – such as 
China or Japan - display instead a perceptual bias towards global information 
processing. Recent evidence has suggested that this cultural contrast might rely on 
culture-specific tuning towards visual spatial frequency information (Miellet et al. 
2013). More precisely, WC observers use preferentially high spatial frequency 
information from foveal vision (e.g., see Miellet et al. 2013 for evidence from face 
recognition). In contrast, EA observers preferentially process contextual information 
by relying on extra-foveal vision during face recognition (Miellet et al. 2013), and for 
change detection of both low-level visual stimuli (e.g., color blocks; Boduroglu et al. 
2009) and complex real-world stimuli (e.g., natural scenes; Masuda and Nisbett 
2001). 
These perceptual tunings have been related to attentional differences across cultural 
groups (Nisbett et al. 2001). In a series of studies, it has been consistently 
demonstrated that WC observers attend to and process more effectively local 
features, while EA observers exhibit a global attention bias (McKone et al. 2010; 
Nisbett and Miyamoto 2005;  Hedden et al. 2008; Kitayama et al. 2003). For example, 
Kitayama et al. (2003) presented Westerners and Esterners a vertical line within a 
square frame and subsequently asked the observers to report the length of the line 
(i.e., rod-and-frame task). In the task requiring local selective attention (i.e., reporting 
the absolute length without referencing to the surrounding frame), WC observers are 
more accurate than EA observers, whereas EA observers outperformed WC observers 
in the task requiring global selective attention (i.e., reporting the relative length by 
referencing to the surrounding frame). EA observers are also more distracted by 
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unrelated global information and faster at detecting targets at the global level 
compared to Westerners, (Boduroglu et al. 2009; Petrova et al. 2013), which suggest 
they might have a global selective attention bias. Within this framework yet, McKone 
et al. (2010) used Navon stimuli to directly quantify the global/local attention bias 
between Westerners and Easterners. Navon figures are hierarchical stimuli 
comprising a large global shape constituted by small local shapes (Navon 1977). One 
of the main advantages of these images lies in that participants viewing the very same 
stimulus (thus perfectly matched in terms of low-level visual properties) can be cued 
or can show a visual preference to either the local or global elements (McKone et al. 
2010; Navon 1977). Interestingly, McKone et al. (2010) reported that only East Asian 
observers identified target letters faster when they were appearing at the global level. 
These authors attributed this performance advantage to a more effective global-
selective attention in EA compared to WC observers (McKone et al. 2010). 
However, the difference in attention selectivity between cultures has been questioned 
in a number of studies. For example, a direct replication of Kitayama et al. (2003) 
reported that both WC and EA observers performed better at tasks requiring more 
global- than local-selective attention (Zhou et al. 2008). Eye tracking results also 
showed that EA observers do not overtly direct more attention (i.e., fixations) 
towards the global information than WC observers (Evans et al. 2009; Miellet et al. 
2010; Rayner et al. 2009; Rayner et al. 2007; but see Chua et al. 2005). In other cross-
cultural studies using Navon figures, Caparos et al. (2013) tested observers from 
Himba culture (i.e. a remote culture from North Namibia, see Davidoff et al. 2008) and 
reported a perceptual bias to local features in this population. However, despite such 
very strong local perceptual bias, the Himba did not underperform on global 
selective-tasks compared to Western controls (Caparos et al. 2013). Altogether, the 
extent to which attentional processes are playing a key role on the cultural 
differences reported above and the presence of this perceptual bias across the 
Western and Eastern cultures remains to be clarified. 
The electroencephalography (EEG) technique is highly relevant to probe this question 
and identify whether and when attentional processes would drive such cultural 
perceptual biases in global/local processing. Notably, attention modulates a 
particular electrophysiological signature in human observers: the P1 event-related 
potential (ERP) (Hillyard et al. 1973; Van Voorhis & Hillyard, 1977; for a review, see 
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Luck, Woodman, & Vogel, 2000). The P1 is a positive deflection peaking roughly 100 
ms after stimulus onset on the occipital scalp surface, larger for attended than 
unattended information. Surprisingly, studies directly comparing two groups of 
observers did not reveal differences on this component (Goto et al. 2010; Lewis et al. 
2008). For example, Goto et al. (2010) manipulated the semantic incongruity between 
objects and scenes. They only observed cultural differences in the ERP amplitudes at 
later stages of information processing (i.e., N400 components; Kutas and Hillyard, 
1980; Holcomb and Neville, 1991). While methodological shortcomings such as 
significant differences in low-level visual properties of the stimuli should be taken 
into consideration (Petrova et al. 2013), conventional ERP analysis relying on 
absolute amplitude differences across conditions might not be sensitive enough to 
reveal early effects (see Vizioli et al., 2010). In order to increase the sensitivity of the 
electrophysiological signals, here we adopted one of the most powerful methods used 
in the neurophysiological literature, which relies on the neural repetition effect. 
Adaptation is a well-established paradigm used to reveal the nature of information 
coding at the perceptual and neurophysiological levels (for a review, see Grill-Spector 
et al. 2006). In this framework, “repetition suppression” (RS) is the reduction of 
neural activity, in stimulus-related regions, associated to the presentation of two or 
more stimuli in rapid succession (Grill-Spector et al. 2006; Henson 2003; Henson and 
Rugg 2003; Wiggs and Martin 1998). It has been argued that RS represents a 
“sharpening” mechanism within the neural population that engage in the processing 
of the repeated stimulus (Grill-Spector et al. 2006; Wiggs and Martin 1998). Thus, the 
amount of RS reflects the capacity of neural populations to discriminate different 
information and can thus be viewed as a novelty detection mechanism and a more 
efficient coding of the sensory input (Caharel et al. 2009; Grill-Spector et al. 2006; 
Jenkins et al. 2010; Vizioli et al. 2010). RS has been reported in EEG and fMRI studies 
across a variety of cognitive tasks (e.g., Gutnisky and Dragoi 2008; Müller et al. 1999; 
Todorovic and de Lange 2012; Vizioli et al. 2010). Interestingly, RS has recently been 
observed in cross-cultural studies on the blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) 
signal with functional magnetic resonance imaging (Goh et al. 2007; Jenkins et al. 
2010). Jenkins et al. (2010) found a significantly larger RS to incongruent scenes than 
to congruent scenes in bilateral occipital cortex for Chinese participants. This 
observation suggests that EA observers engage more in object processing when it 
appears in incongruent than in congruent contexts, which also indicates a bias 
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towards global processing in this population. However, the temporal dynamics of this 
cultural perceptual bias are still largely unexplored. 
To clarify this issue, we took full advantage of the conjoint use of Navon stimuli with 
an EEG adaptation paradigm, in order to map out the temporal dynamics of 
global/local shape processing in WC and EA observers. EA and WC observers viewed 
sequences of two Navon figures (an adaptor and a target, see Figure 4.1), while we 
recorded their scalp EEG signals. Importantly, Navon images were constituted by 
elementary geometric shapes equally familiar to both groups of observers (and not by 
Romanic letters, for which Westerners have greater experience). Participants 
performed an active categorization task requiring the selective detection of (a 
potential) change occurring either on global or local features on the target image. To 
control for electrophysiological artifacts generated by saccades, we simultaneously 
recorded the eye movements and participants were trained to fixate at the center of 
the screen. Moreover, instead of applying a conventional electrophysiological analysis 
that would only focus on the target ERPs, we adopted the novel single-trial analysis 
method developed by Vizioli et al. (2010). Electrophysiological responses elicited by 
the target shapes were subtracted from those elicited by the adaptor shapes 
independently at the single-trial level (see methods).  To better estimate their 
temporal sensitivity, we then used a data-driven spatio-temporal analyses carried out 
independently at all electrodes and all the time-points. Our results showed that EA 
observers were more efficient at detecting global changes compared to WC observers. 
This behavioral effect was paired with larger RS responses for global changes as early 
as 80 ms after stimulus onset, on the attention-sensitive P1 component. These results 
confirm and refine the cultural perceptual bias for global processing in Easterners, a 
process that occurs very early and it is rooted into selective attention. 
4.2  Methods 
 
Participants 
Twelve East Asians (7 females) and 12 Western Caucasians (6 females) took part in 
the study. All participants were students from the University of Glasgow with normal 
or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants' ages ranged from 20 to 29 years (mean 
age 25.7). All the EA participants were from Mainland China, and had no previous 
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experience with a Western country. The maximum duration of residence in the UK for 
the EA participants upon testing was less than 6 months. The experiment received the 
approval of the local ethical committee and all participants provided written 
informed consent. 
Stimuli and procedure 
Stimuli were hierarchical Navon figures composed by five different shapes: circle, 
cross, diamond, square, and triangle (Navon, 1977; see Figure 4.1). We employed 
geometric shape to avoid familiarity differences with alphabet letters between two 
groups of observers. The local shapes (0.6° × 0.6° of visual degree at a viewing 
distance of 70 cm) were equally spaced and arranged to create the global shapes (5.8° 
× 5.8°), resulting in a total number of 25 different stimuli. To minimize the effect of 
low-level visual adaptation stemming from identical images, the size of the target 
Navon stimulus was slightly larger than the adaptor (0.72° × 0.72° on local level and 
6° × 6° on global level). Stimuli were presented on a Dell P1130 19” CRT monitor with 
an 800 × 600 pixel gray background, at a refresh rate of 170 Hz.  
At the beginning of the experiment, participants sat in a dimly lit, sound-attenuated 
electrically shielded booth. Each trial started with a fixation cross (0.3°) presented at 
the center of the screen for 300 ms. The adaptor was presented for 800 ms, followed 
by an interval duration randomly ranging between 150 to 300 ms. The second shape 
was then presented for 600 ms. Following the offset of the target stimuli, subjects 
were required to respond by pressing a key on a standard computer keyboard. A 
randomized inter-trial interval between 1200-1500 ms preceded the beginning of the 
following trial.  
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Figure 4.1, Experimental procedure. Different color in the target represents the condition in the 
current study (as shown in the legend) 
We used a forced choice task. During the experiment, participants categorized the 
feature change between each pair of adaptor and target. There were four conditions: 
1) identical; 2) global congruent condition, where only the local features were 
changed; 3) local congruent condition, where only the global features were changed; 
4) different - both local and global features were different. Upon the offset of the 
target, participants assigned the trial to one of the conditions by pressing one of the 
four pre-assigned buttons, corresponding, respectively to the letter “d”, “f”, “j”, and “k”. 
An example sheet (similar to Figure 4.1) was provided prior to beginning the 
experiment to explain the four possible conditions. Participants were instructed to 
respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. To prevent perceptual and 
decisional bias, we counterbalanced all 25 stimuli so that all stimuli would appear in 
the same proportion both as an adaptor and as a target in each condition and the trial 
sequence was also randomized. Moreover, to minimize the potential EEG artifacts 
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generated by eye movement, we monitored and processed participants’ eye 
movements online for trial validation. Trials containing blink or saccade during 
stimulus presentation were excluded. We defined a trial as valid if the gaze-drift 
during the stimulus presentation was less than 1° of visual angle away from the 
fixation cross. Prior to commencing the experiment, participants performed 20 
practice trials to familiarize themselves with the task. The experiment ended when a 
participant completed 600 valid trials (4 conditions × 150 repetitions). Subjects were 
given a short break every 100 trials. The whole experiment was programmed in 
Matlab 2007b, using the Psychophysics Toolbox (PTB-3, Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al, 
2007). 
Eye tracking and EEG recording.  
Eye movements were recorded by means of Desktop-Mount EyeLink 2K eyetracker 
(SR Research Ltd., Mississauga, Ont., Canada) with a temporal resolution of 1000 Hz, a 
spatial resolution of 0.01°of visual angle and an average gaze position error of about 
0.25°. Eye movements were recorded monocularly on the dominant eye. The eye 
movement data were recorded via Matlab (R2006a), using the Psychophysics (PTB-3) 
and EyeLink Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Cornelissen et al, 2002). Calibration 
and validation of eye fixation were conducted before the experiment and repeated 
whenever necessary during the procedure. 
The EEG data was recorded continuously at 1024 Hz from a 128-channel Biosemi 
Active Two EEG system (Biosemi, Amsterdam, Netherlands). Ag/AgCl electrodes were 
placed in a nylon cap following the 10-5 system (Oostenveld and Praamstra 2001). 
Data were band-pass filtered (0.1 and 100 Hz) online. Electrode impedance was kept 
between ±25 kΩ. The recording reference and ground consisted of two active 
electrodes (CMS, Common Mode Sense; DRL, Driven Right Leg. For further 
information see www.biosemi.com). Subjects were asked to minimize blinking, head 
movement, and other body movement.  
Behavioral and EEG analysis 
We carried out 2 (groups of observers) × 4 (feature changes) mixed model ANOVAs 
independently on the reaction time (RT) and accuracy rate (ACC).  The two groups of 
observers (WC and EA) were the between subjects factor and the four conditions 
(identical; global congruent; local congruent; and different) were the within subjects 
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factors. Moreover, to take into account both measurements, inverse efficiency score 
(IES - Bruyer and Brysbaert 2011; Townsend and Ashby 1978, 1983) was calculated 
as:  
               
Only trials with correct behavioral response were analyzed (93.7% for WC and 95.5% 
for EA, detailed in Result session). EEG data was preprocessed and analyzed using 
Matlab and EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme and Makeig 2004). The raw signal was 
referenced off-line to an average reference, and low-passed filtered at 40 Hz. Noisy 
electrodes were excluded, and interpolated using a spline interpolation algorithm 
implemented in EEGLAB on a subject-by-subject basis. EEG data were epoched from -
100 ms to 500 ms relative to stimulus onset, separately for adaptor and target, 
independently per condition. Baseline was defined as 100 ms prior to, until stimulus 
onset. Baseline correction was applied by removing the average baseline amplitude 
from every time point independently for each epoch. To fully exploit the paired 
nature of the adaptation design, trials were only accepted if both signals elicited by 
adaptor and target stimuli were below the rejection threshold. Single-trial repetition 
suppression (stRS) was then calculated for the accepted trials only, by subtracting the 
target shape epoch from the adaptor epoch. For more details about the procedure, see 
Vizioli et al. (2010). 
We carried out the same 2 (group of observers) × 4 (feature change) mixed model 
ANOVAs independently at all electrodes and all time-points on the stRS amplitude. To 
correct for multiple comparisons, we used robust statistics, including bootstrap 
(Wilcox 2005) and a multivariate clustering technique (Maris and Oostenveld 2007; 
Vizioli et al. 2010). Within each group, we first centered each stRS trial on the mean 
amplitude so that each condition had a mean of zero. We then used bootstrap, 
sampling with replacement the subjects, to derive an estimate of the sampling 
distribution under the null hypothesis of no difference across the conditions’ means. 
We carried out the mixed model ANOVAs (as described above) independently at all 
electrodes and time-points on the centered bootstrapped stRS. The significant F 
values (P < 0.05) were then grouped in spatiotemporal clusters (Maris and 
Oostenveld 2007; Vizioli et al. 2010). We computed the sum of F values in every 
cluster and selected the maximum cluster sum. After repeating the same procedure 
500 times, we sorted all the cluster sums according to their values and selected the 
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95th percentile as the cluster threshold. The original ANOVA clusters F-value sums 
were then compared with the bootstrap cluster threshold. If an observed cluster sum 
was equal to or larger than the threshold sum obtained under H0, all of the time-
points and the electrodes contained in that cluster were considered significant 
(Vizioli et al. 2010). 
4.3  Results 
 
Behavioural results 
The behavioral results are summarized in Figure 4.2. The 2 x 4 ANOVAs carried out 
on RT, ACC and IES showed significant main effects of feature change for RT [F (3,66) 
= 52.07, p < .05], ACC [F (3,66) = 30.17, p < .05], and IES [F (3,66) = 49.49, p < .05]. 
Post hoc paired-sample t-tests indicated that both groups of observers responded 
faster and more accurately to the identical condition compared to the others. No main 
effect of groups of observers was observed for all three measurements [RT: F (1,22) = 
0.96; ACC: F (1,22) = 1.66; IES: F (1,22) = 1.52. All p > .05].  
Importantly, we observed a significant interaction of group of observers (2) x feature 
change (4) for the IES [F (3, 66) = 3.59, p < .05].  To clarify this result, we performed 
post hoc paired-sample t-tests on the IES values between the local and global 
congruent conditions independently for each group of observers. This analysis 
revealed that WC observers identified local congruent items (M = 673 ms, SD = 293) 
significantly slower than the global congruent ones [M = 551 ms, SD = 229, t (11) = 
2.79, p < .05]. No differences were reported between global and local congruent 
conditions for EA observers [t (11) = 1.41, p > .05].   
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Figure 4.2, Results of reaction time (a), accuracy rate (b), and inverse efficiency score (c). Only 
global congruent and local congruent conditions are shown for the inverse efficiency score (c). 
Error bars show standard errors from the means 
Single-trial RS results  
The minimum number of accepted trials across all subjects and conditions was 100. 
Figure 4.3 shows the adaptor ERP, target ERP, and stRS for the electrode where the F 
values for the groups of observers x feature change interaction was maximal (i.e. P4). 
 
Figure 4.3, ERP and stRS for P4. a) and b) depicts the mean ERPs elicited by the adaptor (solid 
line) and the target faces (dashed line) for the four conditions (identical, red line; global 
congruent, green line; local congruent, blue line; different, yellow line) for WC (a) and EA (b) 
observers. stRS responses are shown in (c) for WC and (b) EA  
After multiple comparisons correction, the Mix-model ANOVA revealed a significant 
interaction (groups of observers × feature change) at two spatial-temporal clusters 
(Figure 4.4a). The first cluster was located at right occipito–parietal electrodes 
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(Figure 4.4b). Its time-window was within the latency of the P1 component, which 
ranged from 60 to 110 ms. The F-value of the first cluster reached its maximum at 88 
ms at electrode P4 [minimum F (3, 66) = 2.24; maximum F (3, 66) = 8.32, p < .05]. 
This was the same electrode where P1 component reached its maximum amplitude. 
Post hoc paired-sample t-tests showed that global congruent trials elicited 
significantly larger stRS responses compared to local congruent condition in EA 
observers [t (11) = 3.26, p < .05]. No significant difference between global and local 
congruent conditions were observed for WC observers [t (11) = 0.39, p > .05. See 
Figure 4.4e]. 
The second significant spatial-temporal cluster occurred within the time-window 
ranging from 200 to 350 ms (i.e. the posterior N2 component) and was spatially 
located around the anterior parietal electrodes (Figure 4.4b). F-value topography 
maps revealed 3 local maxima with different spatial distributions (See Figure 4.4c & 
d). The first occurred at 236 ms at electrode CP6 with a right-lateralized topography 
[F (3, 66) = 8.42, p < .05, Figure 4.4c]. Post hoc paired-sample t-tests indicated larger 
stRS responses to local congruent compared to global congruent  conditions for EAs [t 
(11) = 2.4, p < .05] but not WCs [t (11) = .18, p > .05, Figure 4.4f]. The second 
maximum occurred at 273 ms over center-parietal electrodes [C2, F (3, 66) = 10.01, p 
< .05, Figure 4.4d]. Post hoc paired-sample t-tests indicated that WCs displayed larger 
stRS responses to global congruent compared to local congruent conditions [t (11) = 
2.24, p < .05]. No significant differences were observed for EAs [t (11) = .21, p > .05, 
Figure 4.4g]. The third maximum was observed at 312 ms at electrode C5 [F (3, 66) = 
9.29, p < .05]. Post hoc paired-sample t-tests showed significantly larger stRS 
responses to local congruent compared to global congruent conditions for WCs [t (11) 
= 4.30, p < .05]. No significant differences were observed for EAs participants [t (11) = 
2.145, p > .05]. 
117 
 
 
Figure 4.4, Significant interaction of spatial-temporal ANOVAs. (a) Significant F values of the 
groups of observers × feature change interaction on the stRS amplitude. The x-axis depicts the 
time points of the stRS epoch, while the y-axis indicates the 128 electrodes. The electrode order 
is unrelated to their spatial topographical positions. (b), (c), & (d) portrays the F-value 
topography maps at the local peaks of the P1 and N2 spatial-temporal clusters. For illustration 
purpose, here the first two local peaks of the N2 cluster are shown. (b) represents the F-value 
topography of the P1 spatial-temporal cluster at 88 ms (latency of the peak F-value),which was 
maximal at electrode P4. (c) & (d) show F-value topographies of the N2 spatial-temporal cluster 
at two local F-value peaks (236 ms and 273 ms). The peak electrodes were CP6 and C2, 
118 
 
respectively. (e), (f), & (g) illustrates the mean stRS responses of global congruent and local 
congruent conditions for WC and EA observers at each F-value peak latency at the respective 
electrodes. For display purposes, stRS on the negative component was multiplied by -1. Thus, 
more positive values indicate larger repetition suppression. Error bars show standard errors 
from the means. 
4.4  Discussion 
 
The present study aimed to address whether and when cultural perceptual tunings to 
global/local information are driven by attention. We directly tested this hypothesis 
on Western Caucasian (WC) and East Asian (EA) observers while recording their 
scalp electrophysiological signals during the visual categorization of hierarchical 
shapes differing in their global/local properties. We used an adaptation paradigm, as 
well as a single-trial method coupled with robust data-driven analyses on all the 
electrodes and time points. The behavioral results showed that EA observers display 
a global advantage by processing more effectively visual changes on this visual 
property compared to WC observers. More importantly, our electrophysiological data 
showed that global/local feature repetition modulates the P1 and N2 ERP 
components as a function of culture. Specifically East Asian observers showed greater 
sensitivity to global congruency on this component compared to WC observers. These 
observations confirm the existence and refine the knowledge on the cultural 
attentional biases in visual information sampling, which are consistent with previous 
observations (Kitayama et al. 2003; McKone et al. 2010). Importantly, this early 
neurophysiological signature of cultural diversity in Easterners cannot be accounted 
by the inherent nature of the stimuli and/or task, as it was not present in Western 
Caucasian observers. Westerners showed sensitivity to hierarchical Navon shapes 
discrimination at later stages. 
Attention modulation on the P1 component 
We reported an interaction between the culture of the observers and the neural 
sensitivity to global/local information coding at early stages of visual information 
processing. Firstly, only EA participants showed larger stRS responses to global 
compared to local feature repetition, as early as 80 ms after stimulus onset; the time 
window of the P1 ERP component. The P1 is a positive deflection peaking between 70 
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and 120 ms at central occipital electrodes, which has been consistently related to 
attention (Luck, Woodman, & Vogel, 2000). The P1 amplitude modulations observed 
in EA observers suggest that the global precedence in this population is modulated by 
attention. Importantly, there is a growing body of evidence positing that larger RS 
responses reflect greater neural coding efficiency (Caharel et al. 2009; Grill-Spector et 
al. 2006; Vizioli et al. 2010). Although the precise neural mechanisms of RS are still 
debated, numerous models have been proposed to account for the reduction in neural 
activity following stimulus repetition (Grill-Spector et al. 2006; Schacter et al. 2007). 
The most prominent account – the sharpening model – holds that the neuronal 
representations of a stimulus become less redundant and sparser with repetition 
(Grill-Spector et al. 2006). Under the same model, RS can also be considered as a 
neural novelty detection mechanism (Vizioli et al. 2010). Therefore, the larger 
amount of RS to global features for EA observers can result from a more efficient 
neural coding of global information at this stage, which is reflected in the sharpening 
of global feature representations as a function of attention. Moreover, the absence of 
significant differences in the amount of stRS between global and local feature 
repetition in Westerners suggests that, at least at early neural stages of processing, 
there is no preferential tuning to either global or local information coding in this 
population.  
In line with our findings, the sensitivity to global/local selective attention on the 
posterior P1 component has previously been reported in a number of studies (Han et 
al. 1997, 1999; Han et al. 2000; Lin et al. 2008). For example, the priming of 
interdependent self-construal, which is closely related to global perceptual bias 
(Kühnen and Oyserman 2002; Lin and Han 2009), enlarged the P1 amplitude to 
global compared to local features in Chinese participants (Lin et al. 2008). Similarly, 
Han et al. (1997, 1999 & 2000) showed that selective attention to global or local 
feature modified the P1 amplitude in EA observers. The data reported here are in line 
with previous studies, reinforcing the view of an early sensitivity to global 
information coding on the P1 component in Easterners only. In contrast, WC 
observers did not show sensitivity to their preferred (i.e., local) features in this early 
component. It is worth to point out that in the current task observers were forced to 
attend equally information at both the global and the local levels, since they could not 
predict the nature of the potential change in target shape. Therefore, in this task 
global processing might be more dominant than local processing. Thus, the absence of 
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sensitivity in Westerers on the P1 component could be accounted by the ineherent, 
general, slower processing of local compared to global features in visual information 
processing. 
Moreover, EA observers showed a behavioral advantage on the global task compared 
to WC observers. This advantage is likely to arise from their early attentional bias 
towards global information. In fact, we found that WC observers were less efficient at 
detecting global than local feature changes, while EA observers performed equally 
well on both conditions. The behavioral disadvantage of WC observers in the global 
task seems to stem instead from differences in visual saliency between global and 
local features. Specifically, the visual processing of global features precedes the 
analysis of local information (Navon 1977). This global precedence effect would 
conflict with local information, thus inhibiting responses to the detection of local 
features (Han et al. 2001; Miller and Navon 2002; Navon 1977). For example, 
participants are slower at identifying local targets in the presence of interference 
from a global shape, even when this information is irrelevant (Miller and Navon 
2002). The change of global features is disruptive for WC observers when they are 
required to detect changes in local information (i.e. distinguish between local 
congruent and different condition). As comparison, EA observers benefit from a top-
down attention control to global features, thus limiting the disturbance from the 
visual salience induced by global feature changes (e.g., the interface hypothesis, 
McMains and Kastner 2011).   
Cognitive control effect on the N2 component 
We also observed an interaction between the culture of observers and global/local 
information tuning over the central-anterior-parietal electrode site at around 200 - 
350 ms. A fine-grained adaptation pattern revealed distinctive temporal dynamics of 
global/local processing between Westerners and Easterners. Specifically, EA 
observers showed larger stRS responses to local compared to global feature 
repetitions over the right anterior-parietal electrodes at 240 ms. WC observers 
instead displayed first larger stRS responses to global compared to local feature at 
270 ms, to then show a reverse pattern at 320 ms. This modulation occurs in the time 
window of the N2 component, which has a distinct topography (see. Fig. 4c & d) and 
has been related to cognitive control (see Folstein and Van Petten 2008 as a review). 
Cognitive control is partly defined as being a strategy regulation process during 
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response to novelty or (mis)match detection (Nieuwenhuis et al. 2003; Yeung et al. 
2004; Zhang et al. 2003). For example, slower behavioral responses resulting from 
larger demands in cognitive control are correlated with larger N2 amplitudes and 
delayed peak latencies (Gehring et al. 1992; Nieuwenhuis et al. 2003). Moreover, 
inhibition of behavioral response also elicits larger N2 amplitudes, especially when 
stimuli share similar visual features (Folstein and Van Petten 2008). Here, regardless 
of their cultural background, all the observers engaged a larger amount of neural 
resources during the processing of the cultural non-preferred features to overcome 
the interference from the cultural preferred features. Therefore, the fewer amount of 
stRS responses elicited by local feature repetition in WC observers and the fewer 
amount of stRS responses for global feature repetition in EA observers on the N2 
component might reflect a more demanding engagement of cognitive resources 
devoted to performing (mis)match detection for the non-preferred feature repetition. 
More specifically, these resources might be related to the inhibition of the culturally-
preferred bias in visual information sampling (i.e., consistent local feature for WCs 
and consistent global feature for EAs). 
General discussion 
The conjoint use of EEG and Navon stimuli has been widely used to investigate the 
temporal dynamics of attention modulations in global/local shape processing (Han et 
al. 1997, 1999; Han et al. 2000; Heinze et al. 1998; Heinze and Münte 1993; 
Malinowski et al. 2002). Surprisingly, while this approach has been extensively used 
in a wide range of studies on WC observers and EA observers separately, no previous 
study had yet directly compared these two groups of observers. Here, we overcame 
this limitation by testing both groups of observers. As discussed above, our results 
precisely mapped out and confirmed that the temporal dynamics of global/local 
processing is indeed different between Easterners and Westerners. More precisely, 
EA observers show a distinct early sensitivity between global and local feature coding 
compared to WC observers. Such difference in temporal dynamics of visual shape 
processing is driven by an initial attentional selectivity and tuning between these two 
groups of observers from different cultures: a global selective-attention in Easterners 
and a local-selective attention in Westerners (McKone et al. 2010).  
Previous studies on global/local visual shape categorization have suggested that the 
processing of hierarchical visual stimuli is lateralized in the brain. A left hemisphere 
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advantage has been reported for local processing at the encoding stage, and a right 
hemisphere advantage for global processing (e.g., Folstein and Van Petten 2008; Han 
et al. 2002; Lamb et al. 1990). Unfortunately, it is difficult to interpret our results in 
terms of hemispheric asymmetries. Although we found an interaction, for which the 
effect is lateralized in both spatial-temporal clusters (i.e., on the right scalp electrode 
locations in P1 and on both side of scalp electrode locations in N2), we did not 
modulate the visual field presentation nor counterbalanced the response keys across 
participants. The interpretation of our findings without these controls could be 
potentially misleading, and further research is required to elucidate this issue.  
Conclusion 
The present study demonstrated that the temporal dynamics of global-local feature 
coding is shaped by culture. Our data show an early attentional bias in Easterners for 
global visual properties during an active matching task of Navon hierarchical stimuli. 
East Asian observers showed strong EEG repetition suppression responses to global 
compared to local features on the attention-sensitive P1 component. This global 
precedence effect in Easterners was paired with a more efficient processing of global 
feature changes at later stages. Western Caucasian observers displayed instead the 
expected differential electrophysiological responses between global and local 
information processing, but in later electrophysiological stages (i.e. N2 component). 
These findings support the view that cultural perceptual biases in visual perception 
are driven by selective attention. Importantly, they also provide cultural neural 
signatures and their temporal dynamics for global/local feature processing. Overall, 
these distinct neural markers could represent the entry level of the more apparent 
and striking differences observed at the behavioral level across observers from the 
Western and Eastern cultures. 
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5 General Discussion 
 
The main purpose of this thesis was to explore the temporal dynamic of culture 
modulation effect on visual cognition. In particular, the current thesis focused on two 
important questions: when and how culture shapes our visual experiences. To 
directly investigate the temporal modulation effect of culture, here I exploited the 
advantages conferred by EEG (specifically ERPs) and further developed a novel 
fixational eye movement paradigm. The high temporal resolution provided by these 
two methods, combined with data-driven analytical approach, is ideal to reveal the 
time course of culture influence. The first two studies employed human faces as 
stimuli, to investigate the information processing on different facial locations as a 
function of cultural specific eye movement strategy. The third study made use of 
hierarchical stimulus to access the attention modulation of global/local processing in 
WCs and EAs. As shown in all three experiments, early differences in visual 
processing between WCs and EAs are mostly driven by low-spatial frequency 
information or global strategy, whereas detail processing of high-spatial frequency 
information largely reflects later stages. In this section, I will firstly elaborate the 
cultural differences in face recognition (i.e. study 1 and 2) and move on to the general 
global-local bias. I will then discuss the implications of the current results in various 
domains. Finally, I will review evidences from all three studies to interpret how 
culture modulates human perception based on different competitive theories. 
Overall, the results reported here show perceptual and cognitive divergences 
between WCs and EAs. The first two experiments demonstrated that the visual 
information perceive on face preferred viewing location is tuned by culture. Similar to 
previous findings, free-viewing eye movement results showed differences in fixation 
pattern between WC and EA observers in both studies. Westerners preferentially 
gaze at the eyes and mouth, whereas Easterners fixate more on the center of the face 
(Blais et al. 2008; Caldara et al. 2010; Kelly et al. 2010; Kita et al. 2010; Miellet et al. 
2013; Rodger et al. 2010). Importantly, while maintaining observers’ gaze at the 
upper part of the face (i.e., eyes area) optimizes their face identification performance 
in both groups, gaze stabilization on their preferred viewing location is behaviourally 
beneficial for WCs only. The first experiment demonstrated that culture shapes the 
high-spatial frequency information sampling on preferred facial fixation position. 
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Higher microsaccade onset rate was shown on the preferred fixation location around 
450 ms, which allows better visibility of fine-spatial details. Importantly, WCs exploit 
the re-sharpen of high-spatial frequency information to improve their behavioural 
performance, whereas EA observers do not utilize such visual gain. Accordingly, the 
second experiment investigated the conjoint effect of culture and face viewing 
position on electroencephalography signal. By regressing between fixation preference 
of a selective face location with the ERP elicited by force fixation at that location, 
Study 2 revealed that gazing at the preferred viewing position evoke universal and 
culturally specific electrophysiological response. Specifically, an early regression 
pattern was shown on the central-occipital electrode sites for EAs only: larger ERP 
amplitude is observed at the more preferred viewing location around 130 ms. Such an 
effect corresponda to the larger attention span of EAs during fixation (Miellet et al. 
2013). Furthermore, ERP activity around 350 ms at bilateral occipito-temporal 
electrode sites increased on preferred viewing position in both groups of observers, 
suggesting a general cognitive function of PVLs. Taken together, the first two 
experiments indicate that culture modulates the perceptual and cognitive function of 
facial preferred viewing location. Human beings actively attend to and sample diverse 
facial information from their preferred eye movement strategy. The last study 
examined whether the early perception tuning of global-local bias also expands to 
culture-unrelated stimulus. Indeed, correspond with their global processing 
advantage, larger repetition suppression is observed following global than local 
feature repetition in the EA observers at the P1 component. Notably, repetition 
suppression reflects coding efficiency of the selective representation (Grill-Spector et 
al. 2006). A larger adaptation effect to global feature confirmed the attention 
selectivity to global information for EAs (Nisbett et al. 2001). In summary, these 
results strongly suggest that culture perceptual bias is driven by the selective 
attention during information sampling, which further influence the cognition process 
at the later stage. Westerners attend to the information in the fine spatial details and 
perceive it with a local strategy, whereas Easterners prefer to employ a global 
strategy to sample low-spatial frequency visual information. Such perceptual tuning 
differences result in modulation at both early and late time-course as demonstrated 
in the current thesis. Moreover, both information sampling strategies are potentially 
advantageous, depending on the available information and the nature of the task.  
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5.1  Implications 
 
Implications for cross-culture research.  
To the best of my knowledge, the results provided in the current thesis are the first 
empirical evidence of the temporal divergence in visual processing between WCs and 
EAs. By tracking the time course of perceptual difference between two groups of 
observers, these results taken together reveal that culture diversity in the cognitive 
process appears at early processing stage (~80 ms). Specifically, EA observers 
showed stronger electrophysiological response to their preferred information in the 
perceptual stage (i.e., larger ERP at around 130 ms to face information sampling from 
PVL in Study 1 and greater adaptation effect at around 80 ms to global feature in 
Study 3), whereas WCs did not share similar sensitivities. On the other hand, 
modulation between experiment conditions related to high-spatial frequency 
information is revealed in WC observers only at a later stage. For example, better 
visibility of fine-spatial details produced by microsaccade on their PVLs benefit WCs 
but not EAs.  
The observation of such temporal signature of culture is in line with the different 
perceptual profile of local and global information. As a result of the physiological 
property of the human visual system, global features are closely related to fast, 
categorical process. On the other hand, fine-grained cognitive processing mostly 
relied on details in local elements (Han et al. 2001; Miller and Navon 2002; Navon 
1977). With a global perceptual tuning, EAs show categorical differences between 
global and local information earlier than WCs. Meanwhile, information from both 
global and local features is essentially crucial to accomplish complex cognition tasks. 
Thus, universal patterns in the late time-course revealed in the current experiments 
might represent that the detail processing of visual information, especially that 
contains in high-spatial frequency. 
These observations confirm the attention bias between WCs and EAs purposed by 
Nisbett et al. (2001). According to the analytic-holistic cognitive style framework, 
Western Caucasians perceive the world locally, whereas East Asians see the world in 
a more global way. People with an analytical cognitive style, as suggested by Nisbett, 
attend more to the focal objects and their visual properties. Instead, the holistic 
cognitive style biases East Asians toward the information in the context and the 
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relationships among objects. Here by using both social and non-social stimuli, I 
showed that such cognitive bias might closely relate to the perceptual tuning to 
different spatial-frequency spectrum. Indeed, by preferably attend to the low-spatial 
frequency information, EA observers showed early sensitivity to global elements, 
whereas the cognitive advantage of high-spatial frequency information is revealed for 
WCs in later stage, driven by their bias to local features. 
In summary, the current work provides an important contribution in understanding 
how culture influences the temporal dynamics of information processing. As 
proposed by Nisbett et al (2001), culture shapes observer’s preference to local or 
global information. Here, my results showed that the interaction between the culture 
of the observer and the type of information operates on different time course during 
visual processing. Depending on the nature of the task, visual information essential to 
the task is different. Whether culture diversity appears or not, and when such 
diversity is expected to emerge, is designated by observers’ initial bias to the 
particular range of spatial frequency information and the type of task. 
Implications for face perception mechanism.  
The human visual system is markedly tuned to face stimulus (Solla et al. 2000). Brief 
presentation or fixation of the face is sufficient for various tasks including 
categorization and identification (Hsiao and Cottrell 2008; Peterson and Eckstein 
2012). For example, by momentarily fixated just below the eyes, observers could 
obtain enough diagnostic information to optimize face recognition (Peterson and 
Eckstein 2012, 2013). However, human observers usually follow various eye 
movement patterns with alternating saccadic transitions among eyes, mouth and 
nose. Notably, the eye movement pattern during face free viewing is shaped by 
culture (Blais et al. 2008; Caldara et al. 2010; Kelly et al. 2010; Kita et al. 2010; Miellet 
et al. 2013; Rodger et al. 2010). WCs follow a “triangle” pattern containing eyes and 
mouth, whereas EAs preferably fixate on the center of the face (Caldara et al. 2010). 
Different explanations have been proposed regarding the perceptual function of 
preferred eye movement pattern (Caldara et al. 2010; Miellet et al. 2013; Peterson 
and Eckstein 2012). Previous studies from our lab by the means of gaze-contingent 
paradigm and information reconstruction technique showed that different spatial 
frequencies of visual information are sampled during fixation strategies depending on 
the observer’s initial perceptual tuning (Caldara et al. 2010; Miellet et al. 2011; 
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Miellet et al. 2013). Alternative hypothesis suggested that the vast majority of 
fixations during free viewing do not contribute to perceptual decision (Peterson and 
Eckstein 2012). It proposes that after gathering and processing sufficient information 
during the first few fixations, observers revert to a default mode of eye movement 
patterns that reflect their standard social behaviour (Peterson and Eckstein 2012). 
Here, I provided the first empirical evidences of the functional role of preferred 
viewing location in face recognition. Microsaccade result confirmed that WC 
observers rely on high-spatial frequency information from their preferred viewing 
location. Moreover, direct relationship between fixation preference and P3 amplitude 
in both groups of observers suggests a physiological function of the preferred viewing 
location. Such “re-activation” of the occipital–temporal face network indicates that 
the observer’s mental face representation might closely relate to his eye movement 
pattern. The preferred viewing location during face free viewing is not only a 
reflection of social behaviour, but also has important perceptual and cognitive value.  
Implications for methodology 
The present thesis introduces novel approaches in both experiment paradigms and 
data analysis. I innovated an original technique to apply microsaccades as a 
measurement for the perception of high-spatial frequency visual information. Recent 
evidences have shown that the perceptual outcome of microsaccade is similar 
regardless of the potential different origins. Notably, it enhanced visibility during 
fixation (Martinez-Conde et al. 2006), counteracted visual fading both foveally and 
peripherally (McCamy et al. 2012), and re-sharpen fine-spatial details for feature 
extraction (Donner and Hemilä 2007; Kuang et al. 2012). Here by investigating the 
temporal dynamic of microsaccade onset, I showed that WC observers make use of 
high-spatial frequency information from their preferred viewing position. Moreover, I 
also introduced a novel method to analyse the temporal dynamic of microsaccade. 
Transient oculomotor events such as microsaccade are difficult to examine in the 
same way as continuous signals (Otero-Millan et al. 2012). Previous analysis usually 
conducted in a predefined time-window on the smoothed time course (e.g., Engbert 
and Kliegl 2003). Instead, I employed a data-driven method to objectively sample 
microsaccades as they occurred in different time range. Combined with temporal 
clustering as multiple comparison correction, we could therefore explore the 
essential time window of functional microsaccades. 
128 
 
Here I also presented a novel method to combine free-viewing eye movement and 
electrophysiological measures. Regression analysis is introduced to combine 
temporally sensitive and spatially sensitive methods.  I measured observers’ fixation 
patterns in a separate free viewing face learning session and directly link with the 
electrophysiological signals. The individual preferences to different face features are 
evaluated according to the fixation map as an indicator to predict the signal change in 
EEG recording. Data-driven analysis, without prior assumption of components or 
time-windows, exploits the full advantage of these high temporal resolution 
measurements.  
  
129 
 
5.2  Future Directions 
 
In the substantial history of cross-cultural research, different theories have been 
proposed to account for the mechanism of culture modification on perception. 
Hypothesis suggested various intermediate factors that might contribute to the 
cultural differences in information processing. Such factors include historical 
influence in philosophy (Nisbett et al. 2001), social organization represents as 
individualistic or collectivist (Markus and Kitayama 1991), immediate psychological 
factors such as self-construal (Han et al. 2013) or sense of personal control (Zhou et 
al. 2012), and clutter of the visual environment (Caparos et al. 2012; Miyamoto et al. 
2006). While these hypothesized factors are all partially supported by existing 
evidences, the exact contribution and the possible interaction among them remains 
un-clarified. Although the current thesis did not directly test any of these competitive 
theories, the results observed here might be best explained by the visual clutter 
hypothesis. Especially, the perceptual tuning to low-spatial frequency information 
might be more beneficial in a more cluttered visual environment (Itti and Koch 2001; 
Oliva and Torralba 2006). Indeed, the relationship between visual environment and 
perceptual tuning has previously been reported. For example, Miyamoto et al (2006) 
has shown that the scenes from an East Asian country (i.e., Japan) consist of more 
objects and are more complex than the environments from a Western culture (i.e., 
America). Moreover, it has been shown that exposure to complex environmental 
settings influences one’s attention to a global bias (Caparos et al. 2012; Miyamoto et 
al. 2006). Future studies should clarify the potential causal relation between 
cluttering of the environment and the cultural perception bias. For example, it is 
possible to quantify the physical properties of the daily visual stimulus for each 
individual as predictors to correlate with his perceptual bias to visual spatial-
frequency span. 
Previous results suggested culture differences are relative matters of emphasis rather 
than absolute differences of capability (Caldara et al. 2010; Miellet et al. 2010; Zhou et 
al. 2012). Moreover, observers flexibly engage into both types of information 
sampling strategy, according to their cultural background, individual emphasis, and 
available information. By identifying the initial information preference within each 
participant, future studies might be able to fully account for the influence of culture in 
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fundamental vision experiment. Such an idea of reducing culture modification effect 
to individual differences is worth further investigation (McCrae 2000).  
Another important aspect yet somehow missing in cultural studies is how different 
culture preferences or biases are developed, especially the “mental development 
milestones”. While results already shown different development pattern in the 
acquisition of cultural values and social roles, how culture shapes the sensorimotor 
biases in attention or perception is remain to be clarified. Noticeably, the early visual 
experience with specific types of stimuli might sculpt the visual recognition and the 
underlying system (for an example in face perception, see Pascalis et al 2002; 2005). 
Thus, it would be stimulating to parametrically compare different age groups of 
observer between different cultural populations. For example, whether local versus 
global bias is displayed from birth? If not, when and how such perceptual bias is 
developed in infants? Similarly, do people with East Asia heritage who grown up in 
the West culture still exhibited an EA-like cognition bias, or vice versa? Our lab is 
currently testing a specific cultural group in Switzerland. They are Koreans adopted 
by Swiss family from birth. By comparing this population with the “typical” WC and 
EA observers in various perception and cognition tasks, we hope to be able to answer 
some of these questions in the near future. 
Overall, my findings in the present thesis provide a new dimension in exploring 
cultural differences and may potentially stimulate new cross-cultural research in 
other domains. 
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5.3  Final Remarks 
 
Human visual experience is culture-specific. The aim of this thesis was to explore the 
temporal dynamic of cultural modulation on human vision perception. I applied high 
temporal resolution measurements and various visual stimuli to evaluate perceptual 
differences between two groups of observers: Western Caucasian and East Asians. As 
demonstrated in three experiments, cultural diversity appears in the early attention-
perceptual stage as well as the late, in-depth cognitive stage. Cultural differences in 
visual tasks are produced by the joint effect of initial information tuning shaped by 
culture, and the specific visual information essential for the task.  
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